Al-Tayeb Saleh asks: Where did they come from?

Many of those who opposed the FIS regime do not find it difficult to rate their revolt against two previous revolutions: the 1964 revolution against the regime of Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964), and the 1985 revolution against Marshal Jaafar Nimeiri (1969-1985). The regimes of these revolutions were revolutionary to restore civil democratic rule.

Surprisingly, these dissidents continued to find a hard time in the ratio of the rescue system (1989-2018) to the previous regimes that revolted against them. The rescue - the system of the Islamists (as they are known) - is, in their opinion, a source of no origin in the culture of the people of the Sudan at all. And their "apprehension" of the system of cages to a kind of amnesty by the statute of limitations of the tyrannical regimes that preceded it as - despite being dismissed - which can be attributed to the people of Sudan with some hardship and embarrassment of course.

And the original in cutting off the rescue system - in addition to the arrogance of his early ruthlessness that did not kill him - denounced Tayyib Saleh - the great bosses of the Sudanese cultural heritage - to them. When he saw from the system early what Astkahh - writer Sadden to feel the nation - asked in a famous article: Where did they come from? The question continued to follow the regime as the curse of the generation of the generation through the three strife contracts;

Where did they come from? Mothers, aunts and aunts? Do you listen to the wind blowing from the north and the south? But did they see the upper streets of the south (Chill) and fall down? As for wheat, wheat grows in fields and dates are burdened with palm trees. They heard Madaj al-Mahi (Madh al-Rasul from the 19th century), Wood Saad (from the Mahdia Islamic state in the late 19th century), songs of Surur and Khalil Farah (Gael nationalism and art in the 1920s); and Hassan Attia and Kabli and Mustafa (singers of the later period). Did they read the poetry of the Abbasid (School of the revival of poetry in the 1920s) and Majzoub (1919-1982)? Did they hear old sounds and old tastes? Do not they love the homeland as we love it?

And one of the most I heard from the arrogance of the Sudanese to the system of civets and cut off their culture of what one of them told his aunt: sat listening to the names of the last cabinet of the regime before the Maghreb, and remained - when I heard a name of them - ask her nephew:

-Do cuz and not a country d?

If we leave aside the oppressive opponents of the rule of salvation that they ruled that it gave birth to Sudan, it is not true such a break in the rule of history. I will look at the unity of the Sudanese regimes' dynasties which the Sudanese revolted on the basis of logic and history: it is not rational to find your revolutions in proportion while the ratios of the rescue system are cut off from the two other regimes that have been influenced by them. How did you contact the revolution of your revolutions?

On the one hand, history has reached the systems in which the Sudanese revolted in two ways. The first is the obvious similarity in the political organization that revolted against these regimes. The entities that were behind the three revolutions were so congruent that they almost reproduced each other. The second aspect is similar to the political and social nature of the despotic regimes, so that one of them receives the task of the former regime, and continues to do it as if in a swap.

The "gathering of professionals" leading the movement today is another edition of the Professional Bodies Front that led the October 1964 Revolution and the trade union group that led the April 1985 revolution; three of them were based on the "union" of modern forces in the city. It is an organization that has taken over our lives by colonization as a means of the city and its wage-earning forces in the lobbies and factories to express its interests in terms of service and customs of the profession.

It was often guided by this organization in the path of revolution to change from the forces of the "old regime" which has not yet reconciled with the civic as a demographic, economic, social, political and aesthetic reality. If we want an older race for this modern entity, let us say the General Graduates Conference, which was established in 1938 as a union to serve the interests of the Sudanese Afandis in the context of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1936, in which the British and Egyptians agree to promote the Sudanese elite in the service houses of the state.

It is known that the conference quickly grew up on its pure trade union. He asked colonialism to grant Sudan self-government in its famous memorandum in 1942. Thus, we see these bodies all participating as platforms for urban groups that came to our country with the existence of colonialism. Heritage, as in the class of sectarian and tribal leadership of rural parties with the predominant known as "traditional parties."

It is not without meaning that the current movement is "the cities of Sudan are rising." This class did not exist until I took the initiative of removing the leadership of the Sudanese from the traditional hereditary class in various forms, including the revolutions of our article.

