Al-Assad does not rule Daraa Governorate, nor does anyone else rule it. The model of control there is hybrid and overlapping (Al-Jazeera)
Daraa, a Syrian governorate, represents a different model from the rest of the Syrian regions. It was controlled by Syrian revolutionaries, then it became controlled by regime forces and their allies: Russia, Iran, and local and foreign loyalist militias. Despite the regime's military control, the governorate continued to witness a civil movement raising slogans of the Syrian revolution, military operations targeting its forces, and security chaos, in addition to areas in it that remained far from the regime's control.
Because of the ambiguous model of control and the state of exception in southern Syria, studying the scene there constitutes a key to understanding the complexity of the Syrian situation more than in the rest of the Syrian regions, where the control of the different parties seems clear. The south also represents proof of the continuation of the political identities that were formed with the Syrian revolution, and the difficulty of the regime’s social control over the incubators of the Syrian revolution, or a return to the state before March 2011.
2011 - 2018: The cradle of the Syrian revolution
Daraa Governorate was known as the “Cradle of the Syrian Revolution”, due to the launch of the popular demonstrations in Daraa al-Balad on March 18, 2011, and then expanded to various regions of the governorate, and from there to the rest of the Syrian governorates in succession, following the “graffiti writing” incident and the arrest of children, which constituted a spark. Protests.
Soon, various regions in the governorate witnessed general popular participation in the demonstrations, and they began raising local slogans linked to the Hourani identity in the face of the authorities, in addition to national political demands related to political change, freedoms, and the release of detainees. Perhaps the most prominent manifestations of local solidarity were the popular demonstrations in solidarity with Daraa al-Balad in the rest of the governorate’s regions, which was known as “Fazaa.”
What makes Daraa truly the “cradle of the revolution” is that it witnessed the fall of the first martyrs of the Syrian revolution, the first massacres committed by the regime forces, and the first military incursions, until Daraa was present in most of the slogans of the demonstrations that were launched in solidarity in other governorates at the beginning of the revolution.
Despite the similarity between Daraa and the rest of the Syrian governorates, in the dynamics of the revolution, its process, and its expansion; From the demonstrations to the fall of the martyrs, then the major demonstrations, massacres, and broad popular involvement, leading to the shift towards armed action, the state of local solidarity and general popular involvement in the revolution was more apparent in Daraa Governorate than elsewhere, to the point where support for the regime from the first days became a “social stain.” “It pushes clans and families to disavow their sons who are officials in the regime or who support it, as the regime became in the first months of the Syrian revolution, treating Ibn Daraa as an accused; Which makes him vulnerable to arrest. For all this reason, the governorate acquired, from the beginning, a solid political and social identity linked to the Syrian revolution.
Later, in the last third of 2011, the phenomenon of armed action arose in Daraa - like the rest of the Syrian regions - under the slogan "Free Syrian Army." In the second half of 2012, armed action shifted from protecting demonstrations and targeting regime checkpoints to “liberation” and military control. However, the maximum expansion of the rebels in southern Syria was in March 2015 after controlling the city of Busra al-Sham.
Armed action has been linked to the emergence of multiple factions according to regions or orientations. Local Salafist factions have emerged. The most prominent of which are the Al-Muthanna Islamic Movement and the Ahrar Al-Sham Movement. Salafi-jihadi organizations were also active, most notably the “Al-Nusra Front,” most of whose leaders were Jordanian, and then the “Khalid bin Al-Walid Army,” which is accused of being affiliated with ISIS in the Yarmouk Basin region. In this region, between 2015 and 2018, a fighting front arose between the “Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade” and the “Khaled bin Al-Walid Army” on the one hand, and multiple factions, most notably the “Al-Nusra Front” and the “Ahrar Al-Sham Movement” on the other hand.
