"Death of the Villa King" "Arrest behind
the Villa King" Looking at the articles pouring in about the 'Villa King', it feels like the charter fraud situation has already been resolved.
However, as explained in [The Villa King-Kook] Part 1, the
Villa King is just the tail end of the charter fraud criminal ecosystem.
It means that it is difficult to solve the problem by punishing a few villa kings.
In order to find out when and why charter fraud increased, the SBS Charter Fraud Special Reporting Team, together with the data journalism team, analyzed the timing of the purchase of 49 malicious landlords of more than 100 houses who did not return the deposit.
As a result , it was confirmed that
malicious landlords rapidly increased the number of houses by exploiting loopholes in the rental business policy introduced by the government in 2017.
The charter fraud crisis started from the government's policy failure.
You need to know the reason for the failure in order to make a proper countermeasure.
The SBS charter fraud special coverage team summarized three causes of the charter fraud crisis by combining malicious lessor tracking data and expert analysis.
Policy Failure ①: Activation of Rental Businesses without Control Devices
The message that the August 2 real estate measures in 2017 threw to multi-homed people was to sell their homes or register as a private rental business.
In the same year, the 12.13 measure, under the name of 'a plan to promote rental housing registration where landlords and tenants coexist', provided rental businesses with benefits such as exclusion of comprehensive real estate tax and reduction of capital gains tax.
In a situation where there are already benefits such as exemption from acquisition tax for small houses, the cost of ownership has also been drastically reduced.
The reaction of malicious rentals was explosive.
49 malicious lessors who bought hundreds of houses every year, including 358 houses in 2015, 450 houses in 2016, and 550 houses in 2017, 1,335 houses in 2018, 3,309 houses in 2019, 4,141 houses in 2020, and 2,326 houses in 2021. I bought more.
The part where the demand for villas soared due to the high price of apartments, and the blockage of sales loans and the greatly expanded loans for leasehold deposits are also pointed out as the background.
In fact, loans for deposit funds, which were only worth KRW 23 trillion in 2012, have increased steeply since 2016 as the jeonse price rose and support related to deposit funds increased, increasing to KRW 180 trillion at the end of 2021.
[Cho Jung-heun / Chairman, Land and Housing Committee, Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice]
"I wonder if the leasehold deposit loan has added more fuel. Even if the builders are organized and build villas, there is no worry that the lease will not be sold or the jeonse will not go out. Because it was solidly supported, it became a risk-free business.”
Didn't the total number of rental houses increase?
no.
The annual housing purchase volume by private rental operators jumped from 120,000 units in 2015, 100,000 units in 2016, and 160,000 units in 2017 to 290,000 units in 2018, followed by 210,000 units in 2019 and 2020, respectively, and 100,000 units in 2021. decreased again to less than 10,000.
As a result of revitalization measures, it rose sharply in 2018, but the increase did not continue.
The difference is that the annual housing purchase volume of malicious landlords peaked in 2020 and soared sharply to 7 times the level in 2017.
The 2017 rental business activation policy seems to have had a greater effect on the purchase of houses by malicious landlords rather than increasing the total supply of private rental housing.
During the period of rising house prices, the rapid expansion of the rental business system without a control plan for malicious landlords has raised side effects.
[Kim Jin-yu / President of the Korean Housing Society]
"Businesses that rent 5 houses like this and businesses that rent 100 houses or 1,000 houses have completely different personalities. (But) there were no regulations. For example, what kind of financial resources, accounting audits, etc. I should have received it, but there was no such thing. I had to submit a financing plan, and if it was unclear, I had to do a tax investigation and not give permission, or it should have been resolved in this way."
Policy failure②: HUG jeonse guarantee that caused reverse jeonse… "Policy Mismatch"
The fact that the Housing and Urban Guarantee Corporation (HUG) guaranteed housing prices up to 150% of the official price in the deposit refund guarantee system is also pointed out as a loophole.
To put it simply, in the case of a villa with a market price of 250 million won and an official price of 200 million won, HUG is recognized as a sale price of up to 300 million won, which is 150% of the official price, so that it can receive a charter guarantee.
The jeonse scammers who exploited this claim “possibility to sign up for jeonse guarantee insurance” and “2 years of interest support”, received a jeonse price of up to 300 million won, and then spread the increased money as a kickback to real estate consulting brokers, real estate brokers, and pants owners. It is.
The name of the house was handed over to the owner of the pants without money, so the tenant could not get the deposit back.
The flimsy jeonse guarantee system allowed jeonse scammers to make a lot of money without spending a penny of my money.
It has been since 2015 that HUG has provided a charter guarantee of up to 150% of the public price.
But why did it become a problem after the 2017 rental business revitalization measures?
Experts point out that the problem is that the charter guarantee limit is maintained as it is in a situation where the gap between the jeonse price and the sale price is unstable.
[Kim Jin-yu/President of the Korean Housing Society]
“The jeonse guarantee insurance for tenants should have been operated a little tighter, but the fact that it was too open in the name of tenant protection is a strong aspect of abuse. Because I should have made a cushion? It can be seen that I lacked understanding of the market to release this too much.”
It is also pointed out that HUG's charter guarantee policy is in conflict with the public announcement policy promoted by the last government.
The official land price realization rate, which indicates the level of officially announced land price relative to market price, rose to 62.6% in 2018, 64.8% in 2019, 65.5% in 2020, 68.4% in 2021, and 71.4% in 2022.
If the market price of a house in 2022 is set as 100, the official land price is 71.4, and if you multiply this by the guarantee rate of 150%, it comes out that you can get a jeonse guarantee up to 107.1.
If the market price is 100, you can receive a charter price of up to 107.1, so a 'reverse jeonse' is established.
HUG only recently reduced the warranty limit to 140%, but it was too late.
[Kim Jin-yu/President of the Korean Housing Society]
“It is because the price is moving and the realization rate of the official price is increased in an unstable situation. So it's higher than the market price. It's a situation that can be used by charter scammers as much as that part."
Policy failure ③: Abolishment of apartment rental business system leaving villas… "Balloon effect"
2020 is the year that bad landlords' home purchases peaked.
In 2020, 49 malicious landlords bought a whopping 4,141 houses, an average of 84 per person.
However, the government's 2020 July 1 measures abolished the apartment rental business system, leaving the villas as they were.
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