Palestinian Authority figures are preparing to present themselves to the scene that will be left behind by the Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood (Midjerney - Al Jazeera)

After the Al-Aqsa flood began on October 7, the question about the role and presence of the Palestinian National Authority in the Palestinian scene returned with force, as it had previously placed the last rose on the grave of this political body, and had turned into a mere authority without real authority, managing a major municipality. It is called the West Bank, in areas “A” and “B” only, and it is content with a security role in protecting the security of Israel and its settlements, without any political guidance.

However, as soon as about two months had passed since the flood, it seemed that the authority had spokesmen in the name of its “political project,” and the Palestinians began to see speaking faces, most notably: Hussein Al-Sheikh, Muhammad Shtayyeh, and Jibril Rajoub.

This presence of such figures, and the clear absence of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who did not address his people once, brought back the question: Who will succeed Abu Mazen?

The last of the kings

Since assuming the presidency in 2005, Mahmoud Abbas has tightened his grip on the Palestinian power centers by assuming, in addition to the position of President of the Authority, the presidency of the Fatah movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization. This trilogy forms a knot in the legacy of the 88-year-old man, and an axis of anticipated conflicts within the Fatah movement. The Palestinian Authority in particular, and then in the Palestinian political scene in general.

Despite the many speculations and expectations about the person who will inherit Mahmoud Abbas after his departure, the discussions being raised about the “post-Abbas” stage may tend to suggest that none of the candidates alone will be able to fill this void and tighten his grip absolutely on the three authorities, and until the man’s legacy It will be distributed primarily between the heirs in power and Fatah, and will be subject to the balance of power, alliances, and the ability of each faction within Fatah to extract major gains.

Of course, these discussions take place far from the occurrence of any elections, which is the right that Abbas deprived the Palestinians of for nearly 20 years, after he entered the Palestinian scene - two years after assuming the presidency - spending what was termed the “years of division,” which were accompanied by absolute monopoly of power. And the exclusion of all expected opponents and competitors, and the monopolization of power and money over the decision to hold elections, which were around the corner in 2021, before Mahmoud Abbas issued a decision to cancel them under the pretext of “postponing the occupation’s refusal to hold them in Jerusalem.”

After 19 continuous years in power, and his age approaching ninety years, and the conversations that circulate annually about his health condition, and the seasonal rumors about its deterioration, and the official counter-narrative describing this every time as “routine examinations,” and his official appearance after that in meetings, conferences, or media talks, The post-Abbas scenarios, and the extrapolation of the Palestinian scene during them, have become the main concern of international reports and research centers around the world, given the heated conflict between the pillars of power and the Fatah movement in the race to extract political and organizational gains, increasing the chances of them progressing towards this stage that is not being discussed openly within the ranks. Fatah movement or the Palestinian Authority.

What will happen the next day?

In February 2023, the International Crisis Group in Brussels issued a report on “The Battle for Abbas’ Succession,” in which it presented three scenarios about the outcome of the Palestinian scene on the day following Abbas’s departure from power, noting that this battle may lead, in its worst cases, to “the collapse of authority.” Entirely Palestinian.

The first scenario

is holding Palestinian presidential elections on legal grounds. Although it is the best scenario, it is the weakest possibility given the lack of any prospects for holding these elections, whether on the level of internal arrangements in the Fatah movement or on the level of compatibility with the Hamas movement and the rest of the Palestinian factions.

This is in addition to the possibility that Abu Mazen will suddenly cancel the elections, as he fears a new loss for the Fatah movement in light of the decline in its popularity and the rise in the shares of its political rival, Hamas.

The

second scenario

, according to the Center’s report, is for Abbas to choose a successor while he is at the helm of power, or to assign the task to the Fatah movement, which is described as “a choice that may achieve relative stability in a transitional phase.”

Here, the odds and speculations vary between Abbas resorting to creating the position of vice president, or choosing a figure from the Constitutional Court or the Fatah movement to assume the position, in light of the exclusion of the option of the head of the Legislative Council assuming the position of transitional president, after Mahmoud Abbas’s decision in 2018 to dissolve the Legislative Council and call for early elections. This is a step that Hamas described at the time as “lacking any constitutional or legal value.”