In 2014, the “Syrian Army” factions formed a unified umbrella under the name “Southern Front” supported by the “MOC” Chamber, which helped them keep the governorate away from the dominance of local Salafist or jihadi organizations, as happened in the north or east of Syria, but without It represents a complete unification of military action, a cancellation of the links and projects of the factions affiliated with it, or independence of the decision; Which kept the south influenced by regional and international actors, especially Jordan, the UAE, the United States, and Israel.
In addition, Daraa Governorate was affected by the intervention of Iran and the militias it supports in Syria. Since late 2014, Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi and Afghan militias have clearly participated in the battles of the “Triangle of Death” (the area between the northern countryside of Daraa and Quneitra and the southwestern Damascus countryside), but Iran has not been able to change the military equation in southern Syria or gain areas Additional in its favour.
On September 30, 2015, a new military equation emerged in Syria, in which the fragile military balance was broken in favor of the regime and its allies, due to the Russian intervention and its aviation and the new regional equation that accompanied this intervention, which prompted the withdrawal of many allies of the Syrian opposition factions, or a change in the situation. Their strategy, or accept the return of the regime and reach an understanding with it and the Russians.
Thus, the Syrian regions began to collapse rapidly, especially after the fall of Aleppo in December 2016, and then the fall of Eastern Ghouta, in which the regime used chemical weapons in its last battle to force the factions to surrender and accept displacement, which facilitated its mission when the Russian campaign moved to southern Syria. In June 2018.
2018 - 2021: Settlement and exception
The military campaign on southern Syria was preceded by an unannounced agreement between Jordan, Israel, the United States, and Russia, acknowledging the Syrian regime’s control over Daraa Governorate, but with Russian guarantees that Iran and the militias it supports will stay away from the borders with Jordan and the occupied Golan. In the first days of the military campaign, Israel stated that it preferred the Syrian regime’s control over southern Syria and the borders of the separation zone in the Golan.
During the first days of the military campaign, regime forces and their allies took control of most of the eastern countryside of the governorate. Some areas fell after military battles, some as a result of “local reconciliations” or secret agreements with the controlling factions, and other factions collapsed within days, while the “Free Army” in Daraa al-Balad maintained its positions and took control of new sites, but with the fall of the eastern countryside and the collapse of defense lines. The Syrian regime and its allies are now on the outskirts of Daraa al-Balad and the western countryside of Daraa.
After the fall of the eastern countryside, a round of negotiations began between the factions and Russian officers in the city of Busra al-Sham, under the auspices of the “Shabab al-Sunna Division” faction led by Ahmed al-Awda, supported by the UAE, who was the first to agree with the Russian side and call for an agreement with it and not to resist it militarily. Because this is “useless,” and it is likely that this agreement preceded the military campaign.
Negotiations between representatives of Daraa al-Balad and the western Daraa countryside, on the one hand, and Russian officers, on the other hand, resulted in the settlement agreement in southern Syria on July 6, 2018, which was similar in content to the rest of the previous settlement agreements, especially in the northern countryside of Homs and southern Damascus.
The agreement included recognition of the regime, its government, institutions, and flag, abandoning the slogans of the Syrian revolution, “settlement” of the status of those wanted by the regime or those who missed military service, handing over heavy weapons, and the exit of those who wished towards northern Syria. In return, the regime would release the detainees and pledge not to pursue revolutionaries and dissidents and not to enter. The military forces entered these areas, but rather the intervention of its government institutions and the police.
Although thousands of activists and families chose to leave towards northern Syria, the major revolutionary and social bloc chose to remain there, trying to adapt to the new situation after the settlement agreement, and trying not to allow the regime to isolate the remaining individuals, or for widespread displacement to occur there. Although the regime carried out tours in the settlement areas, it quickly withdrew from them, and they remained under the control of the same revolutionary and social networks.
Thus, a new map emerged from the new situation with new actors, but they are a continuation of the revolutionary and social networks that preceded the settlement agreement. With the end of the work on the names of the factions, the “Shabab al-Sunnah Division” faction maintained its presence and moved to work under the name of the “Fifth Corps” of the Russian command, although it was officially within the structure of the Syrian regime’s army, which later moved to the name of the “Eighth Brigade” within the Fifth Corps. . It has become a favorite destination for many fighters in the eastern countryside of Daraa, as a guarantee that the regime will not be persecuted and at the same time an alternative to joining its forces.
