The October 1973 War Operations Room headed by Egyptian President Sadat (Mohamed Anwar Sadat’s website)

Cairo

- In a historical precedent, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense revealed rare secret military documents, dating back to the October 6, 1973 war, when Egypt and Syria began a sudden and bold attack against Israel. To recover the occupied territories, in a fierce war that lasted about 3 weeks.

The documents, which came under the title “Documents of the October 1973 War...Secrets of the War,” included reports of combat operations, the status of forces, records of intelligence information, detailed information about the strategic planning of the war, an assessment of the internal situation of Egypt and Israel, and other details.

The publication of the Egyptian documents came months after Tel Aviv released the entire archive of the war last September.

Cairo's declassification of the documents of the October War, a large part of which the war leaders had previously published in their memoirs, raised questions about the temporal significance of their publication, in light of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, and what is being said that Egyptian-Israeli relations are at their lowest levels. Especially since Cairo announced its participation in pleading before the International Court of Justice, tomorrow, Wednesday, regarding Israel’s practices in the occupied Palestinian territories.

President Anwar Sadat meets with army leaders in the October War operations room on the first anniversary (Mohamed Anwar Sadat’s website)

Meaning of timing

While the Egyptian Ministry of Defense did not disclose the reasons for declassifying the documents, observers linked the matter to the 50th anniversary of the war, as well as to the unstable regional security situation, including the aggression against Gaza, and Israeli efforts to displace Palestinians to neighboring Sinai.

In this context, Egyptian national security expert Major General Mohamed Abdel Wahed says that lifting the secrecy came from his country’s desire to inform Egyptians - especially young people - and those interested in historical documentation of the real, numerous and diverse documents about the war, some of which came in the handwriting of its military commanders.

In an interview with Al Jazeera Net, Major General Muhammad linked the timing of the publication to the current international and regional tensions, “most notably the Israeli aggression against Gaza and the failure to predict the future of the conflict, and in light of the irresponsible Israeli statements about forcing the Palestinians to flee to Sinai.”

He stressed that "it was necessary to showcase the army's heroism in its war against Israel, to strengthen the people's bond with its leadership and unify the internal front, if any kind of escalation occurred, which may reach military escalation in the coming period," he said.

He also pointed out that the Gaza war “had negative effects that cast a depressing shadow on Egyptian society, due to the aggression and continued American support for Israel, which increased the Egyptians’ influence and connection with the Palestinian resistance, especially its visual media, which showed the ordinary soldier (from the resistance) blowing up the world’s most powerful tank.” Merkava type.

Hence, says Muhammad Abdel Wahed, Egypt had to show its people that it had carried out such heroics, and that the Egyptian soldier was the first in his wars against Israel to destroy enemy tanks with an RPG weapon.

Contents of documents

The military documents published by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense on its official website included main topics: she:

  • The June 1967 War, the third Arab-Israeli war after the 1948 War.

  • The tripartite aggression (Israel, France, and Britain) against Egypt in 1956.

  • In addition to the strategic planning of the war in its various stages until the ceasefire on October 28, 1973.

  • The role of the military media.

  • International and regional bodies and organizations and their role.

  • And the memoirs of the leaders, specifically the Chief of Staff - at the time - Field Marshal Abdul Ghani Al-Jamasi.

  • Arab support for Egypt.

  • Granite process

The published documents present the nature of the Egyptian political and military movement in the period following the American Rogers Initiative, which entered into force on August 8, 1970, until the morning of the October 6, 1973 war.

It was an initiative presented by the US Secretary of State - William Rogers, on June 5, 1970, for a ceasefire, to which both parties responded, before it fell on February 4, 1971, when Cairo announced its refusal to extend the initiative and the continuation of a state of non-peace and non-war, with the beginning of its leadership. Making plans to recover Sinai.

The documents focused - in some detail - on the “Modified Granit 2” operation, which is a strategic attack plan on Israeli targets in Sinai, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, which was changed several times under different names, leading up to its implementation in the October 6 War under the name “Operation Badr.”

It also explains the strategic and tactical deception of the war to liberate the occupied territories in both Egypt and Syria, one of whose purposes was to conceal the intentions of mobilization and general mobilization.

An archive photo of raising the flag over Sinai in the October 1973 War (social networking sites)

  • War days

The documents touched on a number of situation reports and military records from the beginning of the war, from the first air strike, the firefight, and the crossing of the Suez Canal, until the destruction of the Bar Lev line (an earthen berm on the eastern shore of the Suez Canal), and the downing of Israeli positions, in addition to the formation and construction of bridge heads ( For the forces to cross the Suez Canal, repel enemy counterattacks, and develop the attack eastward, deep into Sinai.

  • Defrost loophole

Among the published military documents are those that recount the details of the Israeli counterattack on the night of October 15 and 16, 1973, and the besieging of the Third Egyptian Army west of the Suez Canal, in the battle known as the “Defressoir Breach,” or the “Chinese Farm.”

The Ministry of Defense said about the battle that “it was a failed Israeli attempt to reduce the size of the Egyptian victory, and to preserve its dignity, which fell in the war despite American support,” referring to what the Israeli Chief of Staff - at the time - Moshe Dayan said: “We tried, and all our attempts went in vain, and there is no one ahead of us.” But we will continue until the bitter end."

It also revealed in detail the military operations during this battle, but without mentioning the famous dispute between President Mohamed Anwar Sadat and the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Saad Eddine Chadly. Because of how to deal with the loophole, a dispute that ended with the dismissal of Al-Shazly before the end of the October War, and the appointment of Al-Gamsi in his place.

  • Kilo 101 talks

The documents indicated that after the 16th day of the war, a Security Council resolution was issued stipulating the cessation of all military actions starting on October 22, which Egypt accepted but Israel violated, which led to the issuance of another resolution on the 24th, which Israel adhered to starting on the 28th of October. Same month.

She explained that Israel was then forced to enter into military talks to separate the forces, in the months of October and November 1973, known as the “Kilo 101 Talks,” an area on the Suez-Cairo road, in which it was agreed to establish a ceasefire, and the forces would take over... Internationally monitored emergency, with the start of the exchange of prisoners and wounded, and this agreement was an opening stage in establishing peace between the two sides.

  • Al-Jamsi report

Among what was revealed by the military documents was a secret report in the month following the war by Chief of Staff El-Gamasi on military operations, in which he explained the most prominent obstacles that faced the military plan of attack, and how they were overcome. Such as:

  • American support for Israel diplomatically and militarily.

  • Israeli defenses along the canal.

  • In addition to the water barrier, the Bar Lev Line, the berm, the enemy’s defensive lines deep in Sinai, and Israeli air superiority.

  • And the Strait of Tiran (on the Gulf of Aqaba in the Red Sea), as it is one of the main reasons for the 1967 war, after Egypt closed the strait, which was a main artery on which Israel relied commercially, and is considered the only way to supply it with oil.

  • Israel's losses

Al-Jamsi’s report estimated Israel’s losses in the war at about 5,000 dead in the battles on the Egyptian front alone, about 12,000 wounded, and the downing of 270 aircraft, representing half of its new aircraft, and 36 naval vessels, representing a third of its naval vessels, and 900 tanks, without revealing the number of prisoners. The enemy, or the Egyptian losses in lives and equipment, but he stressed that they are not at all comparable to Israel's losses.

  • Arab support

The report revealed a number of Egyptian military talks with countries that supported Egypt and Syria during the war, and supplied them with fighters and soldiers. Including: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Sudan and Yugoslavia (Serbia).

Al-Jamsi stated in his report on the war that the oil weapons, assets, and economic relations had an effective role in supporting the Egyptian position, achieving international isolation for Israel, and deepening the differences between the United States and its allies, which demonstrated Arab unity in its strongest contemporary form.

Source: Al Jazeera