Academic Sami Ayoub: The Ottomans adopted jurisprudential and religious pluralism, and Sharia is the moral legitimacy of modern law.

Highlights: Al Jazeera Net hosts Dr. Sami Ayoub, author of the book “Jurisprudence, the State, and the Sultan: The Ottoman Empire and the Making of Islamic Juris Prudence” The book explores the relationship between the Hanafi school of thought in its late manifestations and the largest sultanate known in modern Islamic history. The Ottomans adopted jurisprudential and religious pluralism, and Sharia is the moral legitimacy of modern law.

Al Jazeera Net hosts Dr. Sami Ayoub, author of the book “Jurisprudence, the State, and the Sultan: The Ottoman Empire and the Making of Islamic Jurisprudence,” published by the University of Oxford in 2020, to talk about jurisprudence in the modern era and its relationship with the Sultanate.

Academic and researcher Sami Ayoub, professor of the Middle East Studies Department at the University of Texas School of Law - Austin (Al Jazeera)

The study of the history of late Islamic jurisprudence and its transformations cannot be considered merely an ordinary jurisprudential study. Rather, it must address the relationship between jurisprudence and state agencies with an interactive historical perspective, aware of the influence of contexts and the changing meanings of concepts in the present time.

On this basis, academic and researcher Sami Ayoub, professor of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas at Austin, explored the relationship between the Hanafi school of thought in its late manifestations and the largest sultanate known in modern Islamic history, and discussed the legislative role played by the Ottoman sultans, and its effects became clear in the books on the branches of jurisprudence that he classified. The late Hanafi scholars, and how the jurists viewed the laws and royal orders and how this affected issues of legislation and jurisprudential jurisprudence.

Dr. Sami Ayoub adopted a historical approach based on the authenticity of the document, and an objective awareness of the nature of Hanafi jurisprudence on the one hand, and the nature of the concepts of authority, whether modern or pre-modern, on the other hand, in order to draw a map of the roles between the sultan, the jurist, and the judge, and between the sultan’s palace and the Sharia courts, and the aspirations of the subjects, whether they are Muslims. or non-Muslims;

In order to understand this more, Al Jazeera Net hosts Dr. Sami Ayoub, author of the book “Jurisprudence, State, and Sultan: The Ottoman Empire and the Making of Islamic Jurisprudence,” published by the University of Oxford in 2020, which was translated into Arabic by the Nahd Center for Studies and Research in 2023, so to the dialogue:

The book “Jurisprudence, State, and Sultan: The Ottoman Empire and the Making of Islamic Jurisprudence” was published by Oxford University in 2020 (Al Jazeera)

What prompted you to write this valuable book, especially since many were concerned with the late Hanafi relationship with the Ottoman Sultanate?

Many things led me to write the book, the first of which was my interest in Hanafi jurisprudence, which began with my fondness for Zain al-Din bin Najim al-Hanafi al-Masri (d. 970 AH), whose works we studied at Al-Azhar.

His writing was our gateway to Hanafi jurisprudence, its principles and rulings.

Accordingly, I wrote the book through my background in Hanafi jurisprudence, which I studied at Al-Azhar, and the second issue is represented by my interest in the history of the Ottoman Sultanate. I found in the works of the later Hanafi jurists that I read references to the Ottoman sultanate orders, which led me to research the determinants of the relationship between the Muslim jurists and the state, who dealt with necessarily with the existing political authority;

Represented by the Ottoman authority.

In the works of late Hanafi jurists I read, I found references to Ottoman sultanate orders, which led me to investigate the determinants of the relationship between Muslim jurists and the state, who necessarily dealt with the existing political authority.

Represented by the Ottoman authority

The period that the book highlights is the Ottoman era from the 16th century until the end of the 19th century.

I focused on this particular era because most of the writings that were written about the Ottoman authority and its role in ruling the Arab states adopt a nationalist narrative that says that the Ottomans were occupiers like the English and the French. However, this narrative did not surface before the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century in the context of The spread of the momentum of nationalist ideology.

