Whoever Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) appoints as the new Defense Minister this Tuesday – the starting position remains challenging: While Europe sees itself in the most threatening situation since the Cuban Missile Crisis due to the Russian attack, the Bundeswehr is in a desolate situation Condition.

The turning point that Scholz proclaimed days after the start of the invasion has so far been little more than lip service to a special mountain of debt.

Germany lost a crucial year to modernize the Bundeswehr.

And there are now only a maximum of two years left before the next federal election campaign will make the necessary unity in parliament for courageous steps as good as impossible.

There is a small window of time left for the new holder (whether male, female or diverse) of authority and command to initiate decisive reforms.

And his successors would also have to pursue them.

It will easily take 12 to 15 years to eliminate the numerous structural causes of the standstill in the armed forces.

Because the defense sector is a case of state failure, the profound consequences of which can be seen in every corner of the system.

Although military security precautions and, as a result, armaments have constitutional status, Germany can look back on 30 years of political disinterest, permanent savings in the defense budget and bureaucratic regulation mania.

As a result, in the Bundeswehr, but above all in the Ministry of Defense and the authorities subordinate to it,

all according to the rules.

The bottom line is that Germany has no appreciable ability to defend itself.

The myriad and intertwined individual problems mean that there is no simple solution.

In order to get the turning point going, to get the Bundeswehr fit again in the long term and also to support Ukraine, the new defense minister has to start work in many areas at the same time.

The most important can be summarized in ten points:

Firstly, the defense minister must convince the cabinet to increase the defense budget and also set up a transformation budget: projects are only tackled if there is enough money and it can be planned.

Despite the special fund of 100 billion euros, this has not yet been sufficiently the case.

If the annual defense budget does not continue to grow, operating and personnel costs eat up the money for regular armaments again - from 2027 at the latest there would be no armaments budget alongside the special fund.

In order to be able to carry out rapid restructuring and layoffs this year, the new management also needs a transformation budget for 2023, beyond the normal budget, in order to be able to act quickly in the first few months.

Secondly, both presuppose that the new defense minister can win over the Bundestag for a long-term restructuring – and that across the governing parties.

Only if the broad masses of democratic parties get involved can the resources and thus stability in day-to-day operations and staying on course in strategic orientation be guaranteed for the above-mentioned period.

The Minister of Defense cannot go before Parliament alone with a comprehensive and long-term restructuring plan.

The Bundeswehr is dependent on other departments, such as economy, finance, internal affairs and foreign affairs, for its function in terms of salaries, security regulations and international cooperation.

Thirdly, therefore, the plan for restoring defense and alliance capability will only be credible and workable with the approval of all these ministries.

This applies in particular to an armaments and procurement strategy.

While the biggest construction sites are waiting here, this will also mean a redefinition of the relationship between the state and the private national and very diverse international defense industry.