These days, Sudanese are in a state of apprehension and anticipation following talk of a close confrontation between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hamiditi. Al Jazeera Net has sought to monitor the scene and its scenes, and obtained from its informed and reliable sources and close to exciting information on this confrontation.
In a private meeting on Wednesday morning, the head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council and commander-in-chief of the army, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, announced the formation of a rapid intervention force under the command of the commander-in-chief of the army, and Burhan confirmed to a military crowd that his army will have a strike force of drones capable of resolving any internal or external threat.
According to a military expert, this message is addressed entirely to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, and according to the same expert, the army already has the latest model of Turkish drones, while the Rapid Support Forces failed to acquire this technology after the Turks apologized for selling it to them under the pretext that military cooperation must pass through the Sudanese Ministry of Defense.
The same source pointed out that the special forces referred to are not new, but rather they exist before and their number exceeded 3,<> fighters, and that the re-announcement of them now and their subordination to the commander-in-chief is an attempt to block the idea of merging the Rapid Support Forces as one bloc in the army under the name of the Rapid Intervention Forces.
According to the same expert, these developments indicate that the army took care of all scenarios that may result from resolving the file of integrating rapid support into the Sudanese army, and that the step represents a victory for the hawkish current in the Sudanese army, and overcoming the station of difference in military estimates, as Al-Burhan preferred calm and deportation in the file of dealing with rapid support, while the other current led by Lieutenant General Shams al-Din Kabashi believed that the file should be resolved faster because the time factor indicates The RSF is rapidly strengthening.
Raising the alert level
Fireworks that covered the sky in central Khartoum two weeks ago were enough to raise the level of alert among the Rapid Support Forces stationed around the Rapid Support Presidency, northwest of the General Command of the Sudanese army. After the sounds of ammunition, which were later discovered to be fireworks that accompanied the opening of a shop, rose, the soldiers began to move cautiously and put themselves on standby for any emergency. The incident was a reflection of the heightened tension between the Sudanese army and the RSF.
According to a senior military source who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, the Sudanese army increased reinforcements around the Radio and Television Corporation building from 3 tanks to 10, and the next day the Rapid Support increased its forces around the same building from 10 to 20 equipped with anti-tank weapons.
According to the same source, what happened around the radio took place in several areas, including the military neighborhood, where the army and rapid support commanders live, south of the army headquarters.
While the tension reached its peak when the Rapid Support - according to a senior military source - brought forces in large numbers from the states of Darfur and Kordofan, estimated at more than 20 thousand fighters, and distributed to 4 main camps around the state of Khartoum.
The source pointed out that the Rapid Support Command practiced misinformation in bringing these forces, and confirmed in its military statement that the arrivals were just new soldiers who came for training, but the next day they were fully armed.
A source close to Hemedti confirms this account, but provides a justification for it by saying that they have received information that the army commander-in-chief intended to abruptly overthrow the RSF commander and his deputy, and that this meant war, as he put it.
The same source added a second reason that the Sudanese army has carried out a large-scale mobilization campaign in Darfur, some on ethnic grounds, and that the RSF does not want to be part of what it described as the new sedition, preferring to deploy in Khartoum.
The calm before the storm
Tensions dropped slightly after Saturday night's meeting at the residence of the head of the Sovereign Council and the commander of the Sudanese army. According to a military and political expert involved in mediation efforts between Burhan and Hemedti, the crisis is still stalled.
The dispute between the army leadership and the Rapid Support is old and dates back to the formation of these forces in 2014 during the era of deposed President Omar al-Bashir, as the army forces at the time refused to attach this new force to the Sudanese army because of its composition, which depends on specific tribal components, and at that time Bashir chose to attach the Rapid Support Forces to the security and intelligence apparatus before they were heavily exploited and became in 2017 separate forces and their command was in the hands of the President of the Republic, who was also the Supreme and General Commander of the Sudanese Army.
The dispute was renewed shortly after the outbreak of the December 2018 revolution, especially after Hemedti refused to participate in the repression of the revolutionaries and showed sympathy for their demands.
The dispute reached its peak shortly after the overthrow of Bashir in April 2019, and at the time General Hemedti refused to work with the head of the new military council, Lieutenant General Awad Ibn Auf, and opened the doors of communication with the rising political forces, which precipitated the withdrawal of Ibn Auf from the scene, in a record number in the presidential residence.
The new differences reared their head as the two men's political ambitions emerged, according to the head of Sudan's Umma Party, Mubarak al-Fadil, who believes that the seizure of power in the second half of the transitional government precipitated the escalation of differences.
