Between the end of 2016 and the end of 2021, French economic output increased by 6.6 percent and Germany by 3.5 percent.

During the same period, the number of people employed in France increased by 5 percent;

in Germany the growth rate was 2.9 percent.

When Emmanuel Macron was first elected to the Elysée Palace five years ago, Berenberg's chief economist, Holger Schmieding, predicted a "golden decade" for France, in which the French economy would outperform Germany's.

With his election victory on Sunday, Macron has created an important prerequisite for continuing a reform policy that will further strengthen France's performance.

However, winning the presidential election is not enough for this.

Macron also needs a majority in the National Assembly in the upcoming parliamentary elections in order to pursue economic and financial policies according to his ideas.

That seems quite possible, but by no means certain: both the extreme right and the extreme left will strive to prevent a second majority for Macron.

Macron is not a radical economic reformer

Even in the event of a victory in the parliamentary elections, Macron would have to take into account the deep divisions in the population that manifested themselves in the presidential election.

Recent economic progress can also be explained by a series of reforms, for example in the labor market or in taxation.

However, the occasionally heard accusation that Macron has delivered France to "neoliberalism" with his reform policy remains in view of a very high government ratio in European comparison, a significant increase in public debt, a still restrictive regulatory network, the centralism that has become even stronger and one in proportion to increasing life expectancy to low retirement age absurd.

Macron was not a radical economic reformer, much less a revolutionary.

Of course, especially in times of tension, alienation and conflict, divisive narratives often have it easier than sober facts.

A tale in which Macron betrayed French values ​​and traditions in favor of profit-oriented globalization has become particularly popular in the northern and southern regions, where Marine Le Pen performed strongly.

It is possible that resistance to globalization at the ballot box expresses concerns about immigration and internal security to the same extent as unease about global economic risks.

In addition, Macron has not always hit the right note when dealing with the "yellow vests".

In view of the necessary but very controversial pension reform, it will not be easy to resolve the contradictions.

The challenges at home will encourage the President to set an example in Europe - in agreement with Germany as well as in competition with it.

Here Macron is now more in tune with the zeitgeist than the federal government, which is struggling for orientation in several respects.

Any news of the death of globalization is clearly premature, but the war in Ukraine, damaged supply chains, and a general increase in geopolitical risk align more with the French vision of a world of blocs than with the German vision of a world economic order governed by rules rather than power.

Under the impression of economic vulnerability in a highly insecure world, French industrial policy is therefore gaining more space in the European Union.

The politicization of the European Central Bank also reflects old French ideas of monetary policy rather than the purist Bundesbank model that Germany believed to be enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty.

If it were up to Paris, other funds would follow the European recovery fund, without Paris being willing to cede important national competencies to Brussels.

Germany does not have to share these all critically questionable ideas;

it should not skimp on alternative designs.

Franco-German dialogue has never been easy, but it is essential.

Macron is lucky in his country: an economically successful France that is less at odds with itself and therefore less susceptible to political extremes would be the best France that Germany could wish for.