Alexander Downs: A Trump presidency would likely be worse for Ukraine (George Washington University website)
Washington -
From the first moments of Russia's invasion of Ukrainian territory, US President Joe Biden pledged to support Kiev endlessly, and followed a three-pronged strategy consisting of: arming Ukraine, imposing sanctions on Russia, and supporting the US military presence in the countries neighboring Kiev.
Two years after the start of the invasion, the American position in support of Kiev became complicated with the start of a hot American electoral season, and the refusal of the majority of Republicans in Congress to provide more aid to Ukraine, while military experts believe in the difficulty of the Ukrainian army achieving any future victories, and the impossibility of liberating its lands.
To shed light on the Biden administration's position as the war in Ukraine enters its third year, and how to manage the conflict, Al Jazeera Net interviewed Alexander Downs, director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, and an expert in international conflicts and urban wars.
The following is the text of the interview:
How do you evaluate the Biden administration's response to the Russian war on Ukraine over the past two years?
The Biden administration has begun to take a cautious but firm stance.
From the beginning, the president was concerned about the potential for escalation, including nuclear escalation.
Biden wanted to send a strong message that Russian President Vladimir Putin's aggression against Ukraine would be resisted, but he had no interest in the United States or NATO entering the conflict directly.
Biden's cautious approach meant a gradual increase in weapons types for Ukraine.
Many weapons were initially prohibited for fear of an escalation that Washington saw as unnecessary in the face of Moscow.
But over time, Kiev acquired HIMARS missile launchers, M1A1 tanks, and F-16 fighter jets, and this was done in a carefully calculated and gradual manner.
Although some observers may view this gradualist approach as modest in the face of an adversary with nuclear weapons, it seems to me a wise and appropriate way forward.
Has Washington changed its strategy towards Ukraine during the past two years?
No, but there may be changes in the near future.
The Biden administration's strategy from the beginning has been to help Ukraine withstand, repel and ultimately defeat Russian aggression, by providing diplomatic, economic, and military assistance.
“Defeat” here does not mean a return to the situation that existed before;
Rather, it is a return to the previous situation with Kiev controlling its entire national territory, including the withdrawal of Russian forces from all Ukrainian territories before 2014 (including the Crimean Peninsula).
President Biden announced at the NATO summit in Vilnius that the United States would support Kiev “whatever it takes,” and the administration continued to say publicly that it would not force Ukraine to negotiate.
But things are changing.
Even with massive aid, NATO training of Ukrainian forces in warfare tactics and advanced Western weapons and tanks, the Ukrainian counteroffensive failed in the summer of 2023. The Russians regrouped and drove Ukrainian forces from Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
In Washington, Republicans refrained from providing more aid to Ukraine.
The president's rhetoric has changed from supporting Kiev and from repeating the phrase "as long as it takes" to repeating the phrase "as long as we can," which is a big difference;
Because “as long as we can” may mean two years or a little more.
Ukraine has no chances on the battlefield without Western generosity, whether in armament, training, or financial support.
Therefore, the Biden administration's position may change to asking Kiev to accept negotiations to reach the best possible deal, in light of the conditions on the ground.
What might former President Donald Trump's victory in the upcoming November 2024 elections mean for the future of the war in Ukraine?
We have to remember that Donald Trump, as a former president, was a great admirer of Putin, and still praises him to this day.
Trump also strongly criticized US and NATO efforts to defend Ukraine.
Trump opposes the Biden administration's proposal to send an additional $60 billion in aid to Kiev, and Trump's allies attacked Republican members of the Senate who voted in favor of this measure.
Trump also said that he could have prevented the war by giving parts of Ukraine to Russia, and that if he won the presidency he could end the war within 24 hours.
It is clear that Trump prefers a deal that involves - at least - accepting Russia's territorial gains by annexing some territory in Ukraine. This would be a radical change from the current declared policy of the Biden administration, although it may be less different from the position that Biden may end up with given recent developments. .
Are you optimistic about the possibility of Ukraine advancing militarily as the third year of fighting begins?
And why?
No, the Ukraine offensive last summer only managed to gain about 10 miles.
Observers imagined that a few dozen German, British, and American tanks, and a few months of combat training with these weapons, would enable the Ukrainian army to launch a blitzkrieg and defeat the Russians.
The Ukrainians did not advance due to the strength of the deep Russian defensive belts, which are riddled with mines and covered by anti-tank missiles and artillery in these areas.
Now the provision of Western and American military aid to Ukraine is faltering, leading to a shortage of ammunition and harming the morale of the forces.
With Republicans blocking US aid to Ukraine, a Trump presidency is likely to be worse for Kiev.
All this is happening at a time when the Russians are regrouping.
On the other hand, the currently ongoing war of attrition is very costly for the Ukrainian side.
This war allowed Russia to gradually advance and control areas and cities around which fighting had recently erupted, such as: Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
It benefits the financially stronger side, and Moscow is this party at the present time.
With this new reality, is a diplomatic settlement to the war in Ukraine possible, or even desirable, by the Biden administration?
Almost all wars end in negotiated settlements.
There are some exceptions in history, but even wars for regime change end before the enemy's ability to resist is completely destroyed.
This war in Ukraine will not be different, and the only question remains: What are these conditions?
Traditionally, the war goals of countries differ depending on their fortunes on the battlefield: countries that are close to victory want more, and countries that are close to defeat settle for accepting some losses.
It appears that the goals of the Ukrainian war have not wavered, as Kiev insists that Russia must withdraw from all the Ukrainian territories it has seized since 2014, including the Crimean Peninsula.
