When US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Osaka at the G-20 Summit in June 2019, world media vied with each other to talk about a “truce” in the confrontation between Washington and Beijing. And although it was mainly about trade at that time (the United States, in particular, delayed the introduction of new import tariffs on Chinese goods), everyone expected that detente would begin in other areas - the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, the technological war ...
In my opinion, it is worth speaking about the latter separately. Of course, fierce competition in the high-tech sphere is not limited solely to telecommunications (it is enough to recall materials with new properties, microprocessors and space), but the example with fifth-generation cellular networks is especially noteworthy. Hipsters from Moscow, London, New York, Shanghai and Abu Dhabi could already use 5G mobile Internet by the end of this year, but here's the trouble! Due to the US-China confrontation, there is still no single data transfer standard (which is, for example, for 4G).
Meanwhile, hundreds of kilometers of cables have already been laid in Europe, America, Asia, and even Russia, tens of thousands of routers and hundreds of tons of additional body kit for cell towers have been installed. Everything is ready to launch 5G. Of course, Washington and Beijing are not quarreling over gadget owners. It is about the management and monitoring of production, infrastructure and transport. Of course, new communication capabilities will be used in the military sphere. Two technological superpowers simply cannot allow their competitor to gain control of at least half of the entire communications of a new generation.
It is curious that, following the meeting between Trump and Si in Osaka, not a word was said about the progress in the negotiations on telecommunication standards. It is possible that it will not be possible to agree on this issue at all, so the United States and China are preparing to build two separate communication systems. If so, then it would be naive to hope to achieve agreements in the near future in the field of intellectual property, technology and investment.
The new consultations between China and the United States on mutual trade issues were brief and inconclusive. According to their results, Donald Trump announced the introduction of a 10% duty on Chinese goods totaling $ 300 billion per year. In response, Beijing suspended imports of agricultural products from the United States and lowered the yuan below the psychological mark of "7" (seven yuan per dollar), for which the US Treasury announced the Celestial currency manipulator. This black mark alone does not mean anything, but Beijing’s new “status” allows Washington to exert pressure on the IMF, as well as its European and Asian partners, who are actively trading with China.
The rapid escalation of the US-Chinese confrontation was continued in the military-strategic sphere. If earlier Beijing claimed only the nuclear missile potential of its satellite - North Korea, now the dispute over missiles has spread to the relationship between the United States and China. The head of the Pentagon, Mark Esper, spoke out for the early deployment of ground-based medium-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region - in Japan, South Korea, and also on Guam. Beijing said it would retaliate.
The media background around the situation in the Asia-Pacific region today increasingly resembles an absentee exchange in the press between the Soviet Union and the United States in the early 1980s, when a real missile race began in Europe.
The only difference is that while American missiles are not preparing for shipping overseas. Nevertheless, the situation is alarming. Media increasingly publish maps with the possible range of action of existing and prospective (alleged) strike systems of the United States and China in Asia, the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
This is not to say that this was a big surprise. Although the United States justified its withdrawal from the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) with alleged violations of the 1987 agreement on the part of Russia, Washington never concealed that they were primarily concerned about the Celestial nuclear arsenal. Donald Trump has repeatedly said about his desire to conclude a Moscow-Beijing-Washington trilateral agreement on the foundations of strategic stability.
It is worth noting that there is logic in this proposal. For decades, China has developed its nuclear missile weapons without being bound by any international agreements other than the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But this agreement today is of very dubious value, especially considering the DPRK’s “Doomsday machines”. How many and what kind of strategic missiles China has at its disposal is a secret behind seven locks.
On this account, there are only expert estimates that are significantly different from each other. As a rule, one speaks of one and a half to two thousand missiles (ground-based mine and submarines) and two or three hundred nuclear warheads. But how can this be verified if Beijing is not bound by any obligation to control its nuclear program? It is very characteristic that various US intelligence agencies give different estimates of the share of medium- and shorter-range missiles in the Middle Kingdom’s arsenal - from 60% to 90%.
It is only known for certain that China has long become the third nuclear power in the world, having significantly outstripped Britain and France in the number of carriers and military units. In the Asia-Pacific region, China simply does not have strategic opponents. We are not talking about any parity in the region. Yes, the United States can transfer special ammunition for its aircraft to military bases in Japan and South Korea, as well as deploy its own Navy, but all these forces and assets fall within the scope of the Chinese system of “barring access and blocking the zone” (in American terminology - A2 / AD). This system involves the Air Force, Air Defense, anti-ship systems (which are also very little known) and the aforementioned medium and short-range missiles - both with conventional and nuclear warheads.
The deployment of American ground-based INF missiles, even on Guam (not to mention Korea and Japan), relatively remote from China, is changing everything. Mobile and mine missiles on land are much easier to hide and cover with air defense systems than missile destroyers.
Many of the key facilities of the Chinese A2 / AD system can be destroyed by the first salvo. Of course, a retaliatory strike will be scary, but it will lead to a global nuclear conflict. That is, strategic parity will be established in the region due to ground-based short- and medium-range missiles. Which, of course, does not like Beijing and makes it tough to respond to the plans of the Pentagon.
But is Washington really planning on a nuclear confrontation with China? Let me remind you that the White House avoids direct conflict with much less serious opponents - the DPRK and Iran. So it is unlikely that he seeks to unleash a war with China or get involved in a long arms race in the Asia-Pacific region.
The threatening actions of the American administration are more like an invitation to dialogue. Yes, this invitation looks, to put it mildly, very unusual, but, firstly, this is the usual style of Donald Trump, and secondly, how else do you order Beijing to start negotiations on strategic stability (exchange of views in the UN Security Council does not count) and take part of the responsibility for what is happening in the world? More precisely - to change the role model of international behavior?
Indeed, until now, China has managed to build up its economic, technological and military power, sometimes challenging the two leading superpowers, but without binding itself to serious international obligations. Beijing is a legitimate member of the nuclear club, but does not participate in any strategic offensive arms limitation treaty. China entered the IMF, but on its own terms. Until recently, it had almost free access to the markets of the richest countries in the world, and China’s own market defended very effectively, and for the time being, no one paid attention to it. Even for the defiant behavior of its client, North Korea, China is not going to take full responsibility.
In the 1970s, it became clear to the leadership of the PRC that the United States was not able to wage a cold war on two fronts, and announced a strategy for "peaceful growth", promising to eventually join the "family of civilized peoples." At the same time, Washington had no choice but to take Beijing's word. Whether he kept his word is a moot point. It is impossible to grab it by the hand due to the absence of not only legally binding, but even just concrete verbal agreements about what China should and should not do, in addition to breaking the military-political alliance with the USSR.
In fact, the United States itself created a non-negotiable (primarily in relation to the United States itself) China. Not to mention the fact that Washington’s withdrawal from most of the agreements it concluded (both old, during the Cold War, and very new, like the Iranian nuclear deal) creates a very unfavorable background for exhorting Beijing to assume international obligations commensurate with its power and influence.
However, if the Celestial Empire continues to evade responsible participation in the construction of a new architecture of strategic stability (and without such a PRC it is impossible to build such an architecture), it risks eventually becoming in the eyes of the world community a new dangerous elephant in a china shop instead of the old elephant - the United States.
Sooner or later, Beijing will make a deal. Another question is what price he will ask for "changing roles." In order to bring down this price, Washington will go to great lengths. So we are only witnessing the beginning of a long US-Chinese bargaining, during which we will see strong handshakes and military maneuvers, and, of course, we will hear loud public statements.
The author’s point of view may not coincide with the position of the publisher.