Groups of former faction fighters also joined militias auxiliary to the Military Security and Air Force Intelligence, and others joined the “Fourth Division” in the regime’s army while remaining within their areas, and the bulk of the fighters remained within their areas in local groups without names.
The “Central Committee in Daraa al-Balad” and the “Central Committee in the Western Daraa Countryside,” composed of local notables and former Free Army faction leaders, emerged to be responsible for negotiating with the Russian side and the regime, and following up on the implementation of the settlement agreement.
These two committees became more like local government bodies in the settlement areas, and their influence extended to other areas that witnessed local reconciliations prior to the settlement agreement, and the areas that fell militarily at the beginning of the campaign. This is in addition to the tribal and local blocs in each region, which ensured that the regime dealt with them as social blocs and not as individuals.
Manifestations of the exception model began to appear in Daraa, a few months after the settlement agreement, as demonstrations returned, raising slogans against the regime, in solidarity with areas where it is waging campaigns, or demanding the release of detainees. The flag of the Syrian revolution also reappeared in the demonstrations, and the slogan “Overthrow the regime” in the settlement areas that the regime’s military forces did not enter, then it expanded even into the areas that were not included in the settlement agreement, becoming a general situation in the governorate.
On the other hand, the regime did not adhere to the terms of the settlement agreement regarding the release of detainees, the return of services to the regions, or the withdrawal of its military forces, and it continued to carry out arrests on the roads between cities and towns, in addition to besieging and raiding some areas that did not require a massive military campaign to storm them.
After the settlement, a state of assassinations and security chaos began. Many of them targeted leaders of central committees, activists, and faction leaders. Some of them also targeted regime forces and officers. Local groups, which joined Military Security and Air Force Intelligence, carried out raid campaigns and assassinations in areas where they were present, creating a situation. The regime encouraged civil strife as an alternative to entering into a direct military war.
Manifestations of the regime's lack of control over the governorate reached their peak on the tenth anniversary of the Syrian Revolution (March 18, 2021), when huge demonstrations took place throughout the governorate, raising the flag of the Syrian revolution and calling for the overthrow of the regime and the continuation of the revolution. Then in the presidential elections in May 2021, when demonstrations against Assad’s election were renewed, the regime was unable to implement elections in most areas of the governorate, even in areas controlled by the “Fifth Corps.” Threats spread to target any center where elections are held.
During the same period, the "Acled" website database recorded 271 demonstrations in Daraa Governorate from August 2019 until the end of February 2023 (it is certain that the real number is higher than that).
This state of defiance prompted the regime, with Russian approval and support from foreign militias, to begin a second military campaign in May 2021 against Daraa al-Balad, without being able to advance militarily there despite its siege and attempt to storm it. The siege of Daraa al-Balad pushed a second "panic" in the governorate, in which local fighters in most areas of the governorate attacked the regime's military checkpoints and detained about 300 of its members, in addition to killing others on July 29, 2021.
Members of the Fifth Corps and Fourth Division participated in the attack on the regime. Which demonstrated the fragility of the regime’s control over the governorate and the adaptive or pragmatic nature of local fighters joining the structure of the Fifth Corps and even the Fourth Division.
The second military campaign ended with a second settlement agreement in Daraa al-Balad, which was moved to the entire governorate in September 2021, similar to the first agreement. This was accompanied by Russia's attempt to change the status of exception in southern Syria, withdraw military manifestations, and weaken the influence of the Fifth Corps and local groups, which actually increased the manifestations of security chaos.
2018 - 2023: Forms of security chaos
Security chaos has become the most prominent feature in Daraa Governorate since the settlement agreement (July 2018), which was concluded under Russian sponsorship and regional and international understanding. Although the military war stopped and the regime declared control over the governorate, the security war began in the governorate at that time.
