Russian Sukhoi-24 fighter (Reuters)

Despite the sensational headlines, leaked Russian military documents discussing the circumstances (including a Chinese invasion scenario) under which a beleaguered Moscow might resort to using nuclear weapons are not surprising, and no one should be confused about why the Russian military has contingency plans to deal with a potential Chinese invasion.

However, one reason why no progress has ever been made in significantly reducing tactical weapons, even though these proposals are on the table after the success of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, is that Russia views these weapons as a last-ditch capability to protect the Russian state in the event of The complete collapse or defeat of its conventional military capabilities, according to an article on the American Intercept website.

Nicholas K. Gvosdev, the author of the article, asked: Do these leaks change anything, especially regarding Russian plans to use such weapons to stop a Chinese invasion?

Gvosdev, director of the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, comments that the job of military institutions around the world is to envision and prepare for any scenario, no matter how unlikely it may occur.

The United States maintained war plans to invade Canada well into the 20th century.

Long term view

He pointed out that the idea of ​​planning based on capabilities (as opposed to planning based on scenarios) assumes that the United States must be prepared to overcome capabilities instead of trusting that the hands that use those capabilities will be friendly and will not use them against the United States or its interests.

The writer added that the Russian General Staff takes a long-term view in this regard.

Today's current partners, including Turkey and China, were once strategic rivals.

Russia's national security establishment remains guided by the principle of Tsar Alexander III, who said that Russia's true and lasting allies are its army and navy.

In other words, Russia views its partnerships from a fundamentally transactional and circumstantial perspective.

Gvosdev explained that Ankara and Beijing opposed Moscow in the past, but they are cooperating today because it is in their interest to do so.

If these calculations change, the relationship changes as well.

He argues that these Russian documents may have been strategically leaked, at this particular point in time, to remind China (and the United States) that Russia was considering setting a lower threshold for nuclear use as a warning against exploiting Russian vulnerabilities.

The beautiful thing about this leak, as the writer says, is that the Kremlin can officially distance itself from the documents (and even claim that they are old) while continuing to achieve its goal.

China can be reminded that conflict with Russia will be costly, and Beijing's goals and desires can be better met through continued cooperation within the current framework of Sino-Russian relations.

The writer concluded by saying: “Yes, the bear may be sick, but its claws remain sharp.”

Source: The Intercept