The explanation session was more than necessary between Paris and Berlin.
While Ukraine's European allies, in difficulty on the ground, seek to increase their military support for Kiev, an emergency meeting was called in the German capital on Friday March 15, between France, Germany and Poland.
This comes in a particularly tense climate between Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz, since the conference in support of Ukraine organized at the Élysée on February 26.
The exit of the French president – who had affirmed that sending troops to Ukraine could not be excluded – cast a chill on relations with Germany, which was quick to categorically reject this option.
Thursday, during a television interview devoted to the challenges of aid to Ukraine, the French president hit the nail on the head, affirming that the West had "set too many limits" by excluding the sending of tanks or medium-range missiles in Kiev, before crossing these red lines in the face of the evolution of the conflict.
These turbulences within the Franco-German couple are not new.
Since the start of the large-scale conflict in Ukraine, strategic differences have emerged over the distribution of support for kyiv, the purchase and shipment of military equipment and even the vision of strengthening European defense.
To analyze these questions, France 24 spoke with Léo Peria-Peigné, researcher specializing in security issues at IIfri and author of a study on the new German defense policy.
How should we interpret these tensions between France and Germany on the question of ground troops in Ukraine?
Léo Peria-Peigné:
First of all, it should be noted that Emmanuel Macron never said that he would send troops on the ground, but that the idea should not be excluded.
This release caused a somewhat exaggerated media hype.
But it is true that on the German side it caused irritation.
Deputy Chancellor Robert Habeck opened fire by suggesting that Paris would do better to concentrate on arms deliveries.
The reactions to these statements reflect quite well the difference of appreciation in Europe on the approach to adopt towards Russia.
Emmanuel Macron's comments were appreciated by the countries of Eastern Europe, who are very worried and are demanding a clear and firm speech.
The Poles, in particular, had criticized the position of the French president when he declared in 2022 that Russia should not be humiliated and that it should be offered security guarantees.
But for Berlin and part of the French political class, the president's new outing is seen as an unnecessary provocation towards Moscow.
Germany has the feeling that France talks a lot and acts little, delivering less weapons to Ukraine than its neighbor – which remains by far Kiev's main European supporter with nearly 18 billion in military aid to its credit. .
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Germany has significantly increased its defense investments. This policy seems to generate friction with France, which nevertheless defends the project of a European defense. How to explain it?
Before Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine, France enjoyed the status of the leading defense power within the bloc.
With this widening of the conflict, we realized that the European armies were not ready to wage war.
This observation is also valid for France which certainly has the capacity to carry out external operations but not a high intensity war.
Germany has reached a turning point and has more resources than France.
We can wonder if Paris is not worried about seeing its neighbor stealing its own private territory in a certain way.
Especially since Germany is much more involved in NATO, in the EU and offers a more inclusive defense model on a European scale.
Of the 100 billion in the special defense budget planned by Germany, a quarter is intended for the establishment of a modular integration base to allow smaller European nations to come and integrate, within the framework of standards of NATO.
However, for this project, Berlin does not really need Paris, which historically has a vision of defense much less focused on Europe and a problematic relationship with NATO, due to a form of distrust towards the UNITED STATES.
For 20 years, Paris has developed an ultra-specialization in external operations.
This met a need but today seems a little outdated.
France is also the only nuclear power in the bloc, which generates a cost.
It invests around 50 billion euros per year in defense, a sum divided between Europe, NATO, nuclear deterrence, the maintenance of the navy in the Indo-Pacific zone, and the maintenance of bases in Africa and support for local allies.
With defense spending at 2% of GDP, which it forecasts from 2024, Germany would then spend 75 billion per year alone on the defense of the European continent.
Finally, there is a form of incomprehension within the “Franco-German couple” itself.
France considers that in Europe its first partner in terms of defense is Germany.
But the opposite is not true.
For Berlin, it is the Netherlands, whose land army is almost completely integrated into the German order of battle.
Their cooperation is extremely extensive while most Franco-German military initiatives stall.
One of the major obstacles is that for Berlin, Paris is not necessarily a priority partner in terms of defense.
In this context, how does Poland position itself? Does she have a card to play?
Since 1991, France, Poland and Germany have had a privileged cooperation framework through the tripartite meetings of the Weimar Triangle.
Today, for Warsaw, it is all the more essential to promote cooperation between France and Germany as it is on the front line of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
Poland is well aware that it will need its two allies if this war widens.
She works on good terms with Paris and her relations with Berlin have improved greatly since the arrival of Donald Tusk, after a period of diplomatic tensions under his predecessor Mateusz Morawiecki.
For Poland, this cooperation is a question of national security: it wishes to relaunch a European dynamic capable of confronting Vladimir Putin.
But to harmonize their strategies, France and Germany have a way to go.
Paris should reassess its defense priorities.
On the Berlin side, even if the desire remains to maintain the political relationship that was there during the time of Angela Merkel, the links have weakened with Olaf Scholz.
He seems to have lost interest in the partnership with France, which obviously does not help to develop a common vision.
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