Is flying over Mali risky for civilian aircraft?

Despite the warning from the American civil aviation, Air France continues to operate its daily Paris-Bamako route. Here, a plane of the company arrives at Bamako airport, March 5, 2021. © Annie Risemberg / AFP

Text by: David Baché

5 min

The US Civil Aviation Authority (FAA) has deemed that the planes were at "increased risk" flying to or over Mali "at all altitudes" due to the presence of a "sophisticated air defense system" used by the Wagner group, as revealed this week by the newspaper Les Échos. Bamako has never admitted to having this type of weaponry and Air France maintains its flights. But according to specialist Akram Kharief, "there is no credible information" in this sense.

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It is a note from the American civil aviation (FAA) dated February 23, which gave the alert, revealed by the French newspaper Les Échos. It notes an "increased risk" of overflying Mali due to the presence near Bamako of Russian anti-aircraft missiles of the Pantsir or SA-22 type, capable of hitting aircraft up to 15,000 meters above sea level within a radius of 36 kilometers. According to this note, they would be in the hands of the mercenaries of the Wagner group.

The Malian transitional authorities have never officially communicated on the acquisition of this type of weaponry.

The US note also cites the Manpads-type man-portable air defense system - surface-to-air missiles deployed in the rest of the country and particularly in the Mopti region - to protect Malian airspace against unwanted intrusion.

Fear of tragic mistakes, as with MH17

More than direct attacks on highly unlikely civilian flights, it is the risk of tragic mistakes that is feared. In 2014, for example, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was mistakenly shot down over Ukraine by Russian military and separatist militiamen. Nearly 300 people were killed.

The FAA note also mentions other risks, Mali being "the theater of fighting", "extremist activities" or "a deterioration of the rule of law". The US agency also points to the fact that the Sahelian branch of the Islamic State terrorist group claimed last July the destruction of a drone of the Wagner group.

No company announces measures as a result

No company serving Mali has announced any specific measures since the publication of this note. Air France, whose planes provide a daily connection to Bamako, says it has followed "with the greatest care" the recommendations of the FAA, but "at this stage, the service to Bamako remains unchanged".

On Thursday, March 16, the SNPL pilots' union still called for the exercise of the right of withdrawal of staff who do not wish, "in the current state of things", to be assigned to flights to Bamako.

« No credible information that there is this type of equipment in Mali »

According to Algerian journalist Akram Kharief, a specialist in defense and armaments issues, particularly in North African and Middle Eastern countries, "there is no credible information that there is this type of equipment in Mali." The founder of the Menadefense website was interviewed by David Baché.

Akram Kharief: The FAA talks about Pantsir, or SA-22 according to NATO codification. It is a medium- and short-range light mobile air defense system that can reach a kind of bubble of 15 kilometers. It is intended primarily to counter drones and small aircraft, not high-altitude fighters or airliners. But it remains an equipment that presents very high risks during approaches near airports or overflights at medium altitude.

RFI: Is it certain that the Malian army, and its Russian auxiliaries, have such equipment?

Not at all: there is no credible information that there is this type of equipment in Mali. When one reads the press release, one gets the impression that the FAA is doing a kind of transposition in relation to Wagner in Libya, by implying the presence of this equipment also in Mali, but does not provide evidence and does not specify the location of this equipment.

The note says "near Bamako"...

Yes. Near Bamako, they talk about Wagner's headquarters, which is near the airport. They also talk about Kati, who is also a kind of headquarters of the junta and the Malian army. So it doesn't indicate that there are Pantsir there.

Maybe the U.S. services have their own intelligence?

It would have filtered, because the Pantsir requires that there be a delivery by air. Mali being a landlocked country, it would have required a large carrier. There are enough tracking tools to note the presence or delivery of large equipment in Mali, but there were none in 2022 or 2023.

So, you consider this alert of the American civil aviation excessive?

I think it is excessive, but I also think it is based on two things. On the real presence of this equipment in Libya, and on its use also by Wagner in Syria. It is also based on rumors that are increasingly heard by promoters of the Malian junta, who speak of the presence of anti-aircraft equipment for the past two or three weeks, on social networks.

It should be remembered that the FAA is supposed to prevent risks, so I think their degree of sensitivity is quite large.

The Malian authorities defend their skies, they are wary of unwanted intrusions, French for example...

Yes, but in this case the Pantsir would not be the ideal armament. The Malian army could buy countless pieces of equipment that would cost much less and be much more efficient.

Akram Kharief: "No credible information that there is this type of equipment in Mali"

David Baché

► READ ALSO: The Russian paramilitary group Wagner has an "Africa office" for its influence on the continent

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