Smoke rising from the Iranian consulate building in Damascus following an Israeli raid on it (Reuters)
In an attempt to extrapolate Israel's bombing of the Iranian consulate in the Mezzeh neighborhood in Syria, and the assassination of elite men in the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard, including General Mohammad Reza Zahedi and others, the director of the Al Jazeera network's office in Tehran provides a long reading to describe the event, its determinants, contexts, and repercussions.
It is naive to present what Israel did, on April 1, 2024, in attacking the Iranian consulate building in Syria and assassinating a prominent military elite among the leaders of the Quds Force, as a message to Hezbollah in Lebanon and its Secretary-General, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and it is also naive to read that this is how it happened. Originally, it was a message to anyone in the region. What happened was more important and broader than that, based on 4 specifics and 4 descriptions.
Determinants:
An Israeli decision to end the state of stagnation, and to demolish the idea of taboos in the regional sense, that is, striking forbidden targets in forbidden areas.
An Israeli decision to abandon the idea of restoring regional deterrence in its form before October 7, and to go for practical implementation of the idea of formulating a new concept of deterrence by removing it violently through the barrel of a gun and not through the negotiating tables.
An Israeli decision to directly and bloody test Iran, its options and capabilities, and to find out whether Tehran has a decision to go towards what is described as a regional abyss.
The only remaining taboo is only open and clear military targeting by the Israeli army inside Iranian territory, and this has not happened so far.
The descriptions are framed by research:
A major step towards restoring the concept of regional deterrence through “one-shot strikes” and from the broad door, that is, the Iranian door.
A bold and dangerous Israeli investment at a pivotal moment, a very complex Middle Eastern moment, an American moment that came with high ceilings and a willingness to take risks, an Iranian moment with intertwined accounts internally, regionally and internationally, and an Israeli moment seeking regional deterrence no matter how much it lost on October 7; All of this at a sensitive and exceptional time that may not be repeated before Israel later.
A direct and intentional assassination of men who are part of the vital nucleus of Tehran’s regional influence, and part of the central mind of the “elite of the axis of resistance,” according to the Iranian definition.
A heavy, bloody and direct message to Iran and no one else, and it is a message signed with the blood of those men who created cordons of fire and circles of bullets and deterrence around Israel since the beginning of the eighties of the last century.
Here two important and important questions arise:
How did this significant security breach happen? What is the intelligence and military position of the regime’s men in Syria in such a breach? How will Iran restore its security and military position inside Syria by maintaining the relationship with the regime and its head in conjunction with the necessity of imposing an iron security cordon that fortifies its position there?
What is Russia's role if Iran decides to make fundamental changes to its security and military positioning in Syria? What is the size of the joint intersections and the expected collision areas?
Israeli context
Israeli, it is a successive assassination of what I currently call “Program Men”; That is, the one who occupies the vital part of the axis of resistance, especially on the fronts of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. This term may be somewhat strange, but it is of great importance in my opinion, and understanding the nature of this term and how to shape it politically and geopolitically is a little clearer.
After America's assassination of the former Quds Force commander, General Qassem Soleimani, two fundamental changes occurred regarding the axis of resistance:
First:
ruling out the idea of recreating a new character for the axis who would act as a new hero (hero) taking the place of the old (hero) who was assassinated. Instead, the Caliph will act as a “program man,” and he will be surrounded by the men running this program, who are the military and security elite that General Soleimani’s experience has produced in practice. Those who were assassinated by Israel since October 7 until now are part of them. Men.
Second:
Transforming the axis as a whole, starting with its motives and mechanisms of movement, all the way to its tools in choices and implementation, from a hierarchical form led by the “hero” to a horizontal form resembling a network extending in different regions, so that each region has its own hero, who determines the form, content, mechanisms of action, and the level of coordination required with the rest. The squares across the program men in the context of the strategic goal, the basis of what the axis as a whole wants.
These two variables created a new form for the axis and a completely different method of operation from the previous one, and this explains the network of multiple, successive Israeli assassinations in a horizontal manner, and not targeting the hierarchical head as it was before.
The Iranian context and response options
To understand the centrality of the Iranian central mind and how it behaves in dangerous and complex circumstances like these, it is necessary to mention two basic points that govern this mind and its contexts in general:
The centrality of the idea of survival, in the sense of the survival of the model, as the regime in Iran is not a suicidal regime, and prefers the pragmatism of remaining at a calculated and strategic level of the basic revolutionary principles and continuing towards what it wants, and prefers that to the enthusiastic revolutionary adventure of creating a “hero” model that is fully committed to the letter of the declared slogan.
The determinant of reaching the desired goal, regardless of the amount of blood spilled on the way, achieving the goal is the only thing that can determine the vitality and correctness of action and reaction in different contexts, not the idea of revenge first.
