This is not the first time that it has promoted or claimed its own nuclear armament.
Soon it will be 10/26.
On October 26, 1979, there was a conspiracy theory that the CIA was trying to stop South Korea from developing nuclear weapons by eliminating Park Chung-hee, behind the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Jae-gyu, who shot and killed President Park Chung-hee in an inside house in Gungjeong-dong, Seoul.
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Until the early 1970s, South Korea's national power was close to inferior to that of North Korea.
In the 1960s, however, the United States, which was plagued by measles during the Vietnam War, took a strategy of withdrawing from Asia.
This is the so-called 'Nixon Doctrine'.
In 1971, 20,000 men from one USFK division (7th Division) actually withdrew.
The following year, Park Chung-hee declared the Yushin dictatorship, and from 1973 promoted heavy and chemical industrialization for self-reliant national defense.
It was in this context that Park Chung-hee developed nuclear weapons despite the opposition of the United States.
It is known that Chun Doo-hwan, who came to power next, destroyed all nuclear development materials during the Park Chung-hee administration in order to improve relations with the United States.
On December 31, 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and the communist bloc was dismantled, the Roh Tae-woo administration and North Korea adopted the 'Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula', and South Korea's nuclear weapons development seemed to be completely closed.
However, in 2004, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, there is an uproar.
The fact that the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) succeeded in a uranium enrichment experiment using a laser in 2000 was revealed at an IAEA inspection.
South Korea was in danger of being referred to the Security Council and subject to sanctions.
When even key allies such as the United States, Britain, and France tried to refer Korea to the UN Security Council, the Korean government mobilized all its diplomatic power to stop it, and with the support of Japan and Germany, the stigma of a 'rogue state' was barely avoided.
(“The President’s Diplomatic and Security Agenda” by Cheon Young-woo)
Even after that, whenever there was an incident that provoked security insecurity, arguments were raised that the Republic of Korea should launch its own nuclear armament.
This was also the case in November 2019, when Trump was president of the United States.
At the time, President Trump was applying all-round pressure to raise South Korea's defense cost-sharing by more than five times, and he secretly leaked the possibility that he could cut US troops in Korea if he didn't pay more.
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On November 11, 2019, Mark Milley, chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, made these remarks ahead of his visit to South Korea to discuss the issue of apportionment.
"When the average American looks at USFK and US forces in Japan, they ask the fundamental question, 'Why do they need it? How much does it cost? Korea and Japan are very rich countries, so why can't they defend themselves?'"
For conservatives who believe in the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the Trump administration's remarks were insulting.
The Chosun Ilbo, in an editorial on November 13th, insists on independent nuclear armament, saying, "If you are armed with nuclear weapons, you don't need US forces in Korea."
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At that time, even some so-called progressives who wanted the withdrawal of US forces from Korea argued that if it could lead to the withdrawal of US forces from Korea, they would support the nuclear armament of South Korea itself.
The irony was that two factions with completely different views on security made the same claim.
In the second half of this year, as Kim Jong-un's tactical nuclear-related provocations continued, voices from the conservative ruling party that nuclear weapons can only be stopped are growing again.
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Some nuclear scientists and policy experts also mention that Korea, which is a nuclear power exporter, already has the capability to develop nuclear weapons and can complete its own nuclear weapons in one to two years.
They argue that the US will initially oppose and impose sanctions, but eventually will have to tolerate it.
Some argue that Western countries will not sell fuel for nuclear power generation to South Korea, but in that case, they can survive as stockpiles and purchase from Russia, China, or the former Soviet Union Central Asian countries.
In this context, the results of a poll by the Chicago Council on International Affairs (CCGA), an American think tank, commissioned Korea Research and asked 1,500 Koreans in December of last year, that 71% supported South Korea's own nuclear development. It is also cited in
What do your readers really think?
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However, the road to self-nuclearization is more difficult and more likely than expected.
I will explain the reasons for this from now on, so please read it and respond to the pros and cons once again.
We interviewed Cha Doo-hyeon, head of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Director of Foreign Affairs and Security Center (Director of Research) about the points to think about before claiming to have its own nuclear weapons.
Dr. Cha Doo-hyeon, who served as the head of the Defense Issues Team at the Korea Defense Research Institute, the head of the North Korean Research Office, and the head of the crisis information and situation team in the presidential office, recently posted a counterargument to those who are too hasty to claim that nuclear weapons are the only solution to the current North Korean nuclear situation on social media. It is actively promoted through media contributions, etc.
I also referred to the book 『The President's Diplomatic and Security Agenda』, a book by Chun Young-woo, chairman of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum, who has dealt with the North Korean nuclear issue as a high-ranking official regardless of the conservative-progressive regime.
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1. Nuclear weapons development will take longer than expected
Although Korea is an exporter of nuclear power plants, research necessary for the development of nuclear 'weapons' has practically stopped after the uranium enrichment experiment using lasers in 2000 and the national diplomatic crisis in 2004 when it was discovered.
Since then, South Korea's nuclear activities are under the strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Even the development of uranium enrichment technology for peaceful and economic purposes has become untouchable.
There is an argument that if South Korea's nuclear research capabilities are diverted to the development of weapons, a nuclear bomb can be made within one to two years.
Cha Doo-hyeon, director of research at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, has a different opinion.
Even if they say that they succeed in secretly enriching and detonating weapon-grade nuclear material within a year or two, piercing the surveillance of the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, that does not mean that it becomes a weapon.
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In order to turn weapon-grade nuclear material into a warhead and put it on a delivery means such as a missile or an aircraft bomb, appropriate design and experimentation must be followed.
Moreover, we do not need ICBM-class nuclear weapons to strike Moscow or Beijing, but rather to create nuclear weapons that can strike North Korea, so we have to go through a process of reducing the size and weight of the warhead through trial and error similar to that experienced by North Korea.
It is pointed out that the claim that this process can be completed in two or three years is overly daring optimism.
2. Where will you experiment and where will you put it?
It is impossible to complete and deploy a nuclear weapon without a single nuclear test.
If we are pursuing our own nuclear armament, where on earth should we conduct a nuclear test?
Even if you try to build a high-level radioactive waste treatment plant, people are outraged by protests, but where can a nuclear test be conducted?
Even if nuclear weapons are completed, there is a problem of where to put them.
Military bases equipped with nuclear weapons are the primary targets of nuclear-armed enemies.
Nuclear weapons themselves contain dangerous substances, and how would the people in the region react if they could fly even an enemy's nuclear missiles?
How to convince them in Korean society?
3. China made so much fuss over THAAD… will you stay still?
There is no need for a lengthy explanation of how China tormented Korea with the deployment of THAAD, which is neither an offensive weapon nor a defense weapon that intