The Indian destroyer INS Chennai is in the Indian Ocean (social networking sites)
Following the outbreak of the Israeli aggression on Gaza, the spotlight was on the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait after the Ansar Allah group (Houthis) began launching attacks on ships heading to Israel or owned by Israeli businessmen.
The US Army responded by launching Operation “Prosperity Guardian” and launching strikes, along with the British Army and other countries, against various targets in Yemen.
Amid the flames of clashes, there was a quiet development that carried important implications, which was the Indian Navy’s deployment for the first time of a huge fleet consisting of 12 warships in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.
Thus, India has the largest naval military presence in these areas, with an amount greater than what it had previously deployed since 2008 under the pretext of confronting piracy operations off the Somali coast, which was usually limited to deploying at least one ship.
Motives for naval deployment
New Delhi justifies the massive deployment of its warships with the following reasons:
Ensuring freedom of navigation through strategic waterways and protecting commercial shipping operations, especially after the chemical tanker “ChemPluto,” owned by an Israeli businessman, was attacked on December 24, 2023, 200 nautical miles from the coast of the Indian state of Gujarat while on its way. From Saudi Arabia to India.
Confronting the recent return of piracy operations near Somalia, which some observers attribute to the shift of security focus to the Red Sea and the decline of the naval military presence following the end of NATO’s anti-piracy mission in 2016. In this regard, a study by the New Delhi-based Research Monitoring Foundation indicates the existence of coordination between pirates in Somalia. And the Houthis in Yemen, to intensify their activities to pressure global shipping traffic in response to the siege of Gaza.
Following the attack on the Chim Pluto tanker, the Indian Navy deployed destroyers, frigates, patrol aircraft and drones in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
In practice, on January 5, the Marine forces on board the destroyer INS Chennai contributed to rescuing the crew of a ship carrying the Liberian flag while it was heading from Brazil to Bahrain, after it was kidnapped 850 kilometers from the coast of East Africa.
An Indian warship also rescued a British cargo ship that was hit by a missile fired by the Houthis on January 26, and at the end of the same month, an Indian patrol ship rescued two Iranian ships that had been hijacked off the coast of Somalia.
Indicators
At the strategic level, New Delhi's deployment of this large number of warships represents an indication of the extent of change in its foreign policy, which previously focused on the Indian interior to ensure its unity, as well as the conflict with Pakistan.
It also demonstrates the continuation of the “outward orientation” policy to demonstrate the ability to act as a security provider in the regional neighborhood, which coincides with the growth of India’s economic capabilities that qualify it to play a more present role on the global stage.
It is a call to the countries of the world to pay attention to this nuclear country, which is inhabited by about 1.4 billion people, which represents one-sixth of humanity after surpassing the population of China.
Indian fears
The Indian concerns that pushed New Delhi to this naval military expansion are:
1- Concern about China
China depends on energy imports from the Arabian Gulf, which cross the Strait of Hormuz, the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and then the South China Sea before reaching Chinese shores, which prompted it to build and develop a series of ports along the coast of the Indian Ocean and East Africa, in Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Djibouti. .
In addition, China launched its first military base abroad in Djibouti in 2017, with the aim of maintaining its energy security. These moves have led to growing Indian fears that Beijing may be planning to militarize these ports in the event of a war, allowing it to control the pipelines. Vital maritime communications, concerns that coincided with the occurrence of Chinese-Indian border confrontations in Doklam in 2017 and the Ladakh region in 2020.
Since India does not have naval bases abroad, which limits its ability to carry out long-term operations in deep waters, in recent years it has adopted an active defense policy based on launching logistical partnerships with friendly countries.
New Delhi also sought to strengthen alliances with major and regional powers, so it joined the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with the United States, Japan, and Australia in 2017, and participated as an associate member in 2022 in the joint naval force led by Washington to secure navigation in the Gulf, then it participated in the “12U2” grouping (I2U2) with... Washington, Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, which was established as an economic and logistical alliance in 2022.
2- Securing energy sources
India imports 86.7% of the crude oil and 53.4% of the natural gas it consumes, and imports 38% of its total oil imports, and 73% of its total gas imports from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
Therefore, any disturbance in the security situation in the Gulf and the Red Sea would directly affect India’s economic and security interests, specifically energy security and India’s trade movement with Europe.
After the Second Gulf War in 1991, India relied on the United States to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, but with the growth of Indian economic and military capabilities, Washington began to view it as a counterweight to China in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and therefore encouraged it to deploy its warships in the region, and provided It has aspects of logistical and intelligence support.
Indian partnership with Iran
Despite India's growing relations with the United States, and New Delhi's centrality in the context of the American-Chinese competition, India is not keen on aligning itself within the Western camp, and prefers to maintain its strategic independence in application of the "India First" principle.
This was evident in the continuation of its relationship with Iran, as it is involved in the project to establish the “North-South” international corridor, which extends from the ports of India to the port of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran, and then to northern Europe through Russian territory.
New Delhi also coordinates with Tehran on the Afghan file to balance the Pakistani role, and supports the work of the Chabahar port in Iranian Balochistan as a maritime gateway to Central Asian countries in exchange for China’s support for the Gwadar port in Pakistani Balochistan.
India supports the Iranian-Armenian position regarding the Zangezur Corridor in the South Caucasus in the face of the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance supported by Islamabad.
In light of these common Indo-Iranian interests, New Delhi refused to participate in the “Prosperity Sentinel” operation in the Red Sea under Washington’s sponsorship, to avoid engaging in a path related to the war on Gaza or causing friction with the Houthis or Iran.
India also sent its Foreign Minister Subramaniam Jaishankar on a two-day visit to Tehran in January 2024 to discuss developments in the war in Gaza and the tension in the Red Sea. Jaishankar expressed his country’s position, saying, “This charged situation is not in the interest of any party.”
The Indian Minister's visit to Iran demonstrates that his country was not limited to deploying its warships in the region, but rather combined that with revitalizing its diplomatic relations to secure its interests and avoid collision with the parties to the conflict. These are steps that indicate India's greater presence in the Middle East files, and its gradual transformation into an active party in its files.
Source: Al Jazeera