A tripartite meeting was held in the Russian capital, Moscow, on December 28, 2022, which included the defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Syria, and intelligence officials of the three countries.
At first glance, the meeting seemed surprising and out of context for Turkish policy towards Syria.
It was natural for it to provoke reactions from all directions, including the US administration, which issued a mild condemnation statement.
The truth is that unannounced meetings, at the level of Turkish and Syrian intelligence leaders, have already been held during the past year or two.
In 2021, the Turkish foreign minister spoke with his Syrian counterpart on the sidelines of a regional conference of foreign ministers, albeit in a fleeting and not prolonged manner.
At the end of November 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly expressed his country's desire to normalize relations with Syria, without ruling out a summit-level meeting in the future.
Erdogan soon followed up his statement a few days later by pointing out that he proposed to President Vladimir Putin a proposal for Russia to organize a tripartite track to advance the process of normalizing Turkish-Syrian relations.
It is clear that the meeting of defense ministers and intelligence chiefs of the three countries in Moscow was the first step in this path.
In general, the implications of this remarkable turning point in Turkish-Syrian relations should not be underestimated, and what it means for the future of Syria.
Syria, Turkey's southern neighbor, has been experiencing a fierce civil war for more than ten years, which has led to the division of this main Arab country into different spheres of influence, and has made it an arena for the struggles of regional and international powers and the stampede of armed factions of all kinds.
Despite the complexity surrounding the Turkish position on the revolution, and on the subsequent Syrian civil war, Turkey is considered a major party to the conflict in Syria, due to considerations, including that the northern Syrian regions are under Turkish control, and that Turkey hosts millions of Syrian refugees, and most of the Syrian opposition forces.
Why did Ankara set out to launch this path in its relations with Damascus, after more than a decade of estrangement and conflict?
What can the normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations lead to?
Preliminary results of the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement
The official statements issued by the three countries after the end of the Moscow meeting used clear language of reservation, albeit expressing a measure of optimism.
As for the unofficial leaks, especially those that came from the Turkish side, they seemed more positive in assessing what resulted from the tripartite meeting.
According to the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the meeting took place in a constructive atmosphere, and the parties agreed to continue contacts to discuss ways to solve the Syrian crisis, the refugee issue, and confront "extremist" groups.
As for the official Syrian news agency, SANA, it described the meeting as positive, and confirmed the agreement of the parties to combat "terrorist" groups.
As for the statement of the Turkish Ministry of Defense, it described the meeting as constructive, and left the details to statements made by Defense Minister Hulusi Akar.
Among what Akar confirmed was that the Turkish side indicated during the meeting the need to move towards a solution to the Syrian crisis on the basis of Security Council Resolution 2245, issued in December 2015.
It is known that this decision laid down a road map for the parties to the internal Syrian conflict to agree to establish credible governance, not sectarian or factional, and on a new Syrian constitution.
However, seven years after the issuance of the UN resolution, and the United Nations supervising a series of meetings between the Syrian parties, there has been little progress either with regard to rebuilding the Syrian state, or drafting a new Syrian constitution based on consensus between the regime and the opposition.
Among what Defense Minister Hulusi Akar confirmed was that the Turkish side indicated during the meeting the need to move towards a solution to the Syrian crisis on the basis of Security Council Resolution 2245. (Communication sites)
The Turkish Minister of Defense must have realized that his talk about Resolution 2245 was not viewed with any degree of reassurance by the Syrian opposition, and by the Syrians in the areas of Turkish influence in northern Syria.
This prompted him, two days after the Moscow meeting, to confirm that the course of contacts between Turkey and Syria would not have a negative impact on the Syrian people and the Syrian opposition forces in Turkey, and also prompted the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to arrange a meeting between Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and the leadership of the Syrian opposition coalition.
Unofficially, a Turkish source told media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, that the Moscow meeting had already reached a number of tangible measures, such as the parties to the meeting agreeing to form a tripartite committee to work on developing a mechanism to facilitate the safe return of Syrian refugees to their country, and to discuss ways of dealing with With the file of the Syrian Democratic Forces (which includes the Kurdish People's Protection Units), and the return of the Turkish commercial transport movement through Syria.
However, whatever the credibility of this report, or the level of the unofficial source to which the report was attributed, it is clear that the Moscow meeting was only the beginning of a negotiation process, which may take a little while before producing tangible results in terms of restoring normal relations between Turkey and Syria.