The new situation prompted the remaining groups and personalities to reposition themselves to adapt to it in different ways. A portion of the fighters moved to civilian life, and a large portion of them maintained their activity within local groups in areas subordinate to or allied with the central committees, or local groups in disagreement with the central committees, whether For reasons related to local competition, lack of discipline, or refusal to settle and negotiate with the regime, while groups joined the Eighth Brigade in the eastern countryside; To avoid persecution by the regime, other groups joined the Fourth Division of the regime’s army in the western countryside and remained within their villages. Groups turned into militias affiliated with Military Security and Air Force Intelligence and became an arm of the security services in their areas.
Local militias
The settlement agreement forced both the regime and opposition fighters to stop direct military war and adapt to the new situation. Because it did not result in complete control by any party, or true reconciliation between the two parties, or between society and the authorities, the adaptation to the new situation for the regime and the revolutionaries was to shift towards security war or confrontation in other ways.
Therefore, the Syrian regime resorted to forming local militias drawn from former opposition groups to fight a proxy war in its areas, in addition to being involved in a network of security missions related to assassinations, drug smuggling, kidnappings, and others. These militias were able to continue the daily war against the revolutionary groups that rejected the regime, without the regime’s direct intervention. By forming these militias, the security services were also able to transform the confrontation in the governorate between society and the authority into a confrontation between the components of society itself, with the authority intervening as a mediator when there is tension.
The most prominent of these local militias were the Mustafa al-Masalma groups in Daraa al-Balad, and the groups of Fayez al-Radi, Imad Abu Zureiq, and Abu Ali al-Laham in the eastern countryside of Daraa. On March 28, 2023, British-American sanctions were issued against those involved in the drug trade, which finances the Assad regime, including leaders of the local militia, Imad Abu Zureiq and Mustafa Al-Masalma (Al-Kasm).
The central committees and activists in the south have accused these militias of being responsible for assassinations targeting former faction fighters and figures who reject the regime’s control in the south. On the other hand, these militias were subjected to many assassinations, the most prominent of which was the killing of Fayez Al-Radi on March 8, 2023, and the killing of Mustafa Al-Masalma, nicknamed “Al-Kasm,” on August 9, 2023 after 8 assassination attempts.
Assassinations and security incidents
The number of victims of the security chaos in Daraa Governorate worsened, from September 2019 until the end of 2023. Assassinations and security operations included all parties there, at the level of actors and targets, and most of them were concentrated in the areas of the western countryside of Daraa, in addition to the purely criminal incidents that were encouraged by the situation. Security chaos, most of which occurred outside the settlement areas or the control of the central committees.
But the most prominent target of assassinations, as the numbers show, are faction fighters before the settlement, some of whom joined the regime’s security and military services, and the majority of them maintained their activity within local groups or moved to civilian life. Assassination operations between the two sections appear to be the most violent, and account for about half of the number of those targeted and killed.
The figures also show the large annual death toll of regime members in an area theoretically controlled by it, as a result of assassinations, bomb explosions, targeting vehicles, or military confrontations, which may exceed the regime’s death toll on the northern Syrian fronts.
Military campaigns
The "Acled" website database recorded 1,419 incidents of military clashes in Daraa Governorate, from August 2019 until the end of February 2024.
Since the settlement agreement, the regime has deployed dozens of military and security checkpoints in the governorate’s areas, especially between cities and towns, and has repositioned itself in military units previously controlled by the Free Army. The regime also converted some checkpoints into huge military barracks, such as the “Al-Irrigation Plant” near the town of Tafas. These barracks imbued the governorate with a broad military appearance, and their presence constituted a case of provocation and easy targeting for local fighters who rejected them. Which also encouraged the escalation of military operations against it. Instead of implementing the condition of the settlement agreement regarding the release of the governorate’s detainees, these checkpoints have carried out about 2,600 arrests since the settlement agreement. Which further contributed to undermining confidence in the new situation after the agreement among the population, central committees, and groups rejecting the settlement, and encouraged ongoing demonstrations demanding the release of detainees, especially in Daraa al-Balad.
