On Sunday, Vladimir Zelensky won the presidential elections in Ukraine. This can be noted as the moment when the wave of populism coming from the West reached the post-Soviet space. In addition, this event testifies to the total rejection of nationalist policies leading to a split of the country and carried out by Petro Poroshenko over the past five years.
Like Donald Trump in the US, and Beppe Grillo in Italy, Zelensky was able to use his television image for political purposes, but in the election campaign he rested on inclusivity - unlike his opponent, who was betraying strife in his rhetoric.
Ukraine was in an unusual situation. The President, who suffers from ideological fanaticism, she changes to something completely unknown. A person who has no support in the Verkhovna Rada and will be forced to wait half a year for the next parliamentary elections.
The 2014 Maidan paradox is that it looked like a revolution, but in the end led not to a real change of power, but rather to a rearrangement of deck chairs on the Titanic deck.
Now you may have to pay for it. And those who supported this movement in the West can only blame themselves for putting their own geopolitical interests above the sincere desire of Ukrainians for change.
Cheated heroes
It was assumed that Ukraine after post-Maid completely reformats the political elite. Petro Poroshenko in the lead here is absolutely no good. To elect the head of state billionaire, who worked in the Cabinet and under Yushchenko, and under Yanukovych, meant immediately wiping his feet on the promises that sounded on the streets of Kiev.
Poroshenko and his entourage were the product of the nineties - the time when the post-Soviet oligarchy was formed. And the few reforms that they agreed to were carried out under pressure from the US and the EU.
Probably, the elite, resisting, showed foresight. In the end, harsh measures led to the emigration of millions of Ukrainians, mainly to Poland and Russia (the latter seems to be a clear paradox, given Poroshenko’s hostile attitude towards the eastern neighbor).
The strategy of the outgoing president was obvious. And cynical. He knew that the promised structural reforms can be safely sent to the garbage can: as long as he maintains the anti-Russian position, the West will support it. Poroshenko knew perfectly well that Brussels and Washington would close their eyes to any violations, if this corresponded to their geopolitical agenda.
So, the West calmly watched as he expelled the former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, once a US pet, from Ukrainian politics. It took a little more than six months - and that of the governor of the Odessa region became stateless: Poroshenko deprived him of his Ukrainian citizenship, and later deported from the country. From the Western establishment, which once raised Saakashvili on a pedestal, this hardly caused even the weakest protest.
Unfortunately for Poroshenko, the Ukrainian electorate had less patience. Now the West will have to deal with Zelensky, whose mood may no longer be pro-Western, but pro-Ukrainian. If so, he will understand that any hopes for the prosperity of his country are connected with the normalization of relations with Moscow, which remains its largest trading partner.
Real changes?
The television series “The Servant of the People”, in which Zelensky played, was, in fact, a pre-election campaign, thanks to which he was on the screens of millions of viewers - ordinary Ukrainians, convincing them that he could well become the head of state.
Although it is possible, of course, that many did not vote for Zelensky’s electoral program, but for the ideals of his alter ego, Vasily Goloborodko.
In the TV series Goloborodko is a true believer and a fighter with a corrupt elite. For Ukrainian voters, corruption is the number one problem. They understood that Poroshenko, himself an oligarch, would never destroy a system that helped him make a fortune. Therefore, when it came to promises to fight corruption, Zelensky (or at least the fictional politician he plays), of course, aroused more confidence among voters than his opponent.
Zelensky also preferred a positive election program and avoided unrealistic promises. Poroshenko continued to focus on his ability to confront Russia. At the same time, there was a feeling that he believed that he was competing with Vladimir Putin, and not with his real competitor. In addition, his anti-Russian rhetoric (often hysterical) caused rejection among voters in the central, southern and eastern regions of the country, often feeling connected with Russian culture and using Russian as the main language. This tactic did not bring much success in the west: according to polls of citizens at the exit from polling stations, Poroshenko lost in all areas, with the exception of hyperpatriotic Galicia.
But, by the way, no matter what anyone thinks about Poroshenko, he at least cleared the way for a peaceful transfer of power and, more importantly, a peaceful change of elites, which has not happened in most of the post-Soviet space, including in Russia.
With all the above, the majority of Russians perceived the Ukrainian elections as a circus and looked like a kind of reality show. And not because they wanted to somehow imitate this. Prospects for the rise of Western-style democracy in Russia in the light of such a race from the neighbors suffered rather than strengthened.
Perhaps Zelensky as president will be ineffective. If in the fall he fails to radically change the composition of the Rada, he will be politically weak. Nevertheless, his victory in the elections confirmed that the Ukrainians were tired of being pawns in the games of both external forces and their own elites.
Supporting Poroshenko, the West miscalculated. Earlier, Russia made the same mistake with its predecessor, Viktor Yanukovych. Zelensky will be prudent if he puts Ukraine’s interests first and realizes that the principle of antagonism did not bring anything good to his country.
The point of view of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.