The missile and nuclear programs are due to Pyongyang's sense of vulnerability and vulnerability
"Limited options" to respond to any North Korean nuclear test
Kim pledged to "double increase" the production of nuclear weapons.
From the source
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American writer and analyst, Daniel Snyder, believes that North Korean President Kim Jong-un's celebration of the New Year, with a strong show of force, was clearly intended to attract the attention of the United States, South Korea, and Japan.
At a meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea at the end of the year, Kim pledged to "double increase" the production of nuclear weapons, along with developing "another new intercontinental ballistic missile system."
And the official Korean media published pictures of Kim and his daughter walking in front of rows of medium-range missiles and mobile carriers, which are weapons that can hit bases in Japan and the United States there and in Guam.
The year concluded with the testing of a new nuclear-capable multiple launch missile system, intended to carry out tactical nuclear strikes against South Korea.
Snyder, a lecturer in East Asian studies and international politics at Stanford University, says in a report published by the American magazine "The National Interest", that North Korea's increasing escalation of missile tests and preparations for an imminent seventh test of a nuclear warhead has alarmed the governments of the region and the United States.
Some observers portray these launches as political theatre, an act of either angry defiance or a desperate cry for attention and a call for negotiation.
Snyder made it clear that the tests and statements issued by Kim and his regime are no different from previous actions, and are a continuation of North Korea's long-established efforts to possess a nuclear weapons capability that can withstand any American attack, overcome existing missile defense systems, and hit key targets. In South Korea, Japan, the western Pacific, and possibly the continental United States.
feel helpless
Certainly, the missile and nuclear programs are due to North Korea's sense of vulnerability and vulnerability, but it is also evidence of a goal that it still firmly clings to, which is the reunification of the Korean peninsula under North Korean leadership.
The current war situation aims in part to drive wedges between the South Korean people and the United States, their country's security ally.
In general, this goal has become in recent years something that can be achieved to a greater degree in the minds of the North Korean regime, as it witnessed the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, its failure to reconcile in Iraq and Syria, and its confusing approach to withdrawing from South Korea during the administration of former President Donald Trump.
President Joe Biden's administration changed direction, recommitting to the importance of security alliances with South Korea and Japan, and this reinforced the return of the conservative leadership in Seoul, but Kim and his senior officials believe that this is likely to be temporary.
Calls by former US officials and other experts to formally accept Pyongyang's nuclear-armed status, a key goal of its diplomacy, should be encouraging for North Korea.
The war in Ukraine has left China and Russia on North Korea's side more firmly than at any other time in the past three decades.
Freeze tests
Under these circumstances, any negotiations with North Korea would result, at best, in a temporary freeze on its testing.
Certainly, this will only come on the heels of the completion of tests that achieve the regime's ongoing missile and nuclear development goals.
Snyder added that Washington should always be ready to offer the familiar exchange of verifiable denuclearization in visible, if incremental, steps toward full diplomatic recognition, a peace treaty to end the Korean War, and broad economic engagement, but all negotiations that took place To achieve this goal it failed for the same reason, which is that it is simply not in North Korea's interest.
Hence, this leaves one viable solution, and it is clear that the Biden administration is pursuing it with the support of South Korea and Japan, which is a strategy of deterrence and containment, based on the lessons of the Cold War.
Snyder says that North Korea's conduct of a seventh nuclear test, accompanied by more successes in missile technology, requires significant support and escalation of the deterrence strategy.
Any containment, generally including all forms of sanctions and economic pressure, is unlikely to intensify given China and Russia's decision to effectively end their participation in long-established sanctions measures, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions.
"So we have to rely on deterrence, and in many respects our deterrence structure in the region is insufficient," Snyder adds.
Indeed, our enemy must be persuaded that the potential use of its nuclear capability to attack the United States or its allies in any crisis or wartime, or even kinetic provocations that do not amount to war, will endanger its existence.
In any case, it is clear that Kim and his generals came to that conclusion.
There are many ways in which deterrence can be more convincing to the Pyongyang regime, and even greatly increase the cost of its continued development of the missile and nuclear system.
All of these methods include an apparent tightening of trilateral security cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, which would quickly attract attention not only from Pyongyang, but also from its backers in Beijing and Moscow.
The first of these methods is the deployment of US strategic assets in the region, to show readiness to carry out retaliatory attacks, in response to any use of nuclear weapons by North Korea.
The second is to move in a serious manner towards the formation of a tripartite air and missile defense command, which includes the structure of the United States and Japan and missile defense coordination between the United States and South Korea, under the joint command of the forces, and exercises have already begun for this purpose.
Formation of joint leadership
The third way, which is the most ambitious so far, is the formation of joint commands, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that includes the nuclear forces, even according to a participation arrangement.
This is a step further than the ongoing political consensus in Japan and South Korea.
The revival of the ongoing consultative dialogues on deterrence between the United States, Japan, and South Korea provides a framework for moving toward a multilateral formula, that is, a NATO-style nuclear planning dialogue that can define the specific tasks that each ally can carry out to help the United States in times of crisis. .
This should be accompanied by regular meetings of the Troika Expanded Deterrence Coordination Group at the Senior Official Level.
Snyder added that these steps would create credibility to ensure expanded American deterrence, which is not currently available.
It would be a powerful statement to North Korea, and its allies, about the consequences of nuclear threats.
These steps will make clear that the international community will never accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.
Snyder concluded his analysis by saying that in the long term, the Kim family's large-scale investment in nuclear and missile capabilities would be an almost total loss.
The regime must realize that it cannot use nuclear weapons without bringing disaster upon itself, and that it cannot use them as effective blackmail.
"With determination and a bit of luck, we should be able to deter North Korea until the situation changes for the better," Snyder said.
• In the long run, the Kim family's large-scale investment in obtaining nuclear and missile capabilities will be an almost total loss.
• There are many ways in which deterrence can be more convincing to the Pyongyang regime, and even greatly increase the cost of its continued development of the missile and nuclear system.
• The North Korean regime must realize that it cannot use nuclear weapons without bringing disaster upon itself, and that it cannot use them as effective blackmail.
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