Really reduce local reliance on real estate
Recently, 29 plots of land were listed for the second centralized supply in Changsha, Hunan, and only 10 plots were sold at the reserve price.
Before the deadline for registration for the second centralized land supply in Beijing, 27 of the 43 plots were not quoted.
Shanghai announced that it will terminate the sale of 7 plots.
Lost auction and termination of the transfer seem to have become the high-frequency vocabulary for the second centralized transfer of land.
According to data released by market institutions, nearly one-third of the 20 cities that have completed the second batch of centralized land supply have passed auctions and terminated transactions.
This is very different from the hot situation in which 22 cities implemented centralized land supply for the first time at the beginning of the year.
At that time, the common characteristics were fierce bidding and high premium rate. To increase the success rate, many companies even changed their "vest" to grab land.
For this reason, the second centralized transfer of land was relaunched after it was stopped by the relevant departments, but in just a few months, such a situation of duality between fire and ice is worth pondering.
The most direct reason is that the second centralized land transfer was mostly "stuck" in the source of funds in the land purchase link.
Taking Hangzhou as an example, the land acquisition fund review regulations are quite detailed, requiring bidder shareholders not to provide borrowing and other financing facilities against them in violation of regulations, not to directly or indirectly use various financing funds of financial institutions, and not to use loans or advance payments from upstream and downstream enterprises. It is not allowed to borrow money from other natural persons, legal persons, etc.
This is a direct reference to the pain points of real estate companies, and it is also a great way to ensure the steady operation of real estate.
In the past few years, many real estate companies operated with high debts, and most of the land acquisition funds were obtained from curves, but their own funds were not much.
Coupled with the recent tightening of policies, the market value of individual companies has plummeted due to the debt crisis, and the funds of real estate companies have generally tightened, and their investment styles have become more cautious.
Furthermore, other conditions for the second centralized transfer of land in various regions are also stricter.
For example, the land purchase qualification review is quite detailed, which basically blocks the possibility of land acquisition by temporarily registered companies.
Another example is the requirement for the sale of existing homes, making the original fast-in and fast-out mode of real estate companies difficult to sustain.
Under such circumstances, real estate companies cannot and dare not take land willfully.
In order to stabilize land prices, local governments have set upper limits on the premium rate of the second centralized land transfer, mostly between 10% and 15%. Compared with the first centralized transfer of land this year, it has been greatly reduced. It is a concessionary move by the local government. .
Land transfer fees account for the bulk of local fiscal revenue. Many of the special bonds issued by local governments use land transfer income as a source of debt repayment. In the current environment of increasing investment and promoting people's livelihood, many local governments are struggling with money.
Under this circumstance, multiple policy objectives of the local government may conflict, and it is difficult to have a deep inner motivation for stabilizing land prices.
In the context of price restrictions, many of the plots of the second centralized land transfer in various regions were located in more remote suburbs, which eventually led to unsold auctions and termination of the transfer.
However, we must be sufficiently vigilant that unsuccessful auctions will lead to a reduction in land supply and lower housing investment. On the contrary, it may push up housing prices and produce results that are contrary to the policy goals. This should be taken seriously.
Land auctions and the recent rebound in energy-intensive industries in various regions actually reflect the same deep-seated problem, that is, the dispute over development methods.
China’s economy is currently undergoing transformation, but regardless of whether real estate companies or local government fiscal revenues, there is still a strong path to rely on, new development momentum has not yet been fully established, and localities are still accustomed to adopting old prescriptions when encountering new problems.
What needs to be fully realized is that the central government has a clear policy and firm determination in this regard. Don't take a chance and hope to play games and underestimate the central government's determination and courage.
It should be noted that the relationship between the land and real estate market model and the overall economic situation will undergo major changes.
On October 23, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress authorized the State Council to carry out pilot real estate tax reforms in some regions.
This move is conducive to stabilizing and increasing local fiscal revenues and curbing the risks of land finance and local debt.
To this end, it is necessary to stabilize land prices, house prices, and expectations, increase the supply of land, especially residential land, and use market forces to adjust the balance of supply and demand.
Continue to advance reforms such as entering the market for agricultural land, break the situation where the government is the sole provider of residential land, and establish a housing system with multi-subject supply and multi-channel guarantee for both rent and purchase.
At the same time, all localities must vigorously develop the real economy, explore other sources of economic development, and truly reduce their dependence on real estate.
Jin Guanping