More dangerous than serial military coups over many decades, more dangerous than regional and internal wars, and reproductive separatist movements, and more threatening to national security, regional stability and international balances, Sudan experienced in mid-April 2023 an unprecedented military rebellion by the Rapid Support Forces, which are considered auxiliary forces, before trying to turn the magic on the magician and remove the regular army from its positions in the heart of the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.
In addition to the factors of internal power struggle, and the calculations of regional and international actors, there is a key word to understand what happened in Sudan: the Janjaweed. It is the nickname by which the first nucleus of what will become in less than two decades a parallel army and a state within a state, which emerged from the mountains of the troubled Darfur region to try to swallow power in one of the largest African countries, and the last Arab country, before reaching the land of Abyssinia.
There is no agreed interpretation of the word Janjaweed, and some people have made it a name carved from the phrase "jinn on a horse", and others have made it from three words, all beginning with the letter Jim: Jinn, Jawad, and Jim three (G3), the well-known weapon. [1]
In addition to its realistic meaning referring to those tribal forces formed by the central authorities of the Sudan in the Darfur region to eliminate an armed rebellion in the region, the word "Janjaweed" refers to a general meaning that benefits an armed force that is uncontrolled and capable of oppression and takes advantage of the tolerance or complicity of the central authorities.
The armies of Darfur. Forces emerged from Sudan's major crises
The danger of the military confrontation that woke up Khartoum in mid-April 2023 lies in its monopolization of the attention of international public opinion, to the extent that these events obscure the developments of the Russian-Ukrainian war in major satellite channels and news agencies. These confrontations also led to the largest evacuation of foreign nationals in Sudan, despite the succession of social and military events in this vast country.
The Janjaweed raise the flag of their victory in one of the sites
Although the regular army remained steadfast in its positions, declaring the failure of what it considered a coup attempt, the delay in the field resolution and the large size of the Rapid Support Forces (estimated by some sources at about 100,<> fighters) made the world hold its breath waiting for a possible settlement between what appears numerically to be two armies within the same country.
If the Janjaweed, according to the consensus of observers and scholars, are the womb from which the RSA emerged, these forces do not adopt any ideological or political orientation. It is a functional armed organization that works for Arab tribes and the Sudanese government, according to the Sudanese opposition.
The Janjaweed are divided into two parts: a smaller section in North Darfur consisting of several organs belonging to the Arab tribes, or "Abala", which are engaged in camel breeding. The bulk of the Janjaweed are concentrated in South Darfur, and they are members of Arab tribes known as Baggara, which is dominated by cow farming. [2]
Official UN documents classify the components of the Janjaweed into three main groups: the first consists of parallel forces directly supported by the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum, the second is a more organized force through paramilitary units, and the third is the so-called "Popular Defense Forces" that include multiple components, including elite forces similar to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and a special border protection apparatus. [3]
It would be a mistake to paint a purely Arab tinge on the Janjaweed, because some Arab tribes in the Darfur region have allied themselves with the rebels against this Khartoum-backed force. Some non-Arab tribes also joined the ranks of the Janjaweed. In the end, we are faced with mixed and heterogeneous forces, lacking the hierarchy and structure of regular armies.