In addition, throughout the years of the settlement, regime forces carried out dozens of military campaigns, in which they followed the approach of mobilizing military forces around the area, bombing it, and requesting the extradition or deportation of people wanted on charges of carrying out military operations against the regime or belonging to “ISIS,” and they often ended with the entry of the Eighth Brigade. (formerly the Fifth Corps) as separation forces, and regime forces enter to conduct inspections in the area, conduct repeated settlements, and then withdraw. Many of these campaigns coincided with harvest seasons, to create double economic pressure on the people. The largest of these campaigns was on Daraa al-Balad, and the town of Tafas in particular witnessed the largest number of military campaigns, and they are the most prominent areas that agreed to the settlement agreement.
The repeated military campaigns put the governorate in a renewed state of war, and undermined - along with assassinations, security incidents, and the deterioration of the service and economic situation - expectations of stability in the south after the settlement agreement. Instead of the region turning into a safe space that encourages the return of refugees, after the agreement the rates of immigration from the region increased dramatically. Rising.
State regulation
The complexity and deterioration of the security situation in the governorate was compounded by the activity of ISIS cells and those linked to it. Before the settlement agreement, the organization’s crisis was limited to the Yarmouk Basin region, which is controlled by the “Khalid bin Al-Walid Army” loyal to the organization. However, the settlement agreement was followed by the opposition factions in the western region carrying out a military operation against the organization during which they took control of the Yarmouk Basin region, and the regime arrested dozens of its members. Then most of them were released during the following year.
These elements redeployed and became active in the governorate, and some of them joined the regime's security services, auxiliary militias, and the situation of security chaos and fragile control in the governorate encouraged it to turn into a focal point for attracting members of the organization from outside the governorate. It also encouraged various organizations to attempt activity there, such as the "Ansar Front" organization. Al-Din", one of its leaders (Abu Jalaybib) was killed while trying to cross into the governorate, after Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham eliminated the organization in Idlib and pursued its leaders.
Former Khalid Army members were active with ISIS members coming from outside the governorate in recruitment and alliance with a third group, which are local groups of members of former revolutionary factions opposed to the central committees, for various reasons, even if the members of these groups were not affiliated with the organization’s ideology or were acting constructively. On his own motives.
The organization’s cells were stationed in areas, most notably Jassim, Tafas, and the Yarmouk Basin. Leaks and “confessions” from prisoners in the central committees revealed that these cells carried out assassination operations against the central committee groups and revolutionary groups opposed to the regime in the region. Some of them revealed recorded communications broadcast on the Internet between leaders of the regime. These cells are with officers from the regime.
The organization's operations mostly targeted the leaders of the central committees and the leaders of local groups, some of whom participated in resisting the regime's control over the settlement areas and in the battles against it after the settlement, especially in Daraa al-Balad and the western countryside of Daraa.
The organization also claimed responsibility for military operations against the regime and the assassination of figures from the local militias affiliated with the security services. Among the most prominent figures whose assassination the central committees held these cells responsible for were: the assassination of the leaders of the former “Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous” room, Adnan Abazid and Moataz Qanat, and the assassination of members of the Central Committee in In the western countryside of Daraa, Fadi Al-Asimi, Ahmed Al-Baqirat, Abu Al-Baraa Al-Jalam, and Musab Al-Bardan, and the “Hafu and Al-Harfush” groups accused of being affiliated with the organization carried out a suicide attack at the house of a known leader in the Free Army in Daraa Al-Balad on October 28, 2022, causing the death of 4 people and wounding others, and was followed by This launched a massive military operation against them.
Drugs
After the settlement, the drug crisis became the most prominent issue in southern Syria at the regional level. The United States placed several leaders in the local militias affiliated with the regime's security services in Daraa Governorate on sanctions lists for their connection to the drug trade.
