Somaliland President Musa Bihi Abdi (right) and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed attend the signing of the memorandum of understanding agreement regarding the port (Reuters)
On January 1, 2024, Somaliland President Musa Bihi Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that they had reached an agreement under which the “Republic” of Somaliland (which is not internationally recognized) would grant Ethiopia a port on the Red Sea overlooking the Gulf of Aden.
Only two days passed after that announcement, and it was confirmed by an official Ethiopian statement, and demonstrations broke out in Mogadishu, the capital of the central state of Somalia, in protest against the agreement that opened the door to Addis Ababa’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state.
The deal in its announced form is likely to benefit both parties, but even if the agreement is not fully implemented, it will reshape the regional balance and the map of geopolitical alliances on both sides of this part of the southern Red Sea, not to mention the revival of old conflicts in this turbulent part of Africa.
Ethiopia appears ready to be the only country to recognize the "Republic" of Somaliland in exchange for access to the Red Sea, although this announcement angered East African countries, as the new alliance could reignite conflict in the already troubled region.
Somalia declared the agreement null and void, describing it as a direct aggression against its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Anatolia Agency)
Geographic conflict
Since Ethiopia lost its coast on the Red Sea following Eritrea's independence in 1993, Addis Ababa's imperial ambitions to dominate the Horn of Africa have become dependent on finding a foothold on the Red Sea again.
Since losing the coast of Eritrea, the Ethiopians claim that their country has been subjected to the theft of an essential part of its territory, despite the fact that Eritrea gained its independence by activating the articles of the Ethiopian Constitution that granted Asmara the right to regain its independence.
In October 2023, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed translated these populist claims by declaring that the Red Sea is the “natural border” of Ethiopia, claiming that Ethiopians cannot live within this “geographic prison.”
Regarding these Ethiopian allegations, which are cited as justification for the agreement it concluded with Somaliland, which represents a flagrant violation of the African Union Charter, Professor Thomas Mandrup, a professor at the Institute of War and Strategic Studies at the Royal Danish Defense College, confirmed to Al Jazeera Net that what Ethiopia witnessed in 1993 took place in accordance with its federal constitution.
The professor went on to say, "With regard to the agreement to lease part of the coast of Somaliland to Ethiopia, the talk that marred the agreement about the former's recognition of the latter's independence represents an assault on national sovereignty and a threat to it."
Over the past decades, Ethiopia has relied on Djibouti to transport more than 95% of its imports and exports, but Djibouti - which hosts many foreign military bases - imposes port fees on Ethiopia in excess of one billion dollars annually, which has exhausted the already exhausted Ethiopian economy, which It reached the point that it recently failed to repay its foreign debts, making direct access to the Red Sea a lifeline for it.
Under the agreement with Somaliland, Ethiopia will secure less expensive and more reliable access to the Red Sea through the port of Berbera, by leasing a 20-kilometre-long coastal strip for 50 years that will also allow it to build a naval base and develop a commercial port on the strategic Gulf of Aden, an area - unlike Djibouti. - It is not a regional center, at least not yet.
Somaliland
Unlike the Italian colony of Somalia, Somaliland was a British protectorate until 1960, and after gaining independence on June 26 of that year, Somaliland became an independent and sovereign state for only 5 days.
On July 1, 1960, the country voluntarily merged with the Somali territories under Italian administration, and then the Republic of Somalia was born. In 1991, following a fierce war between the Somali National Movement - which took its bases in Somaliland - and the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu, Somaliland declared its independence. Once again, but this time the entity is more than 5 days old, extending to the present time.
Since then, Somaliland has succeeded in imposing itself as a fait accompli. Without international recognition, it has succeeded in implementing a different pattern of building a state entity, which is a pattern of building from the bottom up, and by integrating tribal authorities into Western-style institutions.
Somaliland has a population of 5.7 million people, and it has its own constitution, passport, army, and currency. It also has a government and a president, as well as regular direct elections. However, the lack of international recognition remains an obstacle to obtaining the financing and aid it needs to achieve economic development.
The agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland includes many cooperation provisions, including provisions to bring investment to the port of Berbera and along the Berbera-Hargeisa-Wagali trade corridor. Under the agreement, Somaliland will obtain a 20% share of Ethiopian Airlines, in addition to military cooperation. At a high level with Addis Ababa, but the question remains whether Ethiopia will officially recognize the independence of Somaliland, which has become more urgent and complicated after the recent discovery of oil reserves off the coast of Somaliland, which both parties are keen not to promote.
Preliminaries of the Horn of Africa earthquake
The deal was met with enthusiasm in Somaliland, but at the same time it sparked protests. Only a week after the announcement of the agreement, on January 8, Defense Minister Abdul Ghani Mahmoud Attia resigned in protest against the agreement, criticizing his president, Musa Abdi, for not consulting the Council of Ministers regarding the port deal and that they They learned about the memorandum of understanding from private media, and that the agreement allows Ethiopian forces to enter Somaliland, posing a vital threat to national security.
