Chinese state-owned companies are developing new weapons.
Many of them have set up armed volunteer militias, noted the British daily Financial Times and the American news channel CNN.
“At least 16 large groups have established combatant cells, according to an analysis of announcements published in the state press over the past year,” says CNN in an article published Wednesday February 21.
The profile of these companies is very varied: they include the company in charge of the metro in Wuhan, the Shanghai Municipal Investment Group and the water management company in Huizhou.
Strengthen cooperation between the army and the population
In December, Yili Group – the largest dairy producer in China and the fifth largest in the world – became the first private group to do the same.
But we should not be fooled: “even though it may be private on paper, the central government always has a say in the decisions of a company as strategic as Yili,” says Marc Lanteigne, sinologist at Arctic University. from Norway.
This is also a common point between all these structures which have installed militias within them: they are economic actors of strategic importance in the eyes of those in power.
Nothing to do with the few small local businesses which, in recent years, have also called on citizens to play the role of private police auxiliaries, recalls CNN.
The fact that this time these are major groups “means without a shadow of a doubt that it is now a movement coordinated from Beijing”, assures Marc Lanteigne.
The Chinese media remains stingy with details regarding the number of individuals forming these new corporate militias and their profiles.
We just know that these are ordinary citizens, supervised by the Chinese People's Army which also provides them with training.
But it is impossible to know how, for example, they are chosen.
“Is their loyalty to the party tested before they are given weapons?
Do they have previous experience in the army or law enforcement?” asks Marc Lanteigne.
If the emergence of these armed business groups may have been surprising “by the speed at which they have multiplied in one year, it is however not the first time that this has happened in China”, affirms the sinologist.
These militias are officially called People's Armed Forces Departments (PAFD), a term which must revive the memories of older Chinese people.
Mao Zedong had, in fact, pushed for the creation of these militias in the 1950s almost everywhere in the country.
The famous founder of the People's Republic of China officially wanted to strengthen cooperation between the army and the local population.
Similar justifications have been put forward by the current Chinese authorities to explain the appearance of these PAFD 2.0.
The Ministry of National Defense thus explained during a press conference in October 2023 – one of the first to discuss the existence of these local militias at such a level of the state apparatus – that it “ “the aim was to encourage citizens to become more involved in the security of their community and to promote better cohesion between individuals and public authorities,” summarizes Marc Lanteigne.
The model of Fengqiao's experiment
This official version, however, only tells part of the story behind the reappearance of the PAFD.
We must also place this return of a Maoist institution in the context of Xi Jinping's recovery of another of Mao Zedong's fixed ideas: the so-called Fengqiao experience.
This is a historical episode which profoundly marked the course of the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966.
Three years earlier, Mao Zedong had launched the “four cleansings” campaign against the “reactionary elements” of society and in the county of Fengqiao, south of Shanghai, part of the local population had mobilized to denounce the “ enemies” of the people.
Very favorably impressed by the story of what seemed to him to be a spontaneous movement, the communist leader pushed for the “Fengqiao experience” to become a model to be replicated throughout the country.
Read alsoChina: Xi Jinping invokes history to legitimize his power
“It became an institution that relied on millions of ordinary Chinese to help the authorities there manage local unrest,” said Carlotta Rinaudo, China specialist for the International Team for the Study of Security (ITSS). ) Verona.
The Fengqiao model thus became an important tool of social control for the Maoist power.
After the death of Mao Zedong, “no one officially referred to the 'Fengqiao experiment'”, underlines the decryption site China Media Project.
For Beijing “the promotion of economic development took precedence over population control”, underlines Carlotta Rinaudo.
Fengqiao's experience was also closely linked to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the all-out hunt for opponents.
But the reference reappears with the coming to power in 2012 of Xi Jinping.
A year later, the new president published a text entitled “important instructions for the development of the 'Fengqiao experiment'”.
“Since then, Xi Jinping has spoken about it in numerous speeches,” notes Carlotta Rinaudo.
The Chinese president even visited the site in September 2023 to mark the 60th anniversary of this “experience”.
“This is the ideological framework that helps explain the reappearance of the Departments of the People's Armed Forces,” assures Carlotta Rinaudo.
These corporate militias are just the latest avatar in the application of this 60-year-old model to all levels of society.
The government has, for example, “set up a direct line to allow ordinary citizens to report scams”, specifies the ITSS expert.
Fear of social discontent
In ten years, local initiatives to revive the spirit of Fengqiao have multiplied.
Whether in Shanghai, or in the port city of Zhoushan, residents are encouraged to denounce certain actions or to collaborate with the authorities to resolve local unrest, listed the website of The Diplomat magazine in an article published Thursday February 22 .
Also read: Xi Jinping facing the decline of the “Chinese dream”
This is a sign “that economic development is no longer the main concern of the regime and that in the eyes of Xi Jinping we must focus just as much on maintaining social order and the authority of the party over society” , summarizes Carlotta Rinaudo.
The particularity of the return of PAFD in this all-out application of the “Fengqiao'” model lies in the timing.
“It is the expression of the nervousness of those in power faced with the social consequences of the economic slowdown,” asserts Marc Lanteigne.
Rising youth unemployment, difficulty in the real estate sector and a general decline in living standards: the authorities do not want to find themselves left destitute if discontent turns into discontent and then disturbances to public order.
“The demonstrations against anti-Covid health measures have had a profound impact on the authorities,” notes Marc Lanteigne.
For him, Beijing intends to rely on these corporate militias to better anticipate possible social movements.
“These citizens are seen as the best tools to prevent problems because they are already immersed in their community and can warn the authorities of possible tensions very early,” confirms Carlotta Rinaudo.
The icing on the cake: these corporate militias also allow Beijing to strengthen their control over large groups.
Another of Xi Jinping's fixed ideas is to ensure that businesses do not take too many liberties with the directives of those in power.
Carlotta Rinaudo would therefore not be surprised to see the number of these PAFDs multiply and also appear in the very strategic Tech sector or within companies which are engaged in the development of the new Silk Roads.
The France 24 summary of the week
invites you to look back at the news that marked the week
I subscribe
Take international news everywhere with you!
Download the France 24 application