Although the rise of drug manufacturing and transport activity is widespread in the governorate and takes place across it, the intensity of smuggling activities and armed confrontations between smugglers and Jordanian border guard forces focused on the desert of As-Suwayda governorate. This led to targeting and assassinations of people linked to the drug trade, and a Jordanian raid (which Jordan did not officially claim responsibility for) was launched on a site said to be used to manufacture “Captagon” near the town of Kharab al-Shahm on May 8, 2023. The Jordanian raids focused on As-Suwayda Governorate, The largest of these was the bombing of Arman and Tal Melh, which caused a massacre on January 9, 2024, and the escalation coincided with a wave of repeated clashes on the border.
The Jordanian raids were followed by the Central Committee in the western countryside of Daraa announcing a raid on a Captagon storage farm near the town of Tafas on January 23, 2024, and its readiness to participate in the war on drug traffickers.
2022-2024: How did the South regain the initiative?
The revolutionary and social networks in Daraa Governorate maintained their effectiveness after the settlement agreement in 2018, and despite being subjected to numerous strikes due to the delivery of heavy weapons, assassinations, sieges, military campaigns, and the attempt to split civil ranks through the formation of auxiliary militias, these networks have proven their ability to withstand, adapt, and reconstitute, in addition to... Representation and continued support of the local community and its interests, also supported by the strong politicization of local (Hurani) identity in the face of authority.
Three blocs
have mainly
maintained their effectiveness and organization since the settlement agreement, despite the changes they have been exposed to. They are:
the Eighth Brigade
in the city of Busra al-Sham and the eastern countryside of Daraa, and
the Daraa al-Balad bloc
, which was represented by the Central Committee (it announced its dissolution), the Daraa
Clan Council
, and groups. Local fighters affiliated with the Council and Committee, the Central Committee bloc and local groups not affiliated with the regime in the western countryside of Daraa.
In addition to these blocs, which represented an extension of the revolutionary factions and networks that preceded the settlement, social bodies of a tribal or regional nature were formed, the most prominent of which were the Daraa Clan Council and the Council of Notables of the Western Region, in addition to the meeting of the Daraa clans during the period of the siege of Daraa al-Balad on August 5, 2021.
This resort to tribal committees and social representation would preserve the cohesion of the social bloc that rejects the regime in the governorate, and expand the framework of representation and negotiation in confronting the regime, as it is easier to justify military wars against armed parties compared to the presence of a tribal and civil social party. Although the regime also relied on local party or tribal figures supporting it in several regions, it was unable to establish a credible civil entity or a true incubator that could provide social representation that was counter to revolutionary representation.
Therefore, the social and revolutionary networks rejecting the regime in the south reshaped themselves after the settlement agreement, in the form of civil, military, and civil entities, which attempted to present themselves as multi-level representations of society, and to bear responsibility for local governance.
After the battle of Daraa al-Balad and the second settlement agreement in September 2021, the three previous blocs were subjected to changes that weakened them. The Eighth Brigade was attached to the Military Security Service, its bloc was reduced, and its fighters were reduced. The Central Committee in Daraa al-Balad announced its dissolution, and the Central Committee and local groups in the western Daraa countryside faced Renewed military campaigns by the regime, ISIS cells and groups opposed to the Central Committee.
But months after the second settlement agreement, which was accompanied by the delivery of thousands of weapons to the regime, these blocs regained coordination among themselves and tried to maintain the calm and the negotiating option with the regime. It also regained its effectiveness and presence in controlling the local security scene in its regions, and imposed itself locally at the level of its towns and throughout the governorate, to resolve crises and take the lead on the scene with greater merit than the regime. Although the Eighth Brigade was officially attached to the Military Security Division, it maintained its previous behavior in presenting itself as a local faction independent of the regime.