Arabization of the coast. Gaddafi's fingerprints in his war on Chad
The search for the origins of the Janjaweed and their early days necessarily opens the files of Sudan's troubled Darfur region for decades. It takes nearly four decades to go back to the past, specifically in 1987, when an expanded alliance was formed that included all tribes of Arab origin in the region, called the "Arab Gathering" and included 27 tribes, and then the organization expanded to include some Kordofan tribes of Arab origin. [4]
Map showing the distribution of Sudanese militias in the regions
Some observers link the emergence of the Janjaweed to the Chadian war in the eighties, when Chadian President Idriss Deby faced his opponent Hissène Habré, so each party recruited an army of Arab tribesmen living in eastern Chad, and the Janjaweed militia emerged. [5]
The roots of the conflict in the Darfur region date back to the eighties, when a drought swept through Darfur and neighboring Chad and Central African States, with which the region shares several tribal and ethnic ties, as well as pastoral customs in the economic field. After limited unrest in the early eighties, the situation quickly stabilized and the tension eased as the drought subsided, and the Arab (pastoral) and African (agricultural) tribes returned to coexistence and coexistence peacefully again. [6]
The late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was waging a series of wars against Chad, and in this context he founded the "Islamic Legion" in Darfur, an armed faction whose goal was to Arabize the Sahel, and was embraced by the um Jalloul tribe and a tribal leader, the father of the man who will become the future leader of the Janjaweed, Musa Hilal. [7]
For example, a CIA cable dated 1986 reveals that Libya sent a military convoy, weapons, technicians, special forces and people with military experience, which fueled tension between Arab tribal communities and the African-ethnic Fura nationalism, which ended with the emergence of the so-called "Arab Gathering", which is considered the incubator in which the Janjaweed will emerge, with the support and sponsorship of the central Khartoum authorities. [8]
This conflict has existed throughout the eighties of the last century, and the Sudanese government did not do much to intervene, but benefited from the conflict, and the government will later rely on Arab groupings to establish the Janjaweed. [9]
North drought. The fuel of war between Arab and African tribes
In addition to the regional context that contributed to the emergence of the Janjaweed, understanding what has been happening in Sudan over the past two decades requires going beyond the level of direct superficial links between the central government in Khartoum and the Janjaweed forces it used to establish its control over the Darfur region, and penetrating the cultural and social roots of this lethal military force. It is more than just a convergence of interests, which broke up at the end of April 2023 with the outbreak of confrontation between the RSF and the Sudanese army.
The Janjaweed will emerge in the context of an internal conflict in the Darfur region, but the origin of this conflict is a deep rift in the relationship between peasants settled on agricultural land, especially in the south and west of the region, and mobile herders from the north and east of the region. Historically, the two sides have been accustomed to settling their differences in traditional ways linked to consensus and the balance of power, but the extreme climatic fluctuations of the past years have made this traditional system of conflict resolution unable to manage the situation, with pastoralists marching from the north towards the agricultural lands of the south. [10]
If the internal conflict appears at first glance to be purely economic and linked to land ownership and use, with the agricultural tribes settled in the west of the region refusing to share their lands with mobile pastoral tribes fleeing the drought that has afflicted their historical areas[11], digging further into the roots of the conflict refers to another dimension linked to ethnic differences.
The local population of the Darfur region is predominantly Muslim and speaks Arabic, but some tribal components consider themselves only African, while others see their Arab origins as giving them a higher status than other tribes. Gradually tensions have emerged in the region between the Arab and African components, and regional and international parties have entered the line of this ethnic rift in the region.
At the beginning of the third millennium, this interaction between economic and ethnic elements led to the emergence of rebellious movements and ideas among some farming tribes who accuse the central authorities in Khartoum of supporting the increasing "settlement" of Arab pastoral tribes in their historical areas, which in turn led to the establishment of the pastoral tribes of the Janjaweed forces, to suppress the rebellious aspirations of the agricultural tribes settled in the west of the Darfur region. [12]
Darfur rebellion. When the Sudan army failed its capital
The first strikes of the rebels in Darfur were a direct reason that prompted the regime of Omar al-Bashir to form the Janjaweed forces, because the regular army seemed unable to repel those attacks, due to the different pattern of confrontation on the one hand, and the descent of a large number of army leaders from the Darfur region, which makes them hesitate to fight the war in the region, so that playing on the tribal chord ornaments is Bashir's first option. The first step was to integrate some 17,20 SPLM fighters and 13,<> Janjaweed fighters into special forces tasked with countering the rebels. [<>]
Nearly 11 years after the Bashir/Turabi coup that overthrew the democratic government headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi, Bashir turned against his godfather al-Turabi, in what was known as the 1999 Islamist separation, and removed him from power, causing a sharp rift in the so-called Sudanese Islamic Movement, splitting into the National Congress Party led by Bashir and the Popular Congress led by Turabi. [14]
A bone-breaking game broke out between the two sides, and most Darfuris affiliated with the Islamic Movement supported al-Turabi's wing. This put them in the face of the security services loyal to Bashir, so they decided to resist them, and founded the Justice and Equality Movement led by Khalil Ibrahim, one of the most important combat cadres in the Islamic movement, and the emir of what was known as the mujahideen, during the war launched by Bashir and al-Turabi on South Sudan. [15]
Musa Hilal. The bandit who led the war of extermination
Former President Omar al-Bashir established the Janjaweed forces under the direct supervision of his first vice president at the time, Ali Osman Taha, against the backdrop of the emergence of armed movements rebelling against the central state in Khartoum between 2002 and 2003, demanding the restructuring of Sudanese states, and justice in the distribution of wealth and power among the regions of Sudan. [16]
Al-Bashir releases Musa Hilal, who was detained on charges of banditry and killing regular soldiers in North Darfur
Al-Bashir's government released a Darfuri prisoner, Musa Hilal, who was detained on charges of banditry and killing regular soldiers in North Darfur. It was the first moment of formation of the notorious Janjaweed forces, which, according to the government, were established to support the Sudanese Armed Forces in defeating the rebellion. [17]
The Government placed Musa Hilal, after supporting him with money, weapons and equipment, against the Darfur armed movements opposed to them, and asked him to recruit members of Arab tribesmen, especially members of his tribe, under the pretext that the armed movements composed of Darfuri Africans were planning to exterminate and eliminate the Arab race.
