The German government reacted immediately to Moscow's breach of international law by suspending the certification of Nord Stream 2.

This is an important and necessary signal towards Moscow, but also towards our partners in the West.

As a decades-long member of the Western community of values, defense and economics, it is Germany's doomed duty and obligation to act in concert with its partners.

This also applies to economic sanctions against an aggressor who wants to change borders with the help of military operations in Eastern Europe.

It is true that sanctions policy has not enjoyed a good reputation among numerous experts for a long time.

It is seen as largely inefficient, an unsuitable substitute for inopportune military assets, and an instrument with which one may self-harm economically without achieving one's goals.

There is no shortage of historical examples: Napoleon's attempt in the early 19th century to use the Continental System to conquer England economically ended up damaging the French more than the island.

A particularly devastating recent example is the sweeping post-1990 economic sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

They caused great suffering among the population, but the dictator was able to stay in power for a long time.

Are there alternatives?

Autocratically governed states are considered to be particularly resilient to economic sanctions.

Their rulers, but also not a small part of their populations, may have different orders of preferences than western states.

Appeals to a (supposedly) glorious history, great power posturing, military saber-rattling and the invocation of national unity are capable of bringing the ruler, at least in the short term, a high level of popular support in times of crisis, which would perhaps be reinforced by the imposition of economic sanctions by other countries.

Of course, the question arises as to whether this so-called “rally 'round-the-flag effect” is sufficient in the long term to console people about the lack of economic prosperity.

History is replete with examples where seemingly rock-solid autocratic regimes have failed this test, often to the great surprise of renowned Western pundits.

As in many decision-making situations, an important criterion for assessing sanctions are the opportunity costs, i.e. the question: What would happen if the West did not impose sanctions?

Since a military option is not available for good reasons, a reaction was then limited to verbal notes and perhaps irrelevant shop window politics.

This certainly does not impress any aggressor, whose publicly professed understanding of history allows the conclusion that he does not only consider existing border and power relations in eastern Ukraine to be inviolable.

Economic sanctions may not stop a willing ruler, but any lack of antidotes spurred him straight on to move forward.

Sanctions against autocratic rulers are recommended that primarily affect representatives of the regime and those who profit from them, but not the general public directly.

This approach also reduces the costs for one's own national economy.

In the case of a country that is heavily dependent on the sale of commodities, that presents itself as a world power, but whose economic output is only that of a medium-sized western economy and in which wealth is distributed extremely unequally (and is held to a considerable extent by the wealthy in western countries). Starting points for sanctions are obvious.

The optimal use of sanctions also includes their dosage.

The West must act convincingly after the first violation of international law, but it must not immediately mobilize its entire range of instruments in order to be able to react flexibly to any further provocations.

Nec temere, nec timide – neither reckless nor timid: The signal effect that goes out from a united West, also in sanctions policy, is just as important as the incentives that Moscow’s aggression policy gives western countries to reduce their long-term dependence on gas supplies.

That too is a lesson for Germany.