One of the reasons why Ukraine maintained its broad military goals was the support it received from America and Western Europe.
Now that aid flows are at risk of being reduced to a trickle, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may have to reduce his goals and accept the loss of some territory.
What is the Biden administration's vision for a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine war?
It is not clear whether the settlement is a good or bad thing for Washington.
On the plus side of any future settlement, Ukraine would retain most of its territory, a dangerous proxy war with a nuclear-armed adversary would end, and Russia's military power would be weakened by its heavy losses.
On the other hand, Putin's aggressive war may make him more emboldened to launch more attacks against Washington's NATO partners.
But he is well aware of the difference between Washington's allies that are members of NATO, and its allies outside it, so he will hesitate to think about any military adventure with any member of the alliance.
From the Biden administration's point of view, it is not clear that supporting a peace settlement makes it look like a loser, especially since making concessions to opponents in an election year is usually political suicide.
But we are facing a different situation, as Trump's Republicans in Congress oppose providing aid to Ukraine, and 70% of American public opinion in recent opinion polls supports the course of negotiations to end the war.
It is likely that Biden will receive more criticism from within his party, and from traditional Republicans, than from right-wing Republicans who support Trump and the MAGA movement.
However, Trump attacks Biden in all cases, accused him at a campaign event of conspiring to give Ukraine to Russia, and said he would work to protect Kiev more than Biden.
Regardless of American domestic politics, a negotiated settlement to the war is possible, but so far unlikely.
It is likely that Putin's targets are rising and Ukraine's targets have not yet fallen, meaning there is no room for a deal in the coming weeks and months.
Republicans claim that the Biden administration is giving blank “checks” to Ukraine. Do you agree with them?
And why?
It is true that Washington provided a lot of aid to Ukraine, estimated at $50 billion, according to a report issued by the Congressional Research Service.
It is true that this money could have been spent on many priorities for American citizens.
However, in terms of great power politics, aid to Kiev is money well spent.
When an opponent is stupid enough to get bogged down, supporting the other side is a smart strategy to wear that opponent down.
In Vietnam, for example, when the United States entered a war of little strategic interest and value, China and the Soviet Union were more than happy to pump money, men, and weapons into Vietnam to weaken their enemy.
Washington returned the favor a decade later when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and provided support to the mujahideen there, which cost Moscow dearly and contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union.
Iran played the same role during the American occupation of Iraq.
In other words, $50 billion may be a good investment given the extent of the damage the war has inflicted on Russia's military power.
Washington has provided much military and non-military aid to Ukraine, but after two years of fighting, Russia still controls about 20% of Kiev's territory.
How do we calculate the impact of US aid?
On the one hand, the Ukrainians stopped the initial Russian attack before military aid began to flow.
I believe that American weapons and support have made a measurable contribution by ensuring that the regime in Ukraine continues to survive.
Even simple things, like Javelin anti-tank missiles, made a difference early on.
Likewise, 155mm artillery shells kept Ukrainian guns firing non-stop, and SAM systems helped defend Ukrainian cities against Russian missile barrages.
But there are limits to what military aid can do, and in this case US aid did not enable Ukraine to launch attacks and reclaim large swaths of territory.
Advanced technology does not win wars on its own.
Soldiers must be trained to use weapons and be able to operate them in wartime conditions.
It was naive to think that small numbers of American and European tanks would make a big difference.
It is extremely difficult to train personnel in modern combined arms tactics and operations.
NATO trainers were unable to transfer their experience in maneuver warfare to sufficient numbers of Ukrainian soldiers;
Given the limited time available before Kiev's summer offensive.
Under pressure and combat conditions, the Ukrainians returned to their previous ways, and a dead end in advancing militarily ensued.
In short, US and Western military aid has kept Ukraine in the fight and can keep it, but it has not and will not enable Ukraine to expel Russian forces from its territory.
Strategically, how does the Israeli aggression in Gaza affect the war in Ukraine?
It affects in many ways.
First, the war on Gaza created competition for US military aid, whether to provide it to Ukraine or to Israel.
Secondly, attention was distracted at the diplomatic level, as Washington was subjected to ridicule for using its veto power against several resolutions calling for a ceasefire in the Security Council, while it was unable to influence Israel’s goals and its management of the war on the ground.
Third, the Gaza war is disturbing American domestic politics, as pro-Trump Republicans in the House of Representatives prefer to provide aid to Israel.
But they opposed providing it to Ukraine, and ended up blocking aid to both sides.
What are the main geostrategic consequences of the Ukrainian war so far, two years after its outbreak?
One of the surprising geostrategic consequences of the war at its beginning was the unifying and galvanizing effect it had on NATO.
Putin was betting that European countries, such as Germany, which depend on Russian gas, would be reluctant to oppose his attack on Ukraine.
But he was wrong, as NATO came together and remained largely cohesive, with some hiccups, such as: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s opposition to Sweden joining the alliance.
But so far, this unity has not led to significant increases in European military capabilities and defense production.
Production of the 155mm projectile is still weak and will remain so for years.
These countries believed that war in Europe was a thing of the past, and they bet wrongly on that.
NATO unity could also be severely affected if Trump wins the November 2024 elections. That would be disastrous for Ukraine, and perhaps for some NATO countries given Trump's statements that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wants to NATO members, who are not spending enough on Defense.
The second result is the prosperous relations strengthened by the war between Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.
China has been notably restrained on one level, refraining from supplying weapons to Russia.
But it contributed in other ways, such as: purchasing Russian oil, thus filling Putin's war chest. Moscow also obtained artillery shells and missiles from North Korea, and drones from Iran.
Source: Al Jazeera