Since the last quarter of 2022, these groups have begun a series of operations against ISIS and its associated groups, eliminating the bulk of the organization's leadership. On August 9, 2022, local groups in the town of Adwan besieged the organization’s military commander in the south, nicknamed “Abu Salem al-Iraqi,” who blew himself up. On October 15, the clashes and siege imposed by the local groups in the western countryside and the Eighth Brigade in a joint operation on a house in which the organization’s fighters were holed up in the city of Jassim ended by blowing up the house and killing them. The United States later announced that one of the dead was the leader of the organization. General Abu Al-Hassan Al-Hashimi Al-Qurashi.
The pursuit of the organization’s leaders in the Daraa countryside prompted some of them to take refuge in the Sad Road and Camp neighborhoods in the city of Daraa, with the Hafu and Al-Harfush groups, which carried out a suicide operation against the house of a leader in the Free Army on October 28, 2022, followed by launching a large-scale military operation against These groups, in which the Eighth Brigade and Daraa al-Balad groups participated, ended with the control of the region, the escape of Hafu and al-Harfush, and the killing of one of the most prominent leaders of the Free Army in Daraa, Khaled Abd al-Rahim Abazid.
Joint operations of local groups, central committees and 8th Brigade continued through 2023, moving to several towns. Some of them coincided with the regime’s threats to storm these areas under the pretext of the presence of ISIS cells there. The most prominent of these operations was the campaign of the Central Committees and the Eighth Brigade in the city of Nawa at the beginning of 2024, which ended with the announcement of the killing of the organization’s leader, Osama Al-Azizi, on January 28, 2024. The central committees said that he was the governor of the organization in the south.
The coalition of central committees, local groups, and the Eighth Brigade were also active in addressing the kidnapping crisis, and succeeded in March 2024 in releasing several kidnappers and announcing the arrest of the kidnappers, after campaigns and tribal meetings that leveled kidnapping accusations against groups in the Lajat area. The Central Committee and the tribal councils were also active in concluding tribal reconciliation agreements and resolving local disputes, which often led to armed clashes in which deaths occurred without interference from the regime.
However, in several incidents, the Eighth Brigade and the Central Committee faced criticism and accusations of raiding areas, arresting and shooting civilians, or targeting rivals, as happened in the towns of Al-Mataya, Umm Al-Mayadhan, Al-Yadudah, and Maaraba, as a result of the Eighth Brigade’s disputes with local groups, or in anticipation of the regime’s threat to storm these areas due to... The presence of groups of wanted persons, as happened recently when storming the town of Maaraba against the group of Muhammad Jadallah Al-Zoubi, which ended with his death along with 4 of his group in January 2024, or the Eighth Brigade’s arrest of 3 brothers from the town of Al-Mataya due to a dispute with their brother residing in the north. Syria in January 2023.
Local institutions and initiatives alternative to regime institutions appeared at several levels after the settlement agreement, despite the return of regime institutions to the governorate, as after the settlement the governorate did not witness an improvement in the level of services, development or reconstruction campaigns. The continued military situation, security chaos, and increasing arrests have contributed to the deterioration of the economic and service situation.
The regime also did not attempt to provide development initiatives in the governorate as a form of reconciliation with society, or to bridge the political and emotional gap between it and the cradle of the revolution against it. It limited itself to military campaigns, and the greatest burden of managing services remained on the local community, civil initiatives, and expatriate remittances. The governorate’s towns witnessed the beginning of In 2023, a massive fundraising campaign will be launched to operate services, repair water wells, and renovate schools, after the state did not undertake this task.
وعلى المستوى القضائي، فقد ظهرت إلى جانب مؤسسات القضاء التابعة للنظام لجان قضائية محلية غير رسمية، وهي استمرار للشبكات الثورية والاجتماعية القديمة، ونشطت خاصة في حل الخلافات المحلية والقضايا المتعلقة بالمجموعات المحلية المسلحة في مناطقها، وأبرزها اللجنة الشرعية في ريف درعا الغربي، التي أصدر وجهاء 9 بلدات في ريف درعا الغربي بيانًا بكونها المؤسسة القضائية الوحيدة التي يحق لها استدعاء أي مطلوب من أبناء هذه القرى.
