China News Service, Beijing, December 7 (Reporter Du Yan) Today, the "Beijing City Platform Economy Guidelines for Anti-monopoly Compliance" (2021 edition) was officially released.
In response to the characteristics and trends of competition in the field of platform economy, the "Guidelines" respond to business formats and competitive behaviors in the Internet field such as "choosing one of two" and "big data", aiming to improve operators' awareness of monopoly risk prevention.
This "Guide" was developed by a research team formed by the Beijing Municipal Market Supervision Development Research Center and the Competition Law Research Center of China University of Political Science and Law. The Committee’s "Guidelines on Anti-Monopoly in the Field of Platform Economy" and practical experience, in accordance with the classification of monopolistic activities in the "Anti-Monopoly Law", elaborated on the constitutive elements of monopoly behavior and the ideas for determining monopoly behavior, and guided enterprises to establish and strengthen anti-monopoly compliance Management system, consciously standardize business behavior, prevent legal risks of anti-monopoly, and ensure the sustainable, healthy and orderly development of enterprises.
The "Guidelines" combined with the characteristics of the Internet business, explained the basic content, behavior and risk warnings of suspected monopolistic behaviors under the anti-monopoly regulations, and listed corresponding cases to guide platform companies in anti-monopoly compliance management.
The Guidelines list a total of 12 cases and 8 examples. The real cases are sourced from punishment cases disclosed by antitrust enforcement agencies in China, the European Union, and the United States, including 8 cases in China and 4 cases in the United States and the European Union. The real cases are to avoid misunderstandings. Indicate the name of the operator.
8 simulation examples were compiled, and the form of simulation examples was adopted for the behaviors of operators in the field of platform economy that have the possibility of illegality. Based on the description of the example behaviors, the operators review their own behavior and compliance, and improve the ability to identify monopoly risks.
In response to the characteristics and trends of competitive behavior in the platform economy, the "Guidelines" respond to business formats and competitive behaviors in the Internet field such as "choose one out of two" and "big data to kill familiarity".
The “Guidelines” pointed out that operators in the field of platform economy and counterparties of transactions may reach vertical monopoly agreements such as fixed resale prices and minimum resale prices through the following methods: use technical means to automatically set prices; use platform rules to set prices Unification; use data and algorithms to directly or indirectly limit prices and other factors; use technical means, platform rules, data and algorithms to limit other trading conditions, exclude and restrict market competition.
As long as the operator engages in the act of fixing the resale price or limiting the minimum resale price, and does not comply with the exemption conditions stipulated in the Anti-Monopoly Law, it may be punished by the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency (principle prohibition + exception exemption principle).
The "Guidelines" analyze the existence of vertical non-price monopoly agreements that potentially eliminate and restrict competition, with the aim of enhancing operators' awareness of monopoly risk prevention.
For example, platform A has a large number of users and a large amount of traffic. The platform has launched a cooperation agreement and related operating resource agreements, requiring the partner and platform A to sign an exclusive strategic cooperation agreement, and establish an exclusive cooperative relationship with platform A during the cooperation period.
The agreement requires that the partners can only cooperate through the A platform and its associated platforms. Without the prior permission of the A platform, they shall not carry out the same or similar cooperation with any other competitive platform, otherwise they will be deemed to have breached the contract and be held accountable.
During the implementation of the agreement, platform A did not provide the partner with substantial investment in addition to its own business needs, and the partner did not obtain additional traffic resources such as priority promotion due to the exclusive cooperation with platform A.
Platform A signed exclusive agreements with many influential partners as a competitive strategy to increase user click-through rates, which greatly increased the traffic of the platform and severely affected the ability of platform A’s competitors to compete with them. Platform A adopted exclusiveness. The agreement excludes and restricts relevant market competition and is suspected of constituting a vertical non-price monopoly agreement.
In addition, the Guidelines combine the characteristics of platform companies to summarize the manifestations of platform operators' monopolistic behavior, analyze the factors considered in anti-monopoly law enforcement, and provide operators with 15 risk warning tips to cultivate anti-trust compliance and risk warning awareness.
It is reported that, in order to ensure the accuracy and representativeness of the contents of the Guidelines, the research team has conducted serious research and field investigations, learned from the experience and models of European and American anti-monopoly guidelines, combined with China’s national conditions and the level of platform economic development, and innovatively adopted illegal regulations. It also introduces scenario cases, and extensively solicits and fully absorbs the opinions and suggestions of all parties to ensure that the "Guidelines" can build consensus and exert practical effects.
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