The Ottomans were considered Muslim rulers over Islamic lands, which gave their authority political legitimacy in governance. This is not inconsistent with the existence of criticisms related to the method of rule of the Ottomans, but this does not negate the existence of a collective understanding that the Ottoman authority represented the legitimate political authority that claimed to be an extension of the Islamic political systems. Historically, and according to what I claim in the book, the Ottomans are credited with the late formation of the Hanafi school of thought, and by focusing on the Hanafi school of thought present whether in Egypt, the Levant, or the rest of the countries of the Ottoman Sultanate, I wanted to clarify that Hanafi jurisprudence in the Ottoman Sultanate in general adopted a unified position regarding political authority. The list is the consideration of the validity of royal orders and decrees in the jurisprudential tradition.

The Ottomans are credited with the late formation of the Hanafi school of thought

In the book, I discussed the issue of the steady acceptance of decrees and royal orders in Hanafi jurisprudential texts and commentaries from the 16th century until the end of the 19th century. Is this what created what I called the authority of the Ottoman royal orders in the Hanafi doctrine?
How did these orders affect the Hanafi school of thought?

An excellent question. Regarding the issue of the validity of decrees, there are many studies that have been written on the subject in the social, cultural and legal history of the Ottoman Sultanate, but what I have contributed to is highlighting the role of decrees and Shahani orders in the formation of late Hanafi jurisprudence in the Ottoman Sultanate by tracing texts, explanations and fatwas. And jurisprudential treatises in that period.

Secondly, I wanted to point out in the first part of the book that I wanted to discuss some existing views related to the state and political authority in Muslim history.

Such as my argument with Wael Hallaq, who saw in his books that the political authority was completely independent from the jurisprudential authority and that they were two independent authorities. This is a proposition, as explained in my book, that is partly true, but there is a need to understand that the Islamic jurisprudential and judicial framework is necessarily related to and based on an existing political authority that defends it. organize and fix it;

Accordingly, the jurisprudential and judicial system in any system, whether modern or ancient, is necessarily based on a political authority that defends and advocates for it.

The extinction of jurisprudential schools of thought during the 19th century AD was primarily linked to the absence of a political authority that defended them, or under political regimes that fought them or sought to adopt European legal systems, such as the pursuit of legalization policies, for example.

As for the second part of the book, it is related to the disappearance of jurisprudential schools of thought during the 19th century AD, which was mainly linked to the absence of a political authority that defended them, or under political regimes that fought them or sought to adopt European legal systems, such as the pursuit of legalization policies, for example. We find that the issue is not necessarily related to “Closing the door to ijtihad” and relying on “tradition”. Although this proposition in itself is partly correct, the ultimate determinant is the existence of existing political systems that defend a certain representation of jurisprudence and create a place for it in their existing institutions in the state, such as the Ottoman Empire’s adoption of the “Sharia Judiciary” system.

Accordingly, I sought in the book to refute the idea that political authority has no relationship with Islamic jurisprudence in general and later Hanafi jurisprudence in particular, and I emphasized the extent to which Hanafi jurisprudence needs the presence of political authority for its survival.

Later Hanafi jurists, whether in Anatolia or in the Arab provinces, criticized some of the sultan’s orders, as happened in issues such as “preventing farmers from traveling from their lands,” “expanding the will of the Ottoman judge in the issue of endowments,” and other issues in which the Hanafi jurists opposed the Ottoman Sultanate, but this does not It denies the consensus of jurists in their agreement on the importance of political authority in shaping later Hanafi jurisprudence, especially with regard to public policies.

The third matter is that the Muslim jurists in the Ottoman Sultanate proved that there is no room for having effective jurisprudence within Ottoman society away from political authority, except through interaction, whether positive or negative, with it. You find that they compose around these “sultanic decrees and orders” and accept them in their writings, and this does not contradict with What I mentioned in the book is that the later Hanafi jurists, whether in Anatolia or in the Arab provinces, criticized some of the sultan’s orders, as happened in issues such as “preventing farmers from traveling from their lands,” “expanding the will of the Ottoman judge in the issue of endowments,” and other issues in which the Hanafi jurists opposed The Ottoman Sultanate, but this does not negate the consensus of jurists in their agreement on the importance of political authority in shaping late Hanafi jurisprudence, especially with regard to public policies.

Was the jurist independent of the ruling authority, or was he bound by the ideology of the “state,” or was his independence limited?