As for

the third scenario

presented by the report, it is comprehensive chaos that strikes the West Bank, and the outbreak of a bloody confrontation between the leaders of the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement, led by armed groups loyal to a number of first-ranking leaders in the authority or organization, after taking control of various areas in the West Bank, which will lead to... A major political and security crisis that may lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority.

This scenario is fueled by an extended series of raids launched by the security authorities against armed groups in the West Bank, accusing them of loyalty to the dismissed leader Muhammad Dahlan in the northern West Bank and its camps, and others linked to the former head of the intelligence service, Tawfiq Al-Tirawi.

In January 2020, Palestinian and Israeli sources revealed the arrest of an armed group from the Fatah movement, which was planning to assassinate Majed Faraj, the head of the Palestinian Intelligence Service. They said that the group in which weapons and explosives were found was led by liberated prisoners from the Fatah movement linked to Tawfiq Al-Tirawi, This step was linked by various parties to the struggle over the succession of Mahmoud Abbas, and sources reported that the president received complete information about the incident without taking any direct action against Al-Tirawi at the time.

Crushing succession candidates

By tightening his grip on the triumvirate of power, the organization, and the Fatah movement, Mahmoud Abbas undermined, over the years, any opportunities and chances for the emergence of his successors in these three axes. Despite the Fatah movement holding two conferences in 2009 and 2016, and the elevation of a number of the movement’s leaders to the front ranks, opportunities for everyone remained absent. About making a difference in competition so far.

Ghaith Al-Omari, former advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, said in an interview with France 24: “President Abbas and those close to him worked to distort the image and authority of any leader who emerged on the scene,” noting that Mahmoud Abbas himself was one of three prominent candidates to succeed Arafat, but today it is non-existent. The possibility of favoring one candidate over another in the succession of Abbas.

During the past years, Mahmoud Abbas worked to remove the former leader of the Fatah movement and National Security Advisor Muhammad Dahlan, who was dismissed from the Fatah movement and from membership in its central committee and moved to settle in the Emirates, and the security services in the West Bank continued to pursue those associated with him, including leaders and members of the movement.

Nasser Al-Qudwa, the nephew of the late President Yasser Arafat, and the former representative of Palestine to the United Nations, was also targeted, who was expelled from the Fatah movement in March 2021, after he sought to present a list of candidates for the Legislative Council, independent of the Fatah movement, to run in the elections that were scheduled to be held in May of the same year, then it was canceled by decision of President Abbas.

Other leaders from the Fatah movement were targeted to limit their influence, including Tawfiq Al-Tirawi, who was dismissed by presidential decree in August 2022 from the presidency of the Board of Trustees of the Al-Istiqlal Security and Military College, and his personal guards were also withdrawn from him just days after an audio recording of him attacking Hussein was leaked. Sheikh.

In August 2023, the Palestinian President issued a decree dismissing 12 governors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in a move described as targeting Jibril Rajoub, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement, and Tawfiq Al-Tirawi, who have widespread influence among the ranks of the governors.

The targeting was explained by the fact that a number of governors were former officers in the Preventive Security Service, which was headed by Rajoub, including Akram Rajoub, Ibrahim Ramadan, Jibreen Al-Bakri, and others.

The move came after reports received by Abbas about the failure of these governors to confront the spread of armed groups in the West Bank.

Despite the fact that the Secretary of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Minister of Civil Affairs, Hussein Al-Sheikh, and the head of the General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj, formed the narrow circle close to the President of the Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, and their dominance over decision-making in the boycott, and their constant accompaniment of the president on his foreign tours and internal meetings, and their control over the decisions issued by him, By harnessing it to enhance their presence and influence, observers believe that their survival in the leadership position depends on Abbas’s volatile mood.

Nasser Al-Qudwa says in a press interview about Hussein Al-Sheikh that the Palestinian president “could get rid of him easily if he was not popular,” adding, “If Abu Mazen changes his position tomorrow, Al-Sheikh will be finished.”

Who will inherit the province?

There are several prominent names on the Palestinian political scene to succeed Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority, and to seize the representation of the Fatah movement when it holds elections.

The fortunes of these names vary, with none of them possessing all the keys to popular and political power to seize or dominate the position within the Fatah movement.

Today, the Palestinian Authority seems completely on the sidelines, no one cares about it, and has nothing to do with it (Midjerney - Al Jazeera)

Hussein Al-Sheikh

His origins go back to a family displaced during the Nakba from the village of Deir Tarif. He is a former prisoner in the occupation prisons, and the secretary of the Fatah organization in Ramallah during the years of the second intifada.

He currently holds the positions of Minister of Civil Affairs, member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement, and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He is the closest political figure to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and the subject of direct communication and coordination between the Palestinian Authority and the occupation through his leadership of the “Civil Affairs Authority,” which is responsible for issuing VIP cards.” And permits for movement, transportation, and treatment between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the cities of the occupied interior. He has extensive relations with political, military, and security leaders in the occupation, and with Majed Faraj, he forms a duo that dominates the decision-making centers in Ramallah.

The Sheikh's star has emerged in recent years, and he has made himself politically prominent by attending media meetings, attending the President's internal and external tours, meeting with Arab and international delegations, and his constant presence on social media platforms. He fully adopts Mahmoud Abbas's political vision on the internal level and the relationship with the occupation, and he has faith Absolutely committed to the idea of ​​security coordination and suppressing the nucleus of any military movement or signs of a popular uprising against the occupation.

It is important to point out that he is not widely popular among the Fatah movement's popular base, and is in clear disagreement with the rest of the movement's leadership movements.

Gabriel Rajoub

Secretary of the Fatah Central Committee, President of the Palestinian Football Association, and former Head of the Preventive Security Service in the West Bank.

He spent 17 years in occupation prisons, and is widely popular in the city of Hebron, his birthplace, and among the popular base of the Fatah movement, due to his media presence and his somewhat degraded populist organizational discourse from adopting the narrative of complete authority, in favor of exporting the Fatah movement’s discourse and positions.

Marwan Barghouti

Secretary of the Fatah movement in the West Bank during the years of the Intifada, a prisoner in the occupation prisons since 2004, sentenced to life imprisonment 5 times, and a member of the Central Committee of the Fatah movement.

He is widely popular in the Palestinian street, and among the popular base of the Fatah movement, and is viewed as a potential threat by the current Palestinian Authority leaders, because he had previously threatened to run in the presidential elections and support Nasser al-Qudwa’s list in the legislative assembly.

Many parties believe that Marwan Barghouti may be a Palestinian consensual choice among the components of the national scene, and that he represents the “winning horse” of the Fatah movement, in light of the decline in the popularity of Mahmoud Abbas.

Its only candidate for the presidential elections.

According to a recent opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, about 90% of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip demand Abbas’s resignation from the presidency of the Palestinian Authority, and Marwan Barghouti comes first in terms of popularity, as 36% chose him as President Abbas’ successor.

Therefore, prior to the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle, Barghouti’s wife led a series of visits to the countries of the region to pressure to accelerate his release in 2021, but the occurrence of the flood significantly raised the chances of Barghouti’s release as part of prisoner exchange deals, which are supposed to take place as part of the outcome of the battle.

Muhammad Dahlan

The first rival of Mahmoud Abbas, the former commander of the Preventive Security Service in the Gaza Strip, the Minister of Civil Affairs, then a member of the Legislative Council for the Fatah movement in the 2006 elections, and the former National Security Advisor.

The Palestinian President issued a decision to dismiss him from his positions in the Palestinian Authority and the Fatah movement and to revoke his parliamentary immunity in the Legislative Council. He was subjected to trials in absentia during his stay in the Emirates.

He founded the Democratic Reform Movement in the Fatah movement, and inaugurated societal reconciliation with the Hamas movement, which enabled him to work comfortably in the Gaza Strip.

He has a presence in the camps in Lebanon and the West Bank, and he repeats in every media appearance his refusal to hold any official Palestinian position.

The name Muhammad Dahlan sparked a Palestinian-American crisis in 2020, when the American ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, said that it was the name proposed by the United States as an alternative to Mahmoud Abbas, a statement that was said at the time to have come as a “misquote from its publisher.”

Muhammad Shtayyeh

Former Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, and member of the Fatah Central Committee.

He holds a doctorate in economics, and has previously held ministerial and academic positions. He also previously assumed the presidency of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), and a membership in the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid negotiations.

Muhammad Shtayyeh does not enjoy wide popularity among the ranks of the Fatah movement, and his government’s economic policies and the pitfalls it faced, whether in the clearing crises, the outbreak of the Corona epidemic, and the prevention of entry of workers into the country, contributed to the erosion of his chances of competing for the presidency.

Despite his favor with the Europeans and Americans, the “technocratic” model represented by Salam Fayyad during his presidency of the Palestinian government (2007-2013), when he embarked on “financial reforms” that meant besieging the resistance’s money and what supports it socially, and flooding people with bank loans, remains recycled by International actors in the Palestinian issue are a more likely possibility, as these actors repeat from time to time calls for “reforming the Palestinian Authority” and talking during the Al-Aqsa Flood War about a “renewed Palestinian Authority.”

Mahmoud Al-Aloul

Vice President of the Fatah movement, and member of the movement’s Central Committee.

He previously held the position of governor of the city of Nablus, his birthplace. Mahmoud Al-Aloul is considered one of the prominent military leaders in the Fatah movement during the 1982 Lebanon War, and was responsible for the kidnapping of 6 soldiers from the occupation army.

He does not prefer to appear in the media, enjoys wide popularity and acceptance among the ranks of the Fatah movement, and is described as the focus of consensus among the factions within the movement. He also represents the national line in the movement and the Palestinian Authority, and does not express any declared ambitions to assume the position of president of the Palestinian Authority.

Tawfiq Al-Tirawi

A member of the Central Committee of the Fatah movement, and one of the founders of the General Intelligence Service in the West Bank. He assumed its leadership for one year on behalf of Abu Mazen before he was dismissed as a result of American pressure, because he was one of the symbols close to the late President Yasser Arafat.

Al-Tirawi was attributed to forming several armed groups affiliated with him in the West Bank, which were subsequently targeted by the authority’s security services. His name topped the list of candidates to succeed Abbas years ago, and then his presence declined as a result of his exclusion from a number of the positions he held.

He is considered part of the anti-Hussein al-Sheikh and Majid Faraj movement in the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, and audio recordings of him attacking Hussein al-Sheikh were previously leaked.

The Eighth Conference.. The dream of the sheikh that was shattered by the flood

Amid diligent efforts and arrangements made by Hussein Al-Sheikh, the Fatah Revolutionary Council approved in August 2023 the holding of the movement’s eighth conference on December 17, 2023, seven years after the seventh conference was held in 2016, which resulted in the appointment of Mahmoud Al-Aloul as deputy. For the leader of the Fatah movement.

The Lebanese Al-Akhbar newspaper revealed that Hussein Al-Sheikh at the time made internal moves within the Fatah movement to attract loyalties, and sought regional approval to seize the position of deputy leader of the Fatah movement from Al-Aloul, and included Majed Faraj in the central committee of the Fatah movement.

During 2023, the Sheikh held discussions with officials in the occupation entity and Jordan, to present himself as the most capable of controlling the security and political scene in the West Bank.

Within two months, he held three meetings in the presence of Majid Faraj and President Abbas’ advisor Magdi Al-Khalidi, with the non-resident Saudi ambassador to the Palestinian Authority, Bandar Al-Sudairi, to present the Authority’s efforts to “calm down the situation in the West Bank, and its support for the expected Saudi normalization projects with Israel.”

In addition to the regional movement, Hussein Al-Sheikh sought to fully control the course of the Eighth Conference of the Fatah movement, through two paths: the first;

Targeting his rivals within the movement and weakening their influence, by passing a presidential decision to dismiss dozens of governors, ambassadors, and ministers in the Shtayyeh government, a step that was described as targeting those close to Jibril Rajoub and Mahmoud Al-Aloul and replacing them with figures loyal to the sheikh.