On the one hand, if the movement of the Sudanese in 1964, 1985, and 2018 revolutions, it is even more important that half of the regimes against which the counterrevolutionary forces arose were not revolution without counter-revolution. This is evidenced by the drama of the long Sudanese rivalry between the forces of change and the conservative forces they do not want.

The opposition of the Sudanese opposition to the Salvation regime does not interrupt the regime of the counterrevolution that preceded it. Rather, it imposes it as the highest stage of this revolution. He came to the ruling and saw the bite of the serpent in the previous one, and prepared for the order his number and the adult and the bad. These systems are linked in terms of counter-revolution sections that have not been disrupted by any of these systems:

1 - It is a direct hostility to democracy by blocking the freedom of expression and organization; it begins to dissolve the parties under the pretext of its fiasco at the expense of the homeland at the expense of the nation, and not only this hastens to strip the citizens - who gave their name - from their unions the whole point, and agreed on the good management of its affairs. Then newspapers broke down to produce the "Press Press," a name that people used on the newspaper "Revolution" in the regime of the team Ibrahim Abboud, to be issued in the size of the tabloid prevailing at the time.

It is a coincidence that this was the first explicit attempt at that in the civil order, which was replaced by the revolution of October 1964. These civil forces were based on the draft of the Islamic constitution in 1968 and the parliament would have authorized it had it not been for Jaafar Nimeiri's coup in 1969, That the ink he wrote was not settled.

In light of the laws of September 1983, Sudan became an Islamic state at night, and the successor of the covenant was to pledge not to be elected. Then came the rescue with its Islamic civilizational project, as we have seen. Although Abboud ruled a secular system inherited from the British, he was forced - when the south of the country fled in the early 1960s - a quasi-religious state based on Islamization and Arabization.

3 - a male state that has not yet accepted the citizenship of women, even after winning the right to stand and vote thanks to the revolution of October 1964. The presence of women overwhelming in the last movement is a sufficient statement of the depth of humiliation that penetrated the hearts of women, the transformation of the state to "Mutawween" Their movements and their innards are inherently suspicious. This insult was centered on the 1996 Public Order Act, a law that President al-Bashir had decided to review in his most authentic days to appease women.

The independent state of Sudan was established as "the Arabs and their religion is a religion of love." It was the national movement's shoes in imagining the state when it was liberated, and maintained this ethnic and cultural centrality in the face of the legitimate demand of others for citizenship.

The southern nationalist movement began this demand since 1955 with a limited bloody "rebellion", which in time led to the south's exit from Sudan in 2011, after a civil war that has subsided since the independence of the country. It does not reveal the narrowness of this state and its centrality in its centrality, such as the "happiness" of President al-Bashir after the secession of the south. "The south has gone out of Sudan," Bakht said. "Bakht" is the issue of cultural diversity that liberals have been pushing for a civil constitution. The state - as he said - has become pure for Muslims, there is no "sunken" after the day has become the majority of the Ghai.

5. It is the state of capitalist payment that has continued to destroy state ownership of the economic and well-being of colonialism, according to the IMF's structural adjustment. Which was aimed at evacuating the economic stage of the private capitalist initiative, which was written by the economist Dr. Ali Abdelkader extensively.

The rescue cut a long way in this way by silencing the voice of the unions, which resisted this privatization for a long time. The rescue did not hesitate to comply with the dictates of the fund until the lifting of the last support - which sparked the revolts of the Sudanese in December 2018 - was directed by a delegation of the International Monetary Fund, Khartoum a few days before the outbreak of the revolution.

This capitalist drive in the emergence of an obscene capitalist class between the bureaucrats of the Islamic state close to the Russian oligarchs around President Vladimir Putin. It is best to implement the facts of this class - as short as the Mercosio Sudan - Islamic Dr. Tijani Abdul Qadir.

I do not think Tayeb Saleh wanted to ask him: "Where did these people come from?" To be the end of the lords in the science of the state of salvation. But it has become as well as in the irony that began my article; Sudanese trust the validity of their current revolution to their revolutions in 1964 and 1985.

But they have made their state and culture more alienated from Sudanese nationalism and culture, and this is an irreplaceable link to history. My article wanted to reveal the political, economic and cultural structures in our society from which these and others emerged, as the highest stages of the counterrevolution until they departed from us, God willing.