Therefore, Iran's options in response may be:
First:
Attacking Israel directly and with Iranian hands through the Golan front in Syria, which is the front in which Iran has invested extensively, and which was previously prepared by General Soleimani to be the front that will practice madness in exchange for Israeli madness, but there are two specifics, in my estimation, that stand in the way of such an act. At this stage they are:
The Russian veto on activating or using this front in Syria. Only two days after targeting the Iranian consulate, Moscow increased the number and number of its military police patrols stationed on the Syrian-Israeli border.
The regime in Syria does not want to open a declared front with Israel at this stage in light of the outcomes of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7.
In either case, I do not think that Tehran will risk its strategic partnership and its strong relations with Moscow, or take a decision to openly clash with a part of the regime in Syria.
Second
: Providing Hezbollah in Lebanon with new, qualitative types of weapons and allowing it to use them against vital and painful targets in Israel. This seems possible to me, but if it happens, it would require a professional and professional extraction process so that a strike like this would be convincing, and would be placed in Iran’s balance strategically and in the party’s balance as a deterrent, and this would create what could be described as a temporary deterrence, which would allow for regaining the initiative and preparing for more. Influential.
Third:
Defining a bank of targets inside and outside the region by targeting the interests of Israel, its men, and its diplomatic missions. I do not think that this will form the backbone of any Iranian move, as it may be part of it, not all of it.
Fourth:
Raising the ceiling high and venturing into launching a strike with long-range ballistic missiles against targets inside Israeli territory. This would be equivalent to what Israel did, which was bold, adventurous and dangerous. It seems to me unlikely, but it is not impossible and remains on the table.
Fifth:
A mixture of the first three options by integrating security, military, cyber, threats, and shadow wars. My estimate is that this may be the most appropriate option for the Iranian situation, especially in its current form and interim positioning.
Foresight
The entire Middle East is experiencing the harsh throes of giving birth to completely new deterrence equations, equations whose borders are drawn in blood in the fields and not through negotiating tables, even if we see them here and there.
All the equations that ruled the Middle East and the line of conflict between Israel and Iran no longer exist and have fallen completely, and Israel now appears as one who takes the declared initiative to formulate new concepts of new deterrence, by striking what was previously forbidden and without any deterrents. The assessment here is that Israel will continue to do so while trying Maintaining the American bet is a preliminary guarantee, even if theoretically, that Iran and its allies will not take significant deterrent steps.
Which means Israeli:
The birth of a regional deterrence equation that meets in a vital part the requirements of the Israeli situation more than others, and this may be a loss for Tehran in the geopolitical sense. It is the basis of the conflict with Israel, and I do not think that Iran is able to contain or tolerate this for a long time.
Draining the prestige and influence of Iran and the axis it leads in the region as a counter project to the normalization, settlement and peace projects with Israel, and this is an important determinant in the Iranian case as it is the lever of the project and not part of it.
Defusing the Iranian situation by targeting it itself and not just targeting the allies, and appreciating that this will continue in Israel, albeit at a different pace, in the next stage.
As for Iran... anticipating
It seems to me that Iran's bets are completely different, and there is a great connection between the internal situation, the regional situation, and the international context. It also seems that the Iranian assessment revolves around three basic ideas:
First:
The voice in Tehran has become loud and clearly audible that the time has come to draw a clear and declared line for Israel, and that it must be drawn in blood and in a declared manner, followed immediately by a balanced political move to contain the secretions of the squares and control the region at a point of no to open war.
Is the Iranian decision-maker in tune with this, even if his strategic assessment says the opposite? But he may find himself forced to go in this direction in order to protect his higher interests and his regional front, which is the basis of his influence.
Second:
Tehran believes that any direct, widespread, violent and declared clash with Israel now will constitute an invaluable gain for Israel-Netanyahu internally, regionally and internationally, since the current regional and international consensus against Israel will shift overnight to become a consensus against Iran.
Third:
The ceiling of the current battle between Israel and Hezbollah and its gradual development, albeit slowly, at least on the part of Hezbollah, in addition to the transformation of Gaza into something resembling a security quagmire for the Israeli army, in addition to the ceiling under which the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen and the allies in the Iraqi and sometimes Syrian arena appear to be moving. It is sufficient to control the regional situation at an indicator of neither complete war nor partial peace. This stagnation in this manner appears to be an appropriate Iranian action in the strategic sense.
a summary
All analyses, extrapolations and assessments believe that Iran must move in an urgent operation against Israel to control its actions and audacity through balanced military-security action.
Although I understand and comprehend this statement, and agree with a vital part of it, my in-depth reading of the Iranian situation led me to slightly different results, which is that Iran is balancing its conditions internally, its gains and losses regionally, and the very strategic importance of its positioning in the changing international context, albeit slowly.
Any decision to open a direct and declared confrontation with Israel must not be based solely on revenge, but must necessarily serve this triangle internally, regionally and internationally.
Source: Al Jazeera