It was widely believed that General Burhan would step down from the army leadership after handing over power to civilians, but according to people close to the man, that option is no longer on the table and Burhan will retain the position of commander-in-chief and head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which will include some 14 generals and one RSF representative, adding to Hemedti's fears as a soft containment of his forces.
Moreover, Hemedti always thought of elections as a new means of unilateralism and retaining power, and set out to form an alliance based on tribal notables and Sufi leaders, and eventually merge with another coalition of civilian forces dominating the transition.
These steps worried Burhan and senior army commanders who see Hemedti's dominance of power in the future as a security threat, especially if the authority is accompanied by military forces independent of the army, and here the generals are active whispering in Burhan's ear, and sometimes threatening rebellion if the Rapid Support is not integrated into the Sudanese army quickly, and this trend is led by General Shams al-Din Kabbashi, General Yasser al-Atta and a number of military intelligence leaders, at a time when a member of the Sovereignty Council seems to be Lieutenant General Ibrahim Jaber is more conservative and neutral in this crisis.
How did Hemedti jump out of Burhan camp?
Until the October 2021 coup, the relationship between Burhan and his deputy was good, and according to one of Hemedti's advisers - who spoke to Al Jazeera Net on condition of anonymity - Hemedti had broad authority, especially in choosing members of government in the states after the coup, and during attempts to end the crisis, Abdel Rahim Dagalo, Hemedti's brother and a second commander of the Rapid Support in November 2022, led broad negotiations that succeeded in temporarily returning Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok to power through what was then called the agreement However, these negotiations enabled the Freedom and Change team to build bridges to communicate with Hemedti's brother and the keeper of his secrets and win him to their side, and this task was assumed by retired Major General Kamal Ismail, head of the Sudanese Alliance Party, who was able to address the concerns of the Rapid Support in a number of cases related to human rights violations following the dispersal of the General Command sit-in in June 2019.
The mysterious advisor surfaces
Even before the October coup, Hemedti was surrounding himself with advisers with a previous relationship with the Salvation Government, many of whom had political backgrounds dating back to the Brotherhood in Sudan, but Hemedti seconded what is known among politicians as a magician because he was able to change the course of the political arena quietly, the mysterious adviser Youssef Ezzat, completed his university studies in the field of law in Sudan and was then close to the Sudanese left and completed additional studies in Canada, where he obtained citizenship and resided for about 20 years.
The new advisor convinced Hemedti that his political future lies in allying with future rulers and tightening ties with the revolutionary street by adopting his demands for change and civilian rule, and that this new position will wash away the rapid support from the recent past, and open channels of communication with the outside world.
Ezzat became one of the attendees in the meetings of the Alliance for Freedom and Change, and benefited from his relationship with the official spokesman for the Alliance for Freedom and Change, Yasser Arman, in consolidating the new alliance despite the difficulty of the task, but Ezzat - according to those close to him - found that Hemedti had made his choices from siding with the democratic transition and his role was enhanced by this trend.
Last Sunday, the official spokesman for Freedom and Change - Central Council Group, Yasser Arman, said that the Rapid Support has a strike force of more than 100,6 fighters, and that this force has political and economic interests that must be taken into account, but according to a political source, there are undeclared understandings between the leaders of Freedom and Change and the Rapid Support to make him a guardian of civilian rule by adopting his demands to prolong his integration into the army for 14 years, while Hamidi was demanding <> years to accomplish the task.
Does the proof work?
The head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, said that he signed the framework agreement because it achieves the principle of integrating rapid support, and if this is not achieved, he will not move forward with the agreement.
Behind the scenes of the situation, Burhan was looking for a remarkable document that clearly defines the need to integrate the rapid support, and found in the framework agreement his purpose, although he knows that the agreement is broken and will not be able to withstand the weight of politicians' differences, according to a source close to the army commander.
According to a senior military source, the issue of integrating the RSF has a consensus among the Sudanese military and considers it a national security issue ahead of other issues. According to the same source, this task can be completed in 6 months, given that the Rapid Support Force is an organized military force with government records showing its numbers and the military training the force has received.
Regarding the demands of the Rapid Support Command for years for the merger process, the military source considered that this represents an escape and an attempt to blackmail that will not succeed, while a political leader with a close relationship with Hemedti believes that the essence of the dispute between the two men lies in Burhan's attempt to disavow the framework agreement and return the military institution to play a political role, which Hemedti strongly opposes.
What if the worst-case scenario happens?
According to an informed source, the Sudanese army has developed all plans and estimates to confront the situation, and that it does not prefer any military confrontation for one reason, which is that it could cause casualties among civilians in Khartoum and large cities, but if it is forced to this confrontation, plans have been developed to resolve the battle with the least possible losses.
