The "Society for Freedom Rights" was quite certain on Wednesday: The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Schwerin Police Act would "have an impact beyond Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania," the association wrote in a statement.
He had supported the constitutional complaints against the law and is currently coordinating constitutional complaints against the police laws of several federal states by means of "strategic litigation".
The group, founded in 2015 by Green politician Malte Spitz, has an interest in transferring its success to other processes.
Stephen Klenner
Editor FAZ objection.
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However, it is by no means certain that this will succeed.
The automated data evaluation by the police in Hesse and Hamburg, which is due for a decision in Karlsruhe on February 16, does interfere with the same basic rights as a number of standards in the Mecklenburg-Western Pomeranian Police Act.
However, the procedure has a much stronger connection to digitization than the current decision.
The norms from Schwerin that are objected to therein also stipulate prerequisites for technology-based data collection and online searches.
But they go far beyond that: With the requirements for longer-term observations, the use of persons of trust and undercover investigators as well as home surveillance, conventional police instruments are also covered by the Senate decision.
The Karlsruhe judges therefore did not justify their decision with technical considerations, but above all with their anger at the imprecise legislation of the state parliament.
requirements not taken into account
In order to reconcile police work and the protection of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court has been working with different definitions of danger for a long time.
These define when a police measure is permissible.
For longer-term observations, for example, a "concrete danger" is required.
It is linked to two conditions: On the one hand, there must be a foreseeable occurrence of a criminal offense.
On the other hand, it must be clear that people are involved whose identity is known at least enough for the observation to be used against them in a targeted manner.
Even stricter requirements apply to home surveillance: the Basic Law expressly only allows it "to avert urgent dangers to public safety".
Both the extent and the probability of damage must therefore be very high.
Although these requirements were known at least in their basic form, in 2020 the then red-black majority in the state parliament had refrained from consistently aligning the police law accordingly.
The norm that regulates longer-term observations stated, for example, that these are already permissible if “facts suggest that certain crimes have been committed”.
Karlsruhe now complained that this wording went beyond a concrete danger.
The risk of the police observing citizens who are not planning anything criminal is too high.
For similar reasons, the judges were reluctant to include so-called pre-acts in a risk assessment prior to collecting data to prevent terrorism.
These were not sufficient for a concrete danger.
Further norms reprimanded
In addition to the powers mentioned, the Federal Constitutional Court also objected to a norm that previously regulated when undercover investigators had to break off contact with their target.
The police law provides for this if the "core area of private life" of suspects is affected - an overly close relationship between investigator and target person is therefore inadmissible.
However, there can be constellations in which an investigator's loss of contact could endanger people.
The police law therefore provides for exceptions for breaking off contact.
These are also not formulated precisely enough in Karlsruhe.
The state parliament in the north-east has completely exceeded its powers with a regulation on the announcement of suspects for police observation.
Because this topic has already been regulated by the Bundestag in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This blocks a separate regulation in state law.