Demonstrators demand the fall of Abu Muhammad al-Julani, leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (Al-Jazeera)
The northwestern regions of Syria are witnessing ongoing protests against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and its leader, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in what has been described as the biggest challenge facing the group in the Idlib region and the Aleppo countryside.
The protests began as a result of what became known as the “coalition agents” issue, which caused an internal and popular crisis, which escalated to the point of threatening the body’s cohesion and continued control.
The case began in mid-2023 when the security authorities in the Commission arrested hundreds of its members and leaders, most of whom were from the military wing, in addition to others, and charged them with working or collaborating with the “International Coalition against ISIS,” or with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, or with Russia.
Investigations and arrests continued for months, and included prominent leaders such as the Secretary-General of the Idlib region, nicknamed “Abu Muhjin al-Haskawi,” and one of the founders of the Commission and its most prominent leader, nicknamed “Abu Maria al-Qahtani,” who were released months after their arrest amid a festive atmosphere by their followers.
While the investigations and arrests were continuing, a number of detainees who were not found guilty of espionage were released, and upon their release, they complained about the reality of torture and violations to which the detainees were exposed.
In view of the above, the leaders of the military wing felt threatened, in addition to growing feelings of anger within the Commission, and the voices of some leaders began to rise to demand the release of military detainees in the Commission’s security prisons.
Stress results
These pressures resulted in achieving several results that were implemented in the form of gradual steps, the most notable of which are:
Release most of the detainees, who were subjected to torture and whose charges were not proven, in batches, and officially close the case of “coalition agents” on January 26, 2024.
Arresting the security personnel responsible for investigating the case.
Forming a judicial committee to follow up on the consequences of the case, assess the condition of those affected, compensate them, and hold perpetrators of infringements and violations accountable.
The implementation of these steps - along with other steps - was confirmed by the General Shari’a (head of the Supreme Council for Fatwa) in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, “Abdul Rahim Atoun”, via his channel in the “Telegram” application, on March 1, 2024.
Abu Muhammad al-Julani, leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (Al Jazeera)
The clash of wings comes to light
But matters did not stop there. Internal conflicts between the Authority’s wings leaked to social media, and activists and figures who were close to or affiliated with the Authority published testimonies about stories of torture and violations in the Authority’s detention centers.
This led to popular demonstrations that steadily expanded to dozens of points in the areas controlled by the Tahrir al-Sham and the rest of the areas controlled by the opposition.
The demonstrations sometimes included speeches by notables from the regions and figures affiliated with the Commission or who worked within its ranks.
The protesters demanded the release of detainees, the accountability of those involved in violations and attacks on others, and the reform of the governance system, according to dozens of clips broadcast by activists’ accounts on social media and local media platforms.
3 categories and a mixture of objectives
The protesters’ views and orientations vary, and their goals vary. Among those who focus on the release of political detainees and ending the existence of the Commission, and those who demand that Al-Julani step down from its leadership and the dissolution of the Public Security Service, and those who are satisfied with demanding reforms in the administration and management of the affairs of the region, and those who talk about personal lawsuits and grievances and call for the restoration of rights.
This diversity or variation in the scope of the discourse and goals raised by the protesters is nothing but a reflection of the variation and diversity of the groups involved in the protests, which mainly include 3 categories:
Young people who are active in civil and media bodies and initiatives, and who complain about what they call the restriction of freedoms and the encroachment of security and military logic, and who represent the civil movement.
Parties and groups are active in the region and have visions and orientations competing with the Authority, most notably Hizb ut-Tahrir, which shows clear effectiveness in organizing and calling for demonstrations.
Perhaps the most important and most organized element is the factional protesters, who are a mixture of factional groups and elements that have defected or are in disagreement with the HTS. They are active in specific areas to which they belong, and demonstrate against Al-Julani and the HTS alongside local activists.
Popular demonstrations against the regime and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (Al Jazeera)
turning point
The demonstrations represented the turning point of the crisis from internal to general. Since its establishment in 2017, the Authority has gone through many stations and crises and suffered from the withdrawal of important parties from it or a coup against it, in an approach that is closest to continuous liquidation of ranks within the Authority. However, these tremors did not amount to The level of the current crisis, which is considered the most dangerous, is:
It opened the way for doubting Al-Julani’s person and his leadership of the Commission, and considering him part of the problem and not the solution. This state of skepticism can be seen, for example, but not limited to, in tweets issued by former officials of the Commission, such as its former media spokesman, Ali Saber (Muhammad Al-Ali), who resigned from His position and he published statements on his accounts calling on Al-Julani to leave the helm of leadership.
