Resistance missiles struck Tel Aviv in more than one confrontation (Reuters)

With more than 125 days having passed since the start of the war in Gaza, criticism is mounting inside Israel from displaced settlers towards the performance of government agencies, most notably what is known as the Home Front Command.

Some senior military commanders criticized the “evacuation of border towns as a result of the war,” which led former army chief of staff Aviv Kochavi to say that “Israel is shrinking,” which is a clear criticism of the effectiveness demonstrated by the “Home Front Command,” and indicates its failure to implement emergency plans during the period. the war.

Founding backgrounds

The roots of the "Home Front Command" go back to the "Civil Defense", which was established after Tel Aviv was bombed by Egyptian aircraft during the 1948 Palestine War in response to Israeli massacres. Then, in 1951, the Knesset issued a law specifying the tasks of the Civil Defense.

For 4 decades, Israel has not faced fundamental threats from abroad towards the interior, and civil defense has not been truly tested.

The surprise occurred in the Second Gulf War. On the night after the start of the coalition forces’ attack in January 1991 on the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, Scud missiles launched from western Iraq began to fall on Tel Aviv and Haifa, with a total of 39 missiles during the war.

Israel resorted to taking shelter with American Patriot batteries, and it turned out that the Civil Defense was working with a methodology dating back to the World War II era, relying on primitive early warning systems, and so many Tel Aviv residents left their homes.

As a result, a widespread controversy arose about the mass evacuation of the population during the war in light of the army’s rejection of the concept of defense in depth and its adoption of an offensive doctrine based on transferring battles to the enemy’s territory.

Civil Defense Colonel

Based on the lessons of the war, the “Home Front Command” was established as a military command of the Israeli army on February 2, 1992, that is, almost a year after the end of the Second Gulf War, to assume civilian responsibility during the war, while the rest of the army branches devoted themselves to the military side.

It was allocated a main command headquarters in the city of Ramla, as well as 6 subsidiary headquarters, a military training college, and about 65,000 soldiers, most of whom were reserve forces.

These forces were entrusted with several tasks, most notably formulating and implementing a civil defense doctrine, training the population in cooperation with civil institutions to deal with times of emergency, and coordinating the activities of ministries, local authorities, and the private sector in the field of civil defense.

The Home Front Command launched its most prominent work by equipping all new housing built since 1994 with fortified rooms to protect against conventional and chemical weapons.

Exposure to the Lebanon War

The Lebanon War in 2006 revealed fundamental gaps in the operational capabilities of the home front, as an average of 120 rockets fell daily throughout the duration of the war, which exceeded a month, leading to the death of 39 non-military Israelis and the injury of two thousand others.

Thousands of residents voluntarily displaced from the border settlements without a government decision to do so, and many of them resided in temporary tents.

During the war, the work of the “Home Front” focused on search and rescue operations, while it was unable to provide protection for the population, provide them with living needs, or provide them with psychological and social support, and weak coordination between it and the rest of the civil institutions appeared.

The State Comptroller's report concluded that there was ambiguity and confusion regarding the preparation of the civil front for emergency situations, and the overlap of the military and civil fronts also emerged, as the threats to which the settlers were exposed put pressure on decision-makers, while military developments affected the morale of the population and their ability to withstand.

Based on the lessons learned from the 2006 war, the “Home Front” began providing advanced early warning systems. Israel was divided into 25 warning zones instead of only 6 zones in 1990, with the aim of enabling the population to continue their daily routine in areas not subject to targeting. Then, it was increased Later, to more than 250 areas with the development of missile defense systems and linking each missile to the area where it is likely to fall.

To solve the problem of interference between the institutions and ministries concerned with the civil front, the National Emergency Management Agency was established in 2007, and was placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense, but it engaged in a conflict with the “Home Front” regarding responsibilities, setting priorities, and preparing the budget required of each ministry.

After that, the “Ministry of Internal Defense” was established for the first time in 2011 with the aim of directing and coordinating the tasks of various governmental institutions and non-governmental agencies in times of emergency, but the aforementioned ministry was quickly abolished in 2014 due to political considerations related to the army’s reservations about its role.

Moshe Ya'alon, then Minister of Defense, refused to transfer some of his powers to the Minister of National Defense regarding civil defense.

2014 war

In 2012, the Israeli government approved a plan to evacuate residents from areas close to the fighting, and adopted a “host hotel” plan under which each local council is required to build capacity to accommodate a number of displaced persons of up to 4% of each municipality’s population.

In the wake of the 2014 war, which lasted 55 days, during which rockets were fired from Gaza throughout the war, and the killing of a resident of Kibbutz Nahal Oz by a mortar shell, the issue of evacuating Israeli population centers in future confrontations began, and the narrative that evacuated settlers under fire began to be questioned. It represents surrender to the pressures of the Palestinian resistance.

The occupation army realized that there were operational benefits in evacuating border settlements if they were exposed to serious threats, and therefore began preparing emergency evacuation plans in coordination with the Home Front Command.

An emergency plan called “Safe Distance” was prepared to evacuate 70% of about 54,000 people residing in 64 population centers and settlements on the border with Lebanon, and 29 communities in the Gaza Strip, 4 kilometers from the border.

The plan stipulates that the displaced be transferred within a maximum period of 120 hours from the issuance of the evacuation decision to pre-specified schools and hotels to accommodate them temporarily, taking into account their community composition, with a number of residents remaining in the evacuation areas to maintain the minimum level of economic activity there.

It is noteworthy that the army and the Home Front ruled out the possibility of evacuating the densest population centers near the border, such as Kiryat Shmona near Lebanon, and Sderot near Gaza, with a population of 38 thousand people, due to the presence of a missile protection umbrella for them through the Iron Dome.

They also concluded that in any expanded battle with Hezbollah, missiles would target all parts of Israel, making it difficult to carry out large-scale evacuations because there were no safe areas at that time, and therefore the option at that time would be to encourage residents to remain in their homes.

The last surprise

On the morning of October 7, 2023, fighters from the Al-Qassam Brigades - the military wing of the Hamas movement - crossed the separation wall in Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, and took control of the headquarters of the Gaza Division of the occupation army, as well as 22 settlements at a depth of more than 30 kilometers from the Gaza Strip, as Hezbollah began on the day. Next, attacks were launched on border military sites with Lebanon.

The Israeli army resorted to evacuating about 100,000 people from the areas adjacent to Gaza, including the city of Sderot, and 60,000 others were evacuated from the northern border areas, including Kiryat Shmona, as part of an exceptional measure that went beyond the previously prepared plan.

The large number of displaced persons led to the imposition of a heavy economic cost on the Netanyahu government, whether in terms of their interruption of work or their receipt of government aid, as each displaced person to whom the government did not provide a hotel room was paid $50 per day, and incidents of rape and theft appeared, while families complained of obstacles to education. their children.

As the war continued, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced in January 2024 allowing the return of residents who live 4 to 7 kilometers from the border with Gaza, granting each adult who returns to his home 200 shekels per day, while a minor will receive 100 shekels. The government offer will remain in effect until the end of February 2024, with the possibility of extension.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also announced on January 8 that Sderot residents would be allowed to return to their homes by February 4, and in response, on the same day, the Qassam Brigades bombed Sderot with 14 missiles.

These conditions prompted a number of displaced people to protest in front of Netanyahu’s office, and to sleep in front of his office, refusing to return before they felt that security would be provided for them. Their complaints also escalated about difficulties in obtaining life needs, which was reflected in a decline in morale, which represents a burden on Netanyahu’s government, and he adds. A new failure for the leadership of the home front.

Source: Al Jazeera