Atiyah comes from the Awdal region in Somaliland, where Ethiopia is said to want to establish its military base in the coastal city of Lugaya.
For its part, Somalia declared the agreement null and void, describing it as a direct aggression against its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that it conflicts with the one-Somalia policy and weakens efforts to achieve stability in Mogadishu.
In 2006, Ethiopia succeeded in obtaining permission from former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to intervene militarily in Somalia and inflict a major defeat on the Union of Islamic Courts that controlled parts of the country. This was considered by Al-Shabaab to be an invasion that developed into an Ethiopian occupation, given that the Ethiopian forces... Al-Ghaziyeh turned into the largest battalion participating in the country's peacekeeping forces.
Al-Shabaab has condemned the deal and is likely to exploit it to expose the federal government's weaknesses.
The Somali government may find itself between a rock and a hard place. Addis Ababa's challenge may have consequences for Somali security, given that Ethiopian forces constitute one of the largest units among peacekeeping groups in the country.
As for Egypt, given its dispute with Ethiopia over the Nile waters, it fears potential competition in the Red Sea, and that the deal is an attempt by Addis Ababa to destabilize the region and assert its dominance.
As for Eritrea, Ethiopia's renewed ambitions have reignited old tensions between the two neighbors, which prompted Asmara to seek rapprochement with Mogadishu.
As for the African Union, it expressed its concern and urged all parties to exercise “restraint and stop escalation.” After the recent wave of military coups that the continent witnessed, the organization fears that the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia will result in renewed instability in the Horn of Africa that may lead to armed conflict.
Although the African Union fears at the same time that the agreement will lead to establishing a precedent for other secessionist movements on the continent, this fear appears to conflict with the intentionality of the African Union fact-finding committee in 2005, which concluded that Somaliland’s claim to independence is unique Its kind is historically and self-justifying.
The African Union, as described by its fact-finding committee - controlled by Ethiopia, the host country of the African Union - appeared to be keeping the door ajar for possible independence for Somaliland.
Regarding what measures the African Union can take other than the usual statement that expresses concern and urges all parties to exercise restraint and stop escalation, Professor Thomas Mandrup explained that the African Union cannot accept the behavior of a member state in violation of the Charter, noting that recognizing Somaliland as a matter A reality that is seen as a hostile act against Somalia and the principles of the agreements for its future.
Mandrup said that Somaliland has remained a relatively stable region for years, even if it refrained from wanting reunification with the rest of Somalia. As for Puntland, it is a different case as it enjoys self-rule, but desires to be part of Greater Somalia, which raises two possibilities for conflict: the first. One is more aggressive and armed, the other is muted.
As for the United States and the United Kingdom - which have invested hugely in achieving stability in Somalia - the agreement represents a serious challenge. For historical and geopolitical reasons, the two countries cooperated with the leaders of Somaliland, but they have so far refrained from officially recognizing it as a state.
Protests in Somalia after signing an agreement to use Ethiopia as a port on the Red Sea (Reuters)
Scenarios
The evidence is that the agreement resulted in new tensions in a war-torn region, which makes anticipating what is coming limited mainly to two scenes:
Likely scene: escalating tensions
Whereas Ethiopia's ambitions for hegemony on the one hand and Somaliland's quest for recognition on the other hand are enough to lead to increased geopolitical tensions and a change in regional loyalties, and among those changes are:
A rapprochement has already begun between Mogadishu and Cairo.
Closer cooperation between Egypt and Eritrea.
An imminent collision between Addis Ababa and Asmara. In this regard, Mandrup stressed that entering into a war depends on the degree of alliances with Somalia, which is still ambiguous, adding that the African Union can mediate, and that through its relevant agencies it does not seem likely so far. An armed conflict occurred between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Close coordination and cooperation between Djibouti and Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea, coinciding with the high and intense competition between it and Somaliland.
The agreement will weaken the ongoing state-building process in Somalia.
The likely scenario is that the tensions and reformulation of alliances in the region will not reach the point of regional armed conflict. This scenario does not include international recognition of Somaliland, but it will establish its existence as a fait accompli.
Least likely scene: regional conflict
Under the second, less likely scenario, escalating tensions could lead to a regional armed conflict involving many active players, which would lead to further division.
The reason behind this may be Abiy Ahmed’s policy of reviving Ethiopian nationalism to rally the Ethiopians against an external enemy, and in this scene it will be confirmed to Egypt that Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea - including the military base on Somaliland - constitute an existential threat to its national security.
Like the Nile River, the Red Sea is vital to Egypt, as Suez Canal revenues - which in 2023 reached more than $9 billion - are considered its most important stable source of hard currency.
Internal conflicts could spark a regional war, such as the escalation of armed clashes in the city of Las Anod, the administrative capital of the disputed Sool region in Somaliland, which lies along the oil-rich Nugal Valley between Somaliland and Puntland, or Al-Shabaab attacks in Ethiopia. .
Source: Al Jazeera