An excellent question, and it is linked to theoretical discussions about the extent of the independence of the judiciary from the executive authority in the context of the modern state compared to pre-independence states, and here I would like to point out two things:

First: The issue of independence or lack thereof needs to be criticized along the lines of what Wael Hallaq built in his book “The Impossible State” when he argued that political systems in the nation-state do not know such a thing as “independence,” but rather there is functional and institutional independence, as is the case in systems. Contemporary politics that we witness today (separation of the three powers: legislative, judicial, and executive);

Therefore, these authorities are necessarily an integral part of the state and its political roles.

The legislative authority does not enjoy “imagined” independence, and as for the judicial authority, it is sufficient to point out that judges study in law colleges affiliated with the state apparatus, and through them they learn the meaning of “right” and “duty,” and that the order to appoint them comes from the state, and they implement and defend The law of the state, and the executive authority organizes society and implements the law through harmony between those authorities;

Accordingly, the idea of the independence of these authorities, which is theoretically presented as a break with the pre-modern state, needs to be completely refuted.

There are existing schools of jurisprudence in various parts of the Ottoman Sultanate (such as the four schools of thought), but the Ottomans adopted an administrative custom according to which the “judge of the judges” would be a Hanafi to rule according to the doctrine of the Sultan, but he placed the representatives of the noble Sharia (judges in the different regions of the Sultanate) over the rest of the schools of jurisprudence. In the Sharia judiciary

Returning to the Ottoman era, we find something similar to what I mentioned:

Accordingly, the judicial authority is an extension of the policies and priorities of the political authority, and the issue of “independence” was not within their intellectual perception, given the prevailing political and cultural context at the time.

We must make it clear that the Sharia judiciary was within a larger judicial system within the Ottoman system, which included judicial and legal pluralism that was not originally envisioned in the context of the nation-state.

The important thing is that no one before the end of the 19th century looked at the Sharia judge as a mujtahid with the powers of diligence within the framework of the judiciary!

Rather, he was viewed as a jurist who had passed through a certain administrative and practical path, such as obtaining permission from his sheikhs, mastering Hanafi jurisprudence, and training for a period as a teacher or assistant judge, before his appointment by a letter from the Ottoman Empire, to adhere to the prevailing opinion in his doctrine.

Accordingly, the judge is obligated to adhere to and apply the general provisions consistent with the laws of the Ottoman Empire, in the same manner as anyone appointed like him, without invoking “jurisprudential diligence,” because it is not his position.

Accordingly, it is rejected for the judge to make an effort based on his pure thought.

Because the judge is an agent of the Sultan, not of his doctrine, and he is obligated to issue a fatwa according to his doctrine, and if he does not do so, this is interpreted as a violation of the system and judicial ethics.

The Sharia judge applies the prevailing opinion in his doctrine without diligence.

Fatwa, ijtihad, and disagreement are not the tasks of the judge, but rather the tasks of the jurist.

The Sharia judiciary is a place where people obtain their rights, and the public usually has a general understanding of the jurisprudential issues that regulate their life transactions, so when they go to the judge, they do not want to seek diligence as much as they seek to take their rights based on established normative matters.

It can be considered that this approach has its origin in the Islamic system, which believes that the Sharia judge applies the most correct opinion in his doctrine without diligence.

Fatwa, ijtihad, and disagreement are not the tasks of the judge, but rather the tasks of the jurist.

The Sharia judiciary is a place where people obtain their rights, and the public usually has a general understanding of the jurisprudential issues that regulate their life transactions. Therefore, when they go to the judge, they do not want to seek diligence as much as they seek to take their rights based on established normative matters, and therefore the goal of people when they go to the judiciary is represented by “ Constancy and diligence are aspects of change.

Accordingly, the judge adheres to the most correct opinion in his doctrine and rules according to it unless new royal orders are issued that must be followed.

Therefore, we can conclude that the issue is not related to “independence” as much as it is related to the approach on which the political system and the judicial system associated with it are based. The Ottoman Sultanate, for example, was adhering to the Ottoman custom of making the position of chief judge specialized in the Hanafi school, but it made the representatives of the noble Sharia (judges in the regions different from the Sultanate) over the rest of the jurisprudential schools of thought in the Sharia judiciary;

In Upper Egypt, for example, the Ottoman judge ruled according to the Maliki doctrine, while in the Delta region of Egypt he ruled according to the Shafi’i doctrine, while the Hanafi jurist ruled in Cairo and Alexandria. Accordingly, there was a firm understanding among the public and judges of the nature of the system that manages the interaction of the judiciary with the authority of the state.