Both sides, the Turkish and the Syrian, seek to achieve great goals from the normalization process, goals that not only overlap, but are related to the essence of the national security of both countries and their perception of their vital interests.
Two busy decades of Turkish-Syrian relations
Since the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, the Turkish government has pursued an active regional policy aimed at strengthening relations with Turkey's three main neighboring circles: the Arab neighborhood, the North Caucasus, and the Balkans.
It was not surprising that Syria occupies a central position in Turkey's Arab policy, not only because it is a direct neighbor to Turkey, or due to the previous relations between the Syrian regime and the PKK, but also due to social and cultural considerations that linked the two countries and their peoples.
This Turkish approach found a quick response from Bashar al-Assad, who was trying to build a positive image of his regime after he assumed the presidency of Syria as heir to his father, and was working to restore his country's regional and international relations.
There is no doubt that the invasion and occupation of Iraq gave the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement a character of urgency and necessity.
During the first decade of the century, the two countries succeeded in liquidating most of the consequences of the Turkish Republic's annexation of the Hatay region (Iskenderun), which had been stuck since the 1930s, and opened the borders to the free movement of people and goods.
Turkish businessmen rushed to invest in the Syrian market, and Syria almost completely got rid of its ties with the PKK.
For several years, in the face of enormous American pressure on Damascus, it seemed as if Turkey had become the guarantor of Syria's stability and security.
There is no doubt that Turkey has dragged its feet with great difficulty towards engaging in supporting the Syrian revolution.
The revolution broke out in March 2011, and it was the fifth in a series of Arab revolutions that began in Tunisia, then Egypt, then Libya and Yemen.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has previously advised his Syrian counterpart to carry out radical reforms to avoid the fate of other Arab revolution countries.
After the start of the Syrian popular protest movement, and for more than six months, Turkish officials, including the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Turkish intelligence official, made a series of visits to Damascus, in an attempt to push Bashar al-Assad to stop using violence and killing against the demonstrators, and to adopt a reform program. The state and the system of government meet the people in the middle of the road.
But al-Assad, who was accustomed to following the Turkish envoys with all reassuring promises, did not respond in any tangible way to the demands of his Turkish allies.
With the fall of 2011, Ankara realized that Assad was continuing a policy of suppressing his people by force of arms, and that it was futile to rely on the promises of the Syrian president.
At the same time, the number of Syrian refugees to Turkey has increased steadily, and there is no longer any doubt about the extent of Iranian interference in the raging conflict between the regime and the people.
Then, after major Arab countries called for regime change in Damascus, Ankara announced the adoption of a similar policy.
Since the spring of 2012, after the Syrian revolution turned into armed action, Turkey, along with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Emirates, Jordan, and the United States, participated in supporting certain Syrian opposition groups, while making sure to continue contacts with Iran to reach a political solution to the crisis in the country. .
During the next few years, especially since 2015, and for various reasons, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and the United States stopped supporting the forces of the Syrian revolution, and Washington moved in particular to ally with the Syrian Kurdish factions in northeastern and eastern Syria, under the pretext of fighting terrorism and confronting the Islamic State.
Russia soon intervened, with massive firepower, as a direct party to protect the regime and secure its existence.
Since 2018, despite the inability of the Damascus regime to extend its control over large sectors of the country, the multiplicity of spheres of influence inside Syria, the international boycott and the collapse of the Syrian economy, there is no longer any doubt that the Syrian revolution has become incapable of overthrowing the regime.
In other words, the policy of regime change, which Turkey and several Arab countries had adopted, had reached a dead end.
Consequences of a protracted civil war
Closing the horizon in front of the parties to the conflict in Syria had heavy consequences for both Turkey and the Syrian regime.
Turkey receives no less than three and a half million Syrian refugees.
Although the European Union made a modest, one-time contribution to help care for the refugees, the biggest burden falls on the Turkish state.
The spread of large numbers of Syrians in Turkish cities and towns also had tangible economic and social effects, which were quickly used by the Turkish opposition forces, especially those known for their racist nationalist orientation, against the Justice and Development Government and President Erdogan.
However, the security risks that resulted from the deterioration of the Syrian situation represented a much greater threat to Turkey.
