Congolese soldiers patrol the town of Butembo in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Reuters-Archive)

The Uganda-Rwanda rivalry represents one of the main factors in shaping the dynamics of regional politics in the Great Lakes region in general and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular. The forces of the two arch rivals fought violent battles on their lands between 1999-2000, while the indirect confrontation between them almost developed into a war in later stages. .

A group of intertwined factors map out the drivers behind the intervention of Kampala and Kigali in the Congo, which greatly contributed to the complexity of the latter’s crises and prolonged their duration to exceed two decades, leaving millions dead, according to some estimates.

Map of Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda (Al Jazeera)

Race for resources

The desire to benefit from Congolese resources is one of the factors fueling the Uganda-Rwanda rivalry, as eastern Congo abounds with a huge range of underground wealth such as gold, diamonds, oil, cobalt and other precious metals.

The ongoing conflict in the east of the country and the security vacuum it left in the region have provided neighboring countries with the opportunity to benefit from these riches, either directly or using their armed arms of local agents, as rebels supported by Rwanda and Uganda control strategic supply chains extending from the mines in North and South Kivu. To the two countries.

Although Kampala and Kigali deny their involvement in these activities, a paper issued by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in 2022 cites some evidence to refute this denial, making use of data related to the two countries’ exports.

In this context, the paper states that while gold is Uganda's largest export, most of it comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the latter ranks first as the largest producer of coltan in the world.

On the other hand, Rwanda and Uganda come in third and ninth places, which indicates their dependence on coltan smuggled from the Congo, as they only have limited deposits that do not qualify them for this position.

Rwandan President Paul Kagame (Reuters)

Policy overlaps

The ruling elites in both Kampala and Kigali are working to take advantage of the transformation of eastern Democratic Congo into an incubator for a large number of rebel factions to consolidate their authority internally, as the course of events in the regional neighborhood turns into part of the process of creating internal balances in the two countries.

Within this context, Rwanda warns of the danger of the “Forces Democratic for the Liberation of Rwanda” (FDLR), active in eastern Congo, as the heir to the Hutu extremist forces that carried out the bloody 1994 massacres against the Tutsis, as part of a political discourse directed to sustaining the legitimacy of the “Rwandan Patriotic Front.” The ruling force ended the genocide.

Thus, as DRC expert Jason Stearns notes, FDLR has become a convenient tool for Kigali to use as an external threat to justify the repression of political opposition and restrictions on civil liberties by the regime of President Paul Kagame, in the context of its protection of the nation from the specters of a recurrence of those Horrific tragedies.

While an article co-written by Christophe Tytka, assistant professor at the Institute of Development Policy at the Belgian University of Antwerp, explains that Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni uses the Allied Democratic Forces attacks launched from eastern Congo to justify human rights violations, impunity, and obtain material support and aid. Security and military partners are international partners within the framework of the so-called “war on terrorism.”

The Ugandan authorities linked this armed group to both Al-Qaeda and the Somali Mujahideen Youth Movement, which later linked its forces to one of the wings of this group, the Islamic State.

President Gandhi Yoweri Museveni (European News Agency)

This is how the rift began

An International Crisis Group analysis finds that the long-standing and intensifying rivalry between Rwandan Presidents Paul Kagame and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni represents one of the most serious factors of instability in the Great Lakes region.

The roots of the problematic relationship between the two men go back to the fact that many of the men who have shaped the face of Rwanda in the last three decades, led by Kagame, grew up as refugees in Uganda, which received tens of thousands of Tutsi refugees in the 1950s.

With the start of the Ugandan civil war in 1981, Kagame and his companions joined the fight alongside Yoweri Museveni, who as a result became master of the presidential palace in Kampala since 1986. But despite this victory, the Rwandan group felt that it did not receive the reward it deserved, as Kagame expressed his bitterness about He was unable to live up to his personal abilities, as “no one has forgotten that he is Rwandan.”