لا يمكن الحديث هنا عن أن النظام لا يحكم محافظة درعا، ولا عن أنه يحكمها، فنموذج السيطرة الهجينة والمتداخلة بقي مستمرًا منذ اتفاقية التسوية وحتى هذه اللحظة. ولكن المناطق التي كانت خارج سيطرة النظام قبل اتفاقية التسوية، شهدت بشكل خاص مستوى أعلى من الحكم المحلي خارج مؤسسات النظام، ورغم دخول مؤسسات النظام بعض هذه المدن والبلدات بنسب متفاوتة، فإن حضوره يكاد يغيب تمامًا عن مناطق مثل درعا البلد وطفس، إلا في أوقات الحملات العسكرية عليها.
درعا: الدليل الحيّ
يبدو مشهد الجنوب السوري، الأكثر تعقيدًا بين المناطق السورية المختلفة، وذلك بسبب الوضع الذي نتج عن اتفاق التسوية، الذي أوجد سيطرة متداخلة واستمرارًا للصراع، ولكن بوسائل أخرى عديدة، وفوضى أمنية، وتدخل أطراف مختلفة كانت هامشية سابقًا، فضلًا عن الأطراف الجديدة، إلى جانب التأثير الإقليمي والدولي الذي ساهم في منع عودة الحرب الواسعة هناك.
أسس التكيّف مع الوضع الجديد بعد اتفاق التسوية نموذجًا جديدًا غير مسبوق في سوريا، واختلفت المواقف حول طبيعة التكيف المثلى مع الوضع الجديد، فاختار قسم من المجموعات الثورية التهجير بدلًا من التسوية والتعامل مع النظام، وتنوعت مواقف القسم الباقي، فاختارت اللجان المركزية الطريق التفاوضي مع روسيا والنظام مع الحفاظ على توجهها المعارض للنظام وخيار السلاح عند الضرورة، واختار قسم ثانٍ أن ينضم إلى أجهزة النظام الأمنية والعسكرية ويصبح ذراعًا لها.
واختار قسم ثالث اللواء الثامن بديلًا محليًّا عن النظام وعن المواجهة، ورفض قسم آخر اللجان المركزية بسبب خيارها التفاوضي أو بسبب التنافس المحلي على الحكم وضبط المشهد في هذه المناطق. كما نشطت في الوقت نفسه، خلايا تنظيم الدولة وعصابات جريمة منظمة ومجموعات خارج الكيانات السابقة، إضافة إلى نشاط المليشيات الأجنبية المدعومة إيرانيًّا في أوقات الحملات العسكرية، وإن كان نشاطها لم يخترق الحياة المدنية في المحافظة كما فعلت في شرق سوريا مثلًا.
حافظت درعا على هويتها السياسية بوصفها محافظة رافضة للنظام، وتمكنت من تنظيم استدامة هذه الهوية السياسية للمجتمع عبر تنظيم الشبكات الثورية والاجتماعية. إلا أنه رغم ثنائية الصراع الرئيسة هذه بين الثورة السورية ونظام الأسد، فإن تعدد التصنيفات والجماعات صنع العديد من الصراعات الهامشية، التي غذّاها عدم وجود سلطة مركزية أو استقرار أمني أو ارتياح اقتصادي؛ مما أبقى وضع الفوضى الأمنية مستدامًا أيضًا.
The overlapping and unstable scene in Daraa Governorate provides vivid evidence of the inability of the Syrian regime to impose its control over the areas that participated in the revolution against it, without a massive displacement of the people and the actors. It also represents evidence of the inability or will of reconciliation between society and authority on the part of both parties in politicized social contexts. It also provides evidence of the regime’s investment in and fueling chaos and insecurity. This has accumulated a state of despair and migration from the governorate in an increasing manner after the military campaigns, and presented a refutation of the hypothesis of the ability of Syrian refugees to return to the areas where the war ended in favor of the Syrian regime. Ultimately, this scene represents proof of the sustainability of political identities and the radical divisions that arose after the Syrian revolution against the regime.
Source: Al Jazeera