Since Washington adopted a policy of relying on Kurdish armed factions to carry out counter-terrorism missions in 2015, the United States (along with France) has provided continuous financial and military support to the Syrian Democratic Forces, which represent the Kurdish People's Protection Units, closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), its backbone.
And because the American forces present in Syria carry out joint patrols with the People's Units, the United States appears to provide a direct protection umbrella for these Kurdish factions.
These Kurdish groups control large areas of the Syrian Kurdish population in northeastern Syria, and cities and towns with an Arab majority in the east and north of the country.
Ankara believes, and even says, that it has evidence that the Kurdish-controlled areas have turned into centers of training and organization for "Kurdish terrorist" elements, pushed by the PKK to carry out operations inside Turkish cities and against Turkish civilians.
Ankara tried, in vain, to persuade the United States to abandon the alliance with the armed factions. It also sought, through three military operations, to secure the border strip with Syria, west of the Euphrates.
However, the American position still stands as an obstacle to any Turkish attempt to control the area west of the Euphrates.
The consequences are no less bad from the point of view of the Syrian regime.
Although the Assad regime is no longer threatened with collapse, its sovereignty over his country is still limited to the coastal region, the center extending from Aleppo to Damascus and Daraa, and the border with Jordan.
Turkey controls most of the border strip west of the Euphrates, while the Kurdish factions and US forces control most of northern Syria, east of the Euphrates, and a large sector of the east and the Syrian desert, including the oil field areas.
Even in areas under regime control, this control remains limited.
In southern Damascus, there is a fragile agreement with the local forces in Daraa, sponsored by the Russian forces.
As for As-Suwayda, the regime's ability to exercise power appears to be a formality and a great deal of concern.
On the other hand, the Russian presence in Syria in general remained limited to the military and security fields, while the Iranians took from the beginning to play the role of an undeclared tutelage force.
The Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah groups, and other Shiite factions provide effective military insurance for Iranian influence, while other parties linked to Tehran worked to seize lands inside and outside Syrian cities, and penetrate the economic arena.
Tehran also worked to control the joints of the Syrian military and security services.
Whether with or without the consent of the Syrian regime, Iran is establishing bases and centers for military preparation, to be used in any possible conflict with Israel, which responded by invading the Syrian space.
These enormous consequences of the long years of the Syrian civil war, and the diminishing expectations of final victory for any of its parties, are what prompted Ankara and Damascus to try to restore the relationship between them.
The goals of Turkey and Syria
What Turkey wants from normalization with the Bashar al-Assad regime is to seek to provide a safe environment for the start of the return of Syrian refugees to their country, and thus to remove the refugee card from the Turkish opposition.
By restoring relations with Damascus, Turkey also aims to agree on a joint mechanism to deal with Syrian Kurdish groups, not only to protect direct Turkish security, but also to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish entity on the Syrian side of the border.
And because the American military presence in Syria is closely related to the presence of the Kurdish factions, the Turks believe that Turkish-Syrian cooperation to restore order to the areas under the control of the Kurds will eventually lead to the Americans leaving Syria.
There is no indication that Turkey is about to disengage from NATO, or that it is about to disengage from its historical alliance relationship with the United States.
But Ankara views the American presence in Syria with increasing concern.
The Americans missed out on Syria, the Turks say, when Ankara hoped they would counterbalance the Russian intervention.
And when they established a foothold, they took a stand against Turkish interests.
In their vision of the American presence in Syria, the Turks do not lose sight of the unprecedented American military expansion in Greece, and the unreserved American bias towards the Greek side regarding the raging conflict in the eastern Mediterranean.
Reconciliation with Turkey may help the return of thousands of Syrian workers, and the return of a significant part of the Syrian capital that left the country to Turkey.
(communication Web-sites)
There is no doubt that Damascus shares the Turks' goal of containing the Kurdish factions, preventing the emergence of a Kurdish entity, and getting rid of the American presence.
However, Damascus has other goals in the process of normalizing relations with Ankara.
Just as America's exit from Syria makes it easy to extend the influence of the Damascus regime over a large sector of the northeastern and eastern parts of the country, Turkey's agreement to withdraw from the northern strip west of the Euphrates practically means the end of the armed opposition and the restoration of a large sector of Syrian territory.
And because the Syrian economy has actually reached the point of collapse, reconciliation with Turkey may help the return of thousands of Syrian workers, and the return of a significant part of the Syrian capital that left the country to Turkey.