The second path:

Hussein Al-Sheikh took over the logistical arrangements for holding the eighth conference, and secured the attendance of the invitees, through his relations with the Israeli side, and his ability to obtain the necessary permits for them to come to Ramallah from the Gaza Strip or abroad, and controlling the nature of the invited figures, and seeking to exclude the prisoners by claiming the difficulty of their participation in the conference. The conference was a result of the tense conditions in the prisons, which observers considered an attempt to exclude Marwan Barghouti from the Central Committee.

All of the previous planning and arrangements that the Sheikh had diligently sought while waiting for the holding of the eighth conference, on which he had bet heavily to snatch an advanced position in the leadership of the movement, came on October 7 and wasted away two months before the scheduled date for the conference, which went unheeded, waiting for what would turn out. To him the Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood.

Waiting for the "next day"

The political statement has been proven that before October 7 is not the same as after, when the occupation and the Americans thought that the Gaza front had been neutralized by work permits and promises to restructure the blockade, and to achieve deliberate recovery of the economic and living situation in the Strip, and the global and regional powers were preoccupied with the scene of escalating clashes in the West Bank. Western countries, and studying the options available to search for a suitable successor to Mahmoud Abbas. The moment of the flood came to turn the scene upside down, and scattered all existing political calculations and arrangements. The crucial question moved from what “the day after Abbas’s departure” looked like to what “the day after the end of the war” looked like. on Gaza,” which is what America and “Israel” sought to export under the title “post-Hamas.”

As of writing these lines, the Gaza battle has broken the 150-day barrier, and it seems that all the discussions and options that were put forward by Israel, America, and the region before the flood have been postponed to an unknown date and centered around the “post-Abbas” phase, and the continuous storming carried out by these parties to study the acceptable alternative. It has, first and foremost, the ability to meet the American-Israeli conditions and specifications and to fully commit to transforming the Palestinian Authority into a civilian administration operating under occupation.

All of this was without any concern on the part of these parties for the weight and presence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and a clear indifference to the role of Gaza in shaping and influencing the Palestinian and regional political scene. Everyone thought, as we mentioned above, that this front had been neutralized by financial grants, work permits, and regulated economic facilities.

With the start of the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle, the term “the next day after Hamas” came to the fore, and “Israel”, America and the region were busy searching for options that up to the moment seem unrealistic and unclear or incomprehensible about what the next day they are looking for is, at a time when there is still In it, Hamas is present on the ground, fighting, negotiating, receiving offers, accepting and rejecting, conducting partial deals, and pressing its field weight on the ground, within the fiercest waves of aggression and the most violent military confrontations that the region is witnessing in its contemporary history.

Today, the Palestinian Authority, with its president, its poles, and its conflicting movements, seems to be completely on the sidelines, with no one paying attention to it, and having no control over its affairs. But the only constant in light of the ongoing bone-crunching battle in the Gaza Strip is that if Hamas emerges from this battle, it will have imposed its presence. Politically and militarily, it changed the face of the region, its understandings, and the plans of the regional powers, and it became the first force in the Palestinian arena that cannot be bypassed under any circumstances.

Before the flood, talk about the post-Abbas era was talk about an acceptable alternative in Washington and Tel Aviv, but those who were looking for an alternative that suits them are now faced with difficult choices about the nature of the person who will succeed Abbas: Will he be a civil, technocratic figure capable of being A title that enjoys international acceptance and Palestinian consensus to begin post-battle entitlements?

Or a loyal security figure capable of controlling the scene in the West Bank, suppressing the escalating state of clashes, and ensuring that it does not develop into a widespread uprising?

Or a popular Fatah figure capable of gaining internal Palestinian consensus?

Many questions preceded sunrise on the morning of October 7, and hundreds of questions have been generated since the moment Israel’s walls, fences, and army divisions and brigades collapsed in the Gaza envelope. These questions will continue to be generated depending on the facts of the battle and its course, which will definitely create a new political reality. Not only in Ramallah District or the Gaza Strip, but in the region and the world as well.

Source: Al Jazeera