Regional actors did not expect the Qassam Brigades to have the ability to launch such an attack (social networking sites)

A Turkish writer discussed the element of surprise in the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack and the factors that make surprise possible, in general. He focused on what was considered the operational success of one party and the intelligence weakness of the other, without addressing the political goals and results.

Initially, Emre Karaca, in an article in the Turkish magazine "Kritter", likened the surprise of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" to the surprise of the attack by the Egyptian and Syrian armies during the October 1973 war, noting that miscalculations in interpreting the intelligence data that was transmitted to the commanders led to a strategic defeat for Israel. In both cases.

The writer attributed to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert his description of the Israeli security umbrella during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” as weak, and his saying that Israel fell victim to overconfidence that led to arrogance and recklessness, and that the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) “did what Israel normally practiced, which is surprise and intelligence.” And think outside the box.”

He stated that the focus on surprise in Olmert's statement is very important and a functional key to interpreting the operation.

Technological progress underestimates human data

The writer pointed out in the reasons for Israel's surprise that its approach to the concept of security underestimates the importance of the flow of information coming from human sources. According to information available from sources, Israel began to rely heavily on its technological capabilities in the region, which led to ignoring the flow of intelligence information that could be obtained from the human element, and monitoring radio conversations between Hamas members was considered a waste of time.

He said that another field observation was that regional actors did not expect the “Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades,” the military wing of Hamas, to have the ability to launch such an attack, adding that it became clear from the statements of Hamas factions that its armed wing shared information about the attack with a very small group of operational elements, and he even concealed this from his political wing and regional allies.

The writer explained that the available data indicate that the “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack was carried out by only about 1,500 members of the Al-Qassam Brigades.

Surprise theory

Then the article talked about the theoretical framework of surprise, which is that it is not a systematic or structural phenomenon. Surprise exists in the mind of the victim, that is, it is related to human perception and perceptions, as it links perceptions of different risks between strong and weak competitors and the structural environment that encourages surprise and the cognitive environment that provides an opportunity to surprise the opponent. .

The writer also said that the use of espionage and the element of surprise had existed since before Christ, and referred to Chinese and Indian writers who wrote about this subject during that period.

Surprise doubles the power

The writer stated that surprise multiplies power, as it allows one side to obtain the temporary numerical superiority necessary to launch offensive operations, and works to temporarily suspend the dialectical nature of the strategic conflict by removing the active opponent from the battlefield. It also turns war into an event in which the probability of some events can be determined. With a certain degree of certainty, the outcome is not only known in advance, but is determined by one of the parties to the conflict.

Group bias, organizational culture, and the need to please the bureaucracy prevent avoiding surprise, he said, adding that it is safe to say that this is the problem facing the Israeli security services.

He added that everything in war has a cost, as operational security hinders planning and briefing, and even successful surprise attacks, such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred with a very small margin of success.

Controlled sharing

The writer noted that the military wing of Hamas divided the planning of the operation into different units, allowing all participants to obtain information according to their job description only.

He pointed out that victims, in general, tend to assume that surprise exceeds the enemy's ability to carry it out. He said that the variation in caution is a paradox known as the “paradox of risk” and can be summarized as follows: Risky actions are less predictable.

The attack has been studied for many years

The article continued by stating that the “Al-Aqsa Flood” led to a cascading effect similar to a domino effect in its scope and results, and proved that the occupation and siege that lasted for years did not prevent the resistance factions from organizing, and that shocking Israel, which possesses advanced technological capabilities with such readiness as demonstrated by the “Al-Qassam Brigades,” would be A place of study for many years.

He concluded by emphasizing that surprise theory is useful in explaining the factors that make some actors or systems more vulnerable to surprise, and is useful in that it provides a theoretical approach to such attacks that enhances intelligence analysis and risk management. He said that it was important to take into account the complexity of the concept of “surprise”, its relationship to unpredictability and its limited scope in assessments.

Source: Turkish press