The Janjaweed forces cooperated with the regular military forces, and the regular army carried out air raids, followed by a ground offensive with joint forces and coordination between government forces and the Janjaweed, committing atrocities and severe violations against civilians, including the burning of villages, killing and rape. [18]
The confrontation turned into a war of total extermination and ethnic cleansing, according to the United Nations and international human rights organizations, to the extent that the International Criminal Court placed Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal on the list of wanted to appear before the International Criminal Court, forcing the government to place his forces (only nominally) under the command of border guards, but it continued to operate completely independently of him. [19]
By 2007, up to 450,2 people in Darfur had died from violence and disease, and 5.20 million had been displaced, forcing Bashir under UN pressure to approve the deployment of joint OIC-African Union forces tasked with protecting civilians and keeping peace. [<>]
Peace Agreement. An early rift between warlords and the regime
Despite the multiple elements that explain the convergence of the interests of the Khartoum regime and the Janjaweed forces, the signs of a fracture in this relationship are old, and can be seen in particular in Khartoum's signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006 in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, between the Government of Sudan and one of the rebel factions in the Darfur region. [21]
Darfur Peace Agreement signed on 5 May 2006 in Abuja, Nigeria
The agreement led to the Sudanese government collecting Janjaweed weapons in the Darfur region, and one of the Janjaweed's fiercest opponents, the head of the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement, was given a senior advisory position alongside former President Omar al-Bashir, and now exports his experience in integrating the rebels into power, especially after the outbreak of internal confrontations in Libya after the fall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. But the move infuriated the Janjaweed, and they began to show signs of rebellion and gradually evade Khartoum's scrutiny.
وبعد عقدين من حملة القذافي على تشاد، ظهرت حركة تمرد أخرى من دارفور عام 2008، وأدت إلى تقوية علاقة حميدتي مع البشير، حين كانت جماعات الجنجويد الأخرى تتشرذم، بل تتمرد على الحكومة، نظرا لتراجع الحملة في دارفور.[22]
وقد انتهى هذا المسار بتحويل قوات الجنجويد إلى “قوات دعم سريع” بدءا من العام 2013، وذلك في سياق تداعيات سقوط نظام معمر القذافي في ليبيا عام 2011، وما تلاه من انقسام البلاد ورفع الغطاء عن فائض في الأسلحة التي وجدت طريقها إلى الجنوب.[23]
دمج الجنجويد.. قوة أمنية لتحقيق مآرب الرئيس
في العام 2013 أعيدت هيكلة وتشكيل قوات الجنجويد بوساطة جهاز الأمن والمخابرات الوطني السوداني بقيادة حميدتي، بعد أن رفض رئيس الأركان السوداني آنذاك نقل تبعيتها من جهاز الأمن إلى هياكل القوات المسلحة، فاعتبرت قوة نظامية منفصلة تتبع الرئيس البشير مباشرة، ثم أنتجت قوة نظامية جديدة من رحم الجنجويد سُميت قوات الدعم السريع، وتوسع نشاطها ليتعدى ولايات دارفور ويمتد إلى النيل الأزرق وجنوب كردفان، ولاحقا إلى جميع ربوع السودان.[24]
وبعد تشكيلها واعتمادها قوة منظمة، خاضت قوات الدعم السريع عددا من المعارك الحاسمة بتوجيه من الحكومة ضد حركات التمرد في دارفور، فلاقت استحسانا لدى حكومة المركز في الخرطوم، ورافق تلك الانتصارات عدد من الانتهاكات والجرائم ضد الإنسانية، شملت اجتياح القرى التي تقع في محور تقدم القوات وتدمير الممتلكات.