What is the role of the Journal of Judicial Rulings in the process of codifying Sharia law?
How did the Ottoman jurists receive it?

The magazine was published at the end of the 19th century and in the context of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and its trend towards comprehensive administrative, legal and judicial reforms, and it came after many of the Ottoman states had turned into English or French colonies.

The issue of legalization itself is linked to the political system;

As the application of Sharia rulings requires the creation of an established judicial system in which the Sharia judge works.

In any case, the idea behind the Journal of Judicial Rulings is to make it available to all judges in the Sultanate, including those who have not studied Islamic law, so that they can be relied upon in matters to be arbitrated within the new regular courts established by the Ottomans.

It also took ten years of work to be produced and is influenced in form by the French Civil Code. However, I point out in my book that the Journal of Judicial Judgments should not be viewed and reduced to being a product of the influence of European legal systems. Rather, it should also be considered that those who contributed In producing it, he insisted that it was inspired by the provisions of Islamic jurisprudence, especially with regard to the jurisprudential rules of Hanafi jurisprudence.

We find, for example, that the first hundred articles of the Journal of Judicial Provisions are literally the first hundred articles of the Hanafi jurisprudential rules according to Zain al-Din bin Nujaym al-Hanafi al-Masri (d. 970 AH) in his book “Al-Ashbah wa al-Naza’ir,” and those who undertook the draft of the magazine proved that they relied on these jurisprudential rules. While it was codified in the Journal of Judicial Provisions, the issue of codification itself is linked to the political system.

As the application of Sharia rulings requires the creation of an established judicial system in which the Sharia judge works.

Here, it must be noted that the Code of Judicial Provisions is mainly related to commercial matters, which usually depend on “custom” among merchants, as there was general acceptance that trade matters are based on local customs on the one hand, and consent and understanding on the other hand.

The matter that I discussed regarding the Journal of Judicial Rulings in general is that it is a new product in the history of jurisprudence.

The Ottomans wanted the Code of Judicial Provisions to reach universality due to their approach to the path of codification and its application within the new courts while continuing its connection with Islamic jurisprudence, so that any person, even if he was not a Muslim or an Ottoman, within the lands of the Ottoman Caliphate would be able to have the provisions of the Code of Judicial Provisions applied to him, especially in matters. Commercial law, especially since most foreigners were complaining about their inability to go to the judge in the Sharia courts because their testimony against their opponents was not accepted, so the Code of Judicial Rulings came and resolved these matters within the regular courts, where all people had the right to plead, especially since the Code of Judicial Rulings dropped the condition Islam to accept testimony, this effort made these provisions universal in nature as they could be applied to everyone.

Most foreigners were complaining about their inability to go to the judge in the Sharia courts because their testimony against their opponents was not accepted, so the Journal of Judicial Rulings came and resolved these matters within the regular courts, where all people had the right to plead, especially since the Journal of Judicial Rulings dropped the condition of Islam for accepting testimony. This effort made these provisions universal in nature, as they could be applied to everyone.

The other matter was that the Journal of Judicial Rulings was received warmly by lawyers, judges, and sheikhs of Islam.

They considered it a new product based on late Hanafi jurisprudence. The other point is that the legacy of the Journal of Judicial Rulings still exists today in all the countries that belonged to the Ottoman Sultanate and the Sharia courts were not abolished.

Whereas the echo of the Journal of Judicial Provisions is present in both the formation, examination, and practice of the Sharia judge, whether in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, or Iraq, even in the Sharia courts within the “occupying state.”

Accordingly, the Journal of Judicial Rulings turned into an important standard jurisprudential achievement for understanding Sharia courts.

Therefore, it can be said without hesitation that the Journal of Judicial Rulings is not only related to the codification of jurisprudential rulings according to the Hanafi school, but rather it changed the form associated with the administration of regular and Sharia courts. Although Egypt did not adopt the Journal of Judicial Rulings, they produced an Egyptian version of the content of the magazine through what was produced by Muhammad Qadri Pasha, Minister of Haqqaniya. In his book “Sharia Rulings on Personal Status”.