As for the more distant goal of the Assad regime, it is related to Damascus' desire for the restoration of relations with Turkey to encourage the main Arab countries to reconcile with Syria, and for the Turkish and Arab return to Syria to balance Iranian influence.
Big turn and long path
Commenting on the Moscow tripartite meeting, the Turkish Foreign Minister ruled out the resumption of Turkish-Syrian meetings at the political level before the end of January 2023. However, he returned in his statement, on December 31, and after a phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, To say that the meeting of foreign ministers will take place in the second half of January 2023, in reference to the desire of the three countries to maintain the negotiating track, and perhaps to a common positive vision of what the Moscow meeting achieved.
There are parties, such as Iran, the United States and Russia, for which it is almost impossible to make tangible progress in the path of Turkish-Syrian reconciliation without their consent.
There is a Turkish approach to regional reconciliation that has been taking shape since the summer of 2020, and has succeeded, in whole or in part, in restoring normal relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the Israeli occupation state, Armenia, and Egypt.
But Turkish-Syrian normalization is certainly a much larger variable than any of the other reconciliations, not only due to the multiplicity of parties involved in the Syrian crisis and the role that Turkey plays in this crisis, but also due to the extreme complexity that surrounded this crisis over the past decade.
Therefore, if the path of Turkish-Syrian normalization makes real progress during the next few months, this will be the starting step towards a breakthrough in the Syrian crisis and the end of the civil conflict.
However, this does not necessarily mean expecting quick results for the reconciliation process, which would be sufficient to satisfy the two main parties.
Some of what the two countries seek to achieve, such as the return of the regime to the areas of Kurdish control, is a common demand of Ankara and Damascus.
However, the problem is that the Syrian issue is not always related to the will of Ankara and Damascus, even if the regime's desires coincide with those of Turkey.
There are parties, such as Iran, the United States and Russia, for which it is almost impossible to make tangible progress in the path of Turkish-Syrian reconciliation without their consent.
Iran, which has the greatest influence in the Syrian regime's institutions, seems most concerned about the prospects for Turkish-Syrian reconciliation.
In addition, some of the issues under discussion and negotiation, such as Turkey's withdrawal from its areas of control in Idlib, Afrin and northern Aleppo, are difficult to expect until convincing evidence is available of a satisfactory solution to other aspects of the Syrian crisis.
This does not necessarily mean that the Turkish-Syrian reconciliation will lead to an effective implementation of Security Council Resolution 2245, and the Assad regime's agreement to build an inclusive political system that includes the largest sector of the opposition forces, and to draft a new consensual constitution.
The regime’s refusal over the past years to deal seriously with Resolution 2245, the transformation of repression and genocide into a routine policy in the regime’s dealings with the Syrian people, and the dominance of the sectarian character over the regime’s structure, do not suggest that the ruling group in Damascus is ready to launch a real reform program for the state and the system of government. .
Without serious Russian pressure and Iranian approval, Turkey will not be able to push the Syrian regime to adopt a reform program, while it seeks to achieve other goals related to Turkey's national security and its direct interests in the Syrian neighborhood.
(Getty Images)
This certainly raises many questions about the future of the Syrian opposition forces, and the millions of Syrian refugees, in addition to other Syrians residing in areas of opposition control and Turkish influence.
There are numbers of refugees who will certainly take the initiative to return to the country, but other numbers will not accept return, whether because they are not satisfied with the promises of the Syrian government, or because one of its members has engaged in activities opposing the regime.
Nor is the Syrian opposition confined to the Syrian Coalition, which is in fact nothing but a representative framework, nor to the armed organizations.
The Syrian opposition includes many groups, individuals, civil, political, cultural and media organizations.
This opposition counts tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Syrians, most of whom reside in Turkey, and will not accept a return to Syria ruled by the Assad regime.
It does not seem that Turkey knows how it will organize its relationship with all these Syrians, if reconciliation with the Damascus regime goes ahead.
In other words, if it is not wise to ignore the importance of the Turkish-Syrian meetings, and what they mean for the future of Syria and the entire region, then it is also not certain to expect that these meetings will bring quick solutions to the Syrian issue, even if they rise to a meeting at the level of the presidency of the two states.
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This report is taken from Al Jazeera Center for Studies.