وقد ذهب عدد من المحللين إلى وصف قوات الدعم السريع بأنها قوة سياسية حرص من خلالها البشير على تأمين موقعه، وذلك في إثر المحاولة الانقلابية الفاشلة في عام 2012، مما نتجت عنه ثقة كبيرة ودعم غير محدود لهذه القوات.
وكان من تداعيات اكتشاف الذهب في هذه المنطقة عام 2012، قتل قوات موسى هلال وحميدتي أكثر من 800 شخص وتشريد نحو 150 ألف شخص، للسيطرة على الجبل، وذلك قبل أن يشتد التنافس بينهما. وإضافة إلى جبل عامر، تسيطر قوات الدعم السريع على ثلاثة مناجم أخرى على الأقل في جنوب كردفان، وهو ما حقق استقلالية مالية كبيرة لهذه القوات.[25]
وبحسب ما أعلنته مصادر غربية وإعلامية في صيف عام 2014، كصحيفة “نيويورك تايمز”، فقد عادت قوات الجنجويد السودانية لنشاطها في دارفور، بعدما أعادت الحكومة السودانية تنظيمها. ودافع عنها الرئيس عمر البشير في مايو/ أيار 2014، وتحدى معارضيه أن يثبتوا ما يفيد أن تلك القوات ارتكبت تجاوزات ضد المتمردين.[26]
وهكذا اكتملت القوة الخشنة لقوات حميدتي، فكانت تجارة الذهب والمشاركة في حرب اليمن وحراسة الحدود ومنع الهجرة غير الشرعية مصدرا لجلب العملة الصعبة التي استُثمرت في مضاعفة القوة العسكرية لهذه القوات.
محمد حمدان دقلو.. راعي الإبل وقائد الجيوش وحليف البشير
ارتبط ظهور ميليشيا الجنجويد في البداية باسم الشيخ موسى هلال، ناظر قبيلة المحاميد العربية بدارفور بوصفه زعيم الجنجويد، وقد جعل متمردو دارفور اسمه على رأس قائمة قالوا إنهم من قاموا بالتطهير العرقي من الجنجويد.[27]
حميدتي.. صناعة النظام السوداني البشيري
وكان الفريق أول محمد حمدان دقلو أحد الذين جندهم هلال ضمن قوات الجنجويد عام 2003، لكن سرعان ما سطع نجمه وذاع صيته، وأصبح من كبار قادة القوات، بعدما وضع تحت إمرته عشرات آلاف المقاتلين من أبناء القبائل العربية الذين لم يتلقوا تدريبا عسكريا نظاميا، ويدينون بالولاء المُطلق له.[28]
حاول عمر البشير التمكين لحميدتي في دارفور، من خلال استقدامه موسى هلال إلى الخرطوم وتعيينه مستشارا له، لكن موسى انتبه إلى الأمر، فعاد إلى دارفور وأعلن تمرده على البشير، وأسس ما سمي لاحقا “مجلس الصحوة”، بينما ضاعفت الحكومة دعمها لرجلها حميدتي الذي خاضت قواته حربا ضد الحركات المسلحة في دارفور وجنوب كردفان، وحققت كثيرا من الانتصارات، وأما موسى هلال فلم يزل يضعف شيئا فشيئا، إلى أن قررت الحكومة القضاء عليه، فسلطت عليه الزعيم الجديد للجنجويد وتلميذه حميدتي.[29]
ينحدر محمد حمدان دقلو المعروف بـ”حميدتي” من قبيلة الرزيقات الواقعة في الحدود السودانية التشادية، وقد ولد في كنفها عام 1975، وهي من أكبر القبائل العربية المنتشرة في السودان، خاصة في إقليمي دارفور وكردفان.[30] وفي مطلع الألفية، كان مجرّد زعيم لقوات صغيرة في غرب السودان الملاصق للحدود التشادية.[31]
The controversial man never joined the military, dropping out at the age of 15, trading camels, cloth and caravan protection, and moving outside the Darfur region between Chad, Libya and Egypt as a camel seller and caravan protector until he made a fortune. When Khartoum thought of forming a local military force to confront the Darfur rebels, he was ready for the task, and he was the commander of these forces from the beginning. [32]
The commander of the Rapid Support Forces, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), climbed the ladder of power in Sudan, until he became the second man in the political system, as deputy head of the Sudanese military council, which made him express great ambitions, especially after his rebellious position on Omar al-Bashir before his fall gained him great popularity. He declared his disobedience to President al-Bashir by siding with the protesters, nearly 100 days before al-Bashir's fall. [33]
In addition to becoming a difficult figure in Sudan's internal equation, Hemedti played major regional and international roles, as he became constantly in contact with Western officials, both American and European[34]. He also supervised the participation of Sudanese forces in the Arab coalition in Yemen, and some observers even consider him credited with appointing his "friend," Brigadier General Burhan, to head the military council.