The tendency to reject any jurisprudential diversity within the framework of the state and the judiciary in Egypt since the early twentieth century is a product of the stage of political independence and a result of the choices of the jurisprudential legal elite that was formed during the period of the English occupation and which was influenced by the philosophy of civil law in European debates, especially about the role of religion and the state in society and finally

How did the difference of sects within the fabric of the Ottoman Empire affect the legislative process?
How did the unification of sects affect the Egyptian situation?

Thank you for this important question. In general, this tendency based on rejecting any jurisprudential diversity within the framework of the state and the judiciary in Egypt since the early twentieth century is a result of the stage of political independence and a result of the choices of the jurisprudential legal elite that formed during the period of the English occupation and which was influenced by the philosophy of civil law in European discussions, especially about the role of religion and the state in society, and finally, this tendency was also a way to confront the encroachment of foreign privileges within the Ottoman Sultanate, and Egypt in particular was one of the countries that wrote extensively about this issue.

Historically, the Ottomans gave privileges to non-Muslims because of their obligations towards non-Muslims and foreigners who came steadily in the middle of the nineteenth century. In that era, the number of foreigners who came to Egypt, for example, increased very significantly, and due to the existence of treaties, these issues were made within the jurisdiction of the consulates of their countries in particular. What relates to personal status, and has been extended to include criminal matters;

The consul now has a judicial role in the occurrence of any criminal violations committed by a foreigner in Egyptian lands. The starting point for this situation was the desire of the Ottomans to manage the daily life of everyone, regardless of their religion. However, it brought about matters that were not taken into account, especially since it coincided with the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, which is what This paved the way for violations by foreigners to occur within Ottoman lands with the approval and knowledge of the consuls, and so Egypt sought, with Nubar Pasha, to establish “mixed courts” in 1875, which relied entirely on French civil law and foreign judges. After that, “citizen courts” were established in 1883, which also relied on French civil law and a judicial elite trained in France;

Accordingly, the role of the Sharia courts began to weaken little by little until it began to disappear in many areas of Ottoman authority.

The Ottomans were committed to the minimum level of jurisprudential and religious pluralism for everyone who lived within the Ottoman Sultanate. However, this pluralism imposed many challenges, such as resorting in criminal matters to the “Ottoman Penal Code,” which was applied to everyone. However, the Ottoman Sultanate saw that there was more scope. Flexibility reduces its interference in personal status matters, for example, which is represented by Egypt’s possession of seven types of courts, including “Sharia Courts,” “Jewish Courts,” “Coptic Courts,” “Orthodox Courts,” “Armenian Courts,” and others.

In general, the Ottomans were committed to the minimum level of jurisprudential and religious pluralism for everyone who lived within the Ottoman Sultanate. However, this pluralism imposed many challenges, such as resorting in criminal matters to the “Ottoman Penal Code,” which was applied to everyone. However, the Ottoman Sultanate saw that there was A more flexible field that reduces its interference in personal status matters, for example, is represented by Egypt’s possession of seven types of courts, including “Sharia Courts,” “Jewish Courts,” “Coptic Courts,” “Orthodox Courts,” “Armenian Courts,” and others.

But this judicial pluralism, especially in the Sharia courts, was restricted, as it is said, by Muhammad Ali Pasha, who abolished the Ottoman administrative system, as he linked the Sharia courts exclusively to Hanafi jurisprudence, which caused problems for the Hanafi themselves, especially since Hanafi jurisprudence with regard to personal status matters makes divorce difficult compared to the Maliki school of thought. For example, here an important thing must be noted, which is that when the political authority begins to interfere more in the personal affairs of the subjects, the matter of codification becomes important. The connection of the tasks of the Sharia judiciary to what the political authority wants only provides the authority with a high ability to legislate, clearing the way for codification.

The history of the later doctrine of Hanafiism, especially after the Ottoman Caliphate adopted it as an official doctrine. It faced existential challenges from within the system of Islamic thought itself, whether from historical revival movements or from reformist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

How was the codification of Sharia law institutionalized during the era of the reform movement in the 19th and 20th centuries?