According to the same source, the army has comparative advantages in this regard, as the armored corps represents a striking force that the Rapid Support Forces will not withstand and rely on fast personnel carriers, anti-tanks, anti-aircraft and cannons, but all these weapons will not be enough to confront an army in the ranks of the Sudanese army.
On the other hand, represented by the Rapid Support, there are those who believe that the Rapid Support has become a highly efficient fighting force, especially after the experiences of its participation in the Yemen war, and that the army's preferential weapons cannot be used inside cities, and that part of the Sudanese street will be next to the Rapid Support Forces, which carry its aspirations for civilian rule and social justice, although military confrontation will not be an option for rapid support.
In the context, a retired military expert, in an interview with Al Jazeera Net, that the army prefers plans to dismantle the rapid support consisting of forces carrying in the hollow of many variations, as a third of these forces consisting of about 60 thousand fighters came from the border guard forces loyal to Grim Hemedti and the former prisoner leader of the Mahamid clan Musa Hilal, and in the case of any confrontation can neutralize these forces, especially that Hilal recently began to rearrange his forces under the name of the Awakening Council forces.
The same expert also points out that there are forces affiliated with the army and the intelligence service in pivotal centers and locations within the Rapid Support Forces that will side with the army in any confrontation, and also indicates that the army leadership can remove Hemedti from the leadership of the forces like any officer, and then assign a new commander from the same forces and from the same tribal group to which Hemedti belongs, and that this sudden action is enough to prevent any rebellion, and that there are many names, some of which have previously served in the Sudanese army, developed by The military leadership is in its sights.
Hemedti's fatal mistakes in the international arena
One of the RSF's weaknesses that prevents him from making a confrontational decision is that it is difficult to market its leader to the international community, although one Western ambassador in Khartoum described Hemedti as more loyal to the democratic transition and that Burhan is reluctant and increasingly ambiguous on the issue.
According to a political source, Abu Dhabi asked Hemedti to calm down, especially since it has an imminent agreement with Khartoum to build a new port on the Red Sea coast, and that Hemedti's communication with the Russian company Wagner closed the doors of communication with Washington, which sees him as just a militia leader.
The same situation puts him in confrontation with Cairo, which is suspicious of his rapprochement with Addis Ababa, which hosts some of his commercial investments, and Egypt has a military presence in the form of a squadron of fighter jets in the Merowe region in northern Sudan that can be used against the RSF if it chooses confrontation.
Chad also has no positive feelings for Hemedti, and believes that he is moving within Chadian territory with the aim of changing the government in favor of Arab groups, which made N'Djamena officially complain about these moves, which also anger France.
Hemedti has no ally in neighboring countries except in Central Africa, which is preoccupied with its internal battles, which is far from Hemedti and his clan's areas of influence in the North Darfur region, and does not seem a suitable place for the launch of a new rebellion led by Hemedti, who previously rebelled against the Sudanese government in 2007, and the border with internally volatile Libya may be a preferred option for Hemedti if he is forced to confront.
Hemedti's money hinders his movement
According to military and economic experts, Hemedti will not resort to the option of confrontation because of his financial wealth earned from gold prospecting, where he will lose most of this wealth and will not be able to move it nor move his family's money abroad, but close to the Rapid Support believe that Hemedti calculated for this step and open investment outlets in Ethiopia and Kenya, and is looking for safe ports within the jungles of the African continent make him benefit from this money if he takes the decision to confront that will end in victory or rebellion.
Hemedti, as described by a military expert, is like a lucky gambler who came to the field with limited capital and then gained a lot, and will not give up, and in the event of confrontation he decided to fight his battles from within the army's combat box, taking into account the possibility of withdrawing to the borders of Darfur and leading a new rebellion that forces Khartoum to negotiate with him again.
He could ally himself with new social components, as in his first rebellion, where he managed to convince fighters from the Fur tribe, Darfur's largest tribal component, to fight alongside him, despite a long history of conflict between them and Hemedti's Arab tribes.
Confrontation is possible but not imminent
A number of military experts who spoke to Al Jazeera Net agreed that the confrontation between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces is possible but not imminent, and Burhan will not be able to retreat from the issue of integrating the Rapid Support Forces, because the price of this will be a military coup such as the one led by Major General Abdul Baqi Bakraoui in September 2021, which was motivated by stopping the expansion of the influence of the Rapid Support Forces. At the same time, Hemedti is unable to break up his new alliance with the Forces of Freedom and Change, which represent a lifeline and perhaps a boat to carry him towards a prosperous political future through the ballot box.