It shook the confidence of the members of the Commission and the local community in the leadership of the Commission and its security detail, and this was evident in the words delivered in the demonstrations and the banners raised therein, which called for the removal of the Commission and Al-Julani from managing what they call the liberated areas.
It highlighted cases of political detention in the region.
It produced a state of sharp polarization within the Authority between the leadership of the security joint and the leadership of the military joint.
It moved from the internal framework of the body to popular demonstrations, relatively large in number or demonstration points.
Although the participation of factional elements and groups in the protests had an impact in expanding the scope of the protests, at the same time it may have raised fears in popular circles that it would be used to settle accounts of factional authority and influence.
Expansion and living situation
Many sources attribute the main reason for the escalation of the "coalition agents" crisis and its transformation into popular demonstrations to the deteriorating economic and living situation in the region, as a fundamental factor in the escalation of popular discontent.
According to a certain segment, the aggravation of the living crisis is due to the administration of the region by the body “classified on terrorist lists” and the monopoly of economic resources by specific figures.
While other sources consider that the actual cause of the tensions is the Commission’s attempts to expand and annex vital areas and facilities to its control, which were originally under the control of the so-called National Army and the Syrian Interim Government.
During the years 2022 and 2023, the Authority launched four military campaigns, with the aim of strengthening its influence in the opposition areas, during which it took control of the vital “Al-Hamran” crossing, which connects the opposition areas to the areas controlled by the Kurdish-majority “Syrian Democratic Forces”.
As a result of this expansion, the Authority’s relations with the National Army factions and the local community in the areas of clashes became tense.
Many groups came out against Tahrir al-Sham in different regions (Al-Jazeera)
other reasons
In addition to the above, it is possible to point out a number of direct and indirect reasons that intertwine with each other and stand behind the complexity of the “employment crisis” and its expansion into the sphere of the popular movement, the most prominent of which are:
The security apparatus’s role and influence increased, and it began to arrest and torture military and field leaders with organizational or social influence from inside and outside the agency. This was acknowledged by Al-Julani in his speech delivered on February 1, 2024, in which he tried to explain the developments of the crisis from his point of view.
Abuses and violations by security and military personnel and agencies against civilians or other movements and factions, and they expressed their demands in the demonstrations.
Ongoing disputes stemming from internal confrontations between former and current leaders, movements, and groups in the body, to compete for power or resources, and often ended in the withdrawal of certain parties and groups from the body and turning it into a trench for its opponents.
The grievances and lawsuits accumulated over years of the authority’s control, which found in this crisis the opportunity to express itself and demand accountability and restoration of rights.
The desire to shift from the dominance of the factional and military situation to a civil administration that does not follow the factional situation, and this was constantly repeated in the calls and demonstrations that were active on the sidelines of the “coalition agents” crisis, and was stipulated in the initiatives and statements of the parties that interacted with the demonstrations in Idlib, the most prominent of which was a statement The Syrian Islamic Council, which called for choosing a competent leadership emanating from the free will of the people.
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham is considered the strongest faction on the ground in northwestern Syria (Al Jazeera)
Repercussions and attempts at containment
This crisis contributed to highlighting many sensitive files and issues in the region governed by Al-Julani through the HTS and the Salvation Government, most notably the security and economic file. It also gave the HTS’s opponents the opportunity to pressure it to introduce amendments to its security or administrative approach.
The crisis paved the way for other parties and factions to express their desire to participate in military decision-making and governance in the region.
Despite the escalation of the protests and the incriminating rhetoric that prevailed in the demonstrations and the slogans raised therein, the Authority was careful not to clash with the protesters and clearly avoided the use of excessive force, and its leadership showed an explicit approach to containing the crisis and trying to respond to the demands of the protesters, whether on the internal level or on the general popular level.
This appeared clear in Al-Julani’s speech, in which he presented his vision of the crisis and its developments on February 1, 2024.
So far, the containment efforts made by the Commission have succeeded in limiting the damage that could have been caused to it, and it is still seeking to absorb the anger of the street by following cautious measures that include introducing structural amendments in the “Salvation Government” and the security apparatus, opening more to activists, actors, and local notables, and making promises. Reform and accountability, while warning against crossing red lines.
Meanwhile, the ball of protests continues to roll, and the possibilities of escalation are still possible, especially since the actual steps provided by the Commission on the internal (security and military) levels or on the governance and economic levels are considered limited compared to the ceiling of the protests’ demands, which appear to be higher than the Commission’s ability or willingness. .
Source: Al Jazeera