Professor Mahmoud Mamdani describes what the Rwandan officers went through as a feeling of “betrayal by their former comrades-in-arms,” which was not alleviated by Museveni’s support for the Rwandan Patriotic Front led by Kagame, through which he was able to become his country’s number one man since 1994.

In this context, Henning Tam, a lecturer in international relations at St Andrew's University, believes that the personal factor plays a role in the rivalry between the two men, and that one of the reasons behind the dispute that erupted between them in the Democratic Republic of Congo later is partly due to Kagame's desire to prove his ability to challenge Uganda's influence and confront Museveni. He and his companions described him as his “Rwandan sons.”

Regional superiority

Despite the importance of the economic factor as one of the driving drivers of the Uganda-Rwanda rivalry in eastern Democratic Congo, the endeavor of both countries to prove their regional superiority is no less important in formulating their policy regarding their roles in the giant, exhausted neighbor, which has turned into a geopolitical battlefield between Kampala and Kigali.

This dispute between the two parties appeared early, as it was linked to the course and repercussions of the first Congo wars (1996-1997) and the second (1998-2003), where the emergence of the Rwandan role in the overthrow of former Congolese President Mobutu Sese Seko and the subsequent power-sharing arrangements raised concern in Uganda, which read it. Not only as an attempt by the Rwandan elite to escape from the mantle of Kampala, but also to compete with it.

Associate researcher at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Paul Nantulya, points out in his article that the battles fought by the forces of the two countries in eastern Democratic Congo between 1999 and 2000 constituted a final turning point in their relations, as Paul Kagame stated nearly two decades later that Uganda was working to “undermine My country since 1998.

Proxy war

A report by the International Crisis Group traces how the rivalry between the two countries has taken the form of proxy wars on Congolese territory, with Kampala and Kigali accusing each other of supporting militias hostile to the other.

There are multiple roles played by these armed factions in the context of the Uganda-Rwanda rivalry, as they represent a tool used by each party to threaten the interests of the other in the Democratic Congo or across the border. They are also considered an entry point to influence the local policies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the peace agreements it concludes with Kinshasa, which allows them to Entering the wheels of power in the country.

Many factors have combined to make eastern Democratic Congo a “paradise for rebels,” whose factions number more than 100 according to international estimates, as the region’s richness in underground resources has given these groups the ability to build mini-economies that have enabled them to finance their activities and arm their fighters, in addition to some of them being linked to neighboring countries that benefit. Including smuggling precious metals in exchange for providing logistical and security support.

The most important agents

Within the framework of the Rwandan-Uganda rivalry, a number of armed factions supported by both parties and active in eastern DRC emerge.

The March 23 Movement (M23) is one of the most important of these groups, and its operations almost sparked the war between Kigali and Kinshasa. It was founded in 2012, and after its defeat the following year, it signed a peace agreement with Kinshasa that led to the disintegration of the movement, after which part of its forces fled to Rwanda, and part Another to Uganda.

After the two factions returned to eastern Congo later, each accused the other of becoming subordinate to Kampala or Kigali, and groups of them resumed fighting again in 2021, accusing the government of not fulfilling its pledges.

A report by United Nations experts stated that there is strong evidence of Rwandan support for the operations of this wing, which Kigali denies.

On the other hand, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, a Rwandan armed Hutu opposition militia, whose leaders were involved in the 1994 massacres of Tutsis, stand out.

After their defeat by President Paul Kagame, they regrouped in the North Kivu region in 1998, allying with former Congolese President Laurent Kabila, who tried through them to reduce Kigali's influence in the east of the country.

While Rwanda accuses Kinshasa of supporting these forces, it also suspects Uganda of supporting them.

In addition to these two movements, eastern Congo is home to the Rwanda National Congress (RNC), an armed militia based in South Kivu. Its leaders are Tutsi dissidents from Kagame, who have allied themselves with Congolese Tutsi militias hostile to the Congolese army and Rwanda. Kigali accuses Kampala of supporting this movement. .

Source: Al Jazeera + websites