The history of the late Hanafi doctrine, especially after the Ottoman Caliphate adopted it as an official doctrine, faced existential challenges from within the system of Islamic thought itself, whether from historical revival movements or from reformist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

We find that the Hanafi doctrine in Egypt, for example, which became the accepted doctrine in the Sharia judiciary in general at the beginning of the nineteenth century, in which the Ottoman custom was satisfied with making the position of chief judge specialized in the Hanafi school, but it placed the representatives of the noble Sharia (judges in the various regions of the Sultanate) over the rest of the jurisprudential schools of thought in the judiciary. Legal, as I mentioned previously.

This Ottoman custom was overturned after the arrival of Muhammad Ali Pasha to Egypt in 1804, after which all judges, regardless of their sect, were obligated to rule according to the prevailing Hanafi opinion.

This change caused the exacerbation of social problems for Egyptians and the jurisprudential complications of the Hanafi school of thought, especially in matters of divorce and contracts, which were historically neutralized by the authorization of Maliki judges, for example, in matters of divorce due to harm.

After this change, new problems emerged related to application, renewal, and fabrication.

The matter ended with the adoption of the reformist school of Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935), and the Salafist school and those who embraced its doctrine such as Ahmed Shaker (d. 1958) and Hamid al-Fiqi (d. 1959) to end the jurisprudential tradition by separating the jurisprudential tradition from legislative issues, and considering that obliging judges According to the Hanafis, what is most likely is “sectarian fanaticism,” and the logic of legislation and jurisprudential renewal in Egypt, especially in the field of what was called “personal status” at the beginning of the twentieth century, has become nothing but “high orders and decrees” from the Khedive or “initiatives” from the Ministry of Haqqaniyya that are approved by some. The sheikhs said that they "do not oppose Sharia law."

The matter of legislation ended up with complete codification, which effectively eliminated Sharia courts and religious councils with Al-Sanhouri’s project, which - despite his appreciation for the jurisprudential heritage - demonstrated the necessity of abolishing Sharia courts in his writings in the context of the momentum of nationalist ideology in that period and the post-independence precursors to the establishment of the “national judiciary.” Or “unification of the judiciary” or “merging the judiciary” before the official abolition in 1955 in favor of the new civil law, which marked the end of the Sharia judiciary. Al-Sanhouri’s project must be seen first as an expression of his political vision of the nature of the nation-state, its powers, the role of its legislative and judicial institutions, and the place of religion in Egypt after independence, especially after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the caliphate.

In the end, I would like to point out the necessity of critical consideration of the Egyptian legal modernization project in the mid-twentieth century as an exception to the legal and judicial modernization projects in the Arab and Islamic world.

Judicial institutions in the region have benefited from civil codification and reaped some of the benefits of modernizing their historical judicial institutions in new contexts and with more effective procedural, administrative and legislative tools that are connected to society.

Most importantly, these reforms in the Arab and Islamic world did not lead - as happened in Egypt - to a cognitive and institutional break with the pre-independence state and the culture and customs of society or to the complete exclusion of the Islamic and other judicial and jurisprudential elite in the Jewish and Christian religious courts.

I claim that part of the problems related to what was called “application of Sharia” in the Egyptian context, within the demands of Islamic political movements, is partly related to the abolition of Islamic judicial institutions that historically provided a connection between Sharia and society and which could have been integrated and modernized in the emerging judicial system in the post-independence stage, as we see. In most countries of the Arab and Islamic world today.

The imposition of civil codification in Egypt during the period of independence and the inspiration of some jurisprudential rulings in some of its articles appears to have not received any chance of legitimacy outside the context of the legal elite controlling the power of the state. It appears that this trend in thinking has harmed the phenomenon of law in Egypt, as its legitimacy has become based almost entirely on The oppressive power of the state, which deprived him of a moral cover

Finally, the imposition of civil codification in Egypt during the period of independence and the inspiration of some jurisprudential rulings in some of its articles appears to have not received any chance of legitimacy outside the context of the legal elite controlling the power of the state. It appears that this trend of thinking has harmed the phenomenon of law in Egypt, as its legitimacy has become almost established. Kamel criticized the oppressive power of the state, which deprived him of a moral cover that could have guaranteed a minimum level of social, cultural, and religious participation and legitimacy.

Source: Al Jazeera

Academic Sami Ayoub: The Ottomans adopted jurisprudential and religious pluralism, and Sharia is the moral legitimacy of modern law.

You may like

Trends 24h

Latest