Protection of criminals. Traditions of Sudan's War Allies
The Janjaweed forces benefited from a well-established tradition of the Sudanese regime dating back to the eighties, legitimizing the work of parallel forces and granting them immunity from prosecution, as laws were issued recognizing this type of force and granting it a hierarchy that reaches the top of the state pyramid. This was most evident in 2005, when Khartoum refused to respond to international demands to hand over those responsible for war crimes in the Darfur region to international justice. [35]
Janjaweed forces after burning the village of West Darfur
The alliance that brought together the Sudanese authorities with the Janjaweed forces goes beyond profit and loss calculations and finds its explanations more in historical, cultural and social dimensions. Some events are also seen as the first spark for this coalition, through attacks on the Sudanese army in Darfur in 2003, which inflicted heavy losses against local rebels, which was a great psychological shock to the Sudanese army. [36]
The peace agreement signed in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, on 31 August 2020, between the transitional government and the armed movements under a civil-military alliance called the Revolutionary Front, was a great opportunity to integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the comprehensive security arrangements for those forces after the fall of the human regime. [37]
But Hemedti's ambitions, carried over the waves of his complex regional and international alliances, have exceeded the ceiling of internal consensus and coexistence, to become his ultimate goal: to occupy the presidential palace.
Sources
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[2] https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2014/2/16/ Janjaweed
[3] https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2012-2-page-387.htm#re9no8
[4] https://180post.com/archives/37263
[5] https://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/2014/2/16/ Janjaweed
[6] https://daraj.media/19118/
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[8] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/gold-weapons-and-fighters-international-path-sudans-janjaweed-took-power-and-fortune
[9] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/gold-weapons-and-fighters-international-path-sudans-janjaweed-took-power-and-fortune
[10] A. El-Battahani, « Ideological Expansionist Movements versus Historical Indigenous Rights in the Darfur Region of Sudan: From Actual Homicide to Potential Genocide ».
[11] http://www.politique-africaine.com/numeros/pdf/conjonctures/101111.pdf
[12] http://www.cairn.info/revue-afrique-contemporaine-2005-2-page-129.htm
[13] http://www.rmes.be/CDR7/2NBCR7.pdf
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[16] https://daraj.media/19118/
[17] https://daraj.media/19118/
[18] https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/sudan-RSF-from-militias-to-regime-forces-2003-2018.pdf
[19] https://daraj.media/19118/
[20] https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/21/AR2007072101347.html
[21] A.-M. Impe, « Darfour : jusqu'à quand accepterons-nous l'inacceptable ? », Enjeux internationaux, n 16, 2007
[22] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/gold-weapons-and-fighters-international-path-sudans-janjaweed-took-power-and-fortune
[23] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/gold-weapons-and-fighters-international-path-sudans-janjaweed-took-power-and-fortune
[24] https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/sudan-RSF-from-militias-to-regime-forces-2003-2018.pdf
[25] https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/sudan-RSF-from-militias-to-regime-forces-2003-2018.pdf
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[32] https://www.alqabas.com/article/660491-Hemedti-Sayed-Game-in-Sudan
[33] https://www.alqabas.com/article/660491-Hemedti-Sayed-Game-in-Sudan
[34] https://sudanreeves.org/2019/04/29/biographical-notes-on-lt-general-mohamed-hamdan-dagalo-aka-hemeti/
[35] https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-etrangere-2012-2-page-387.htm#no54
[36] J.-L. Peninou, « Désolation au Darfour », Le Monde diplomatique, mai 2004.
[37] https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/sudan-RSF-from-militias-to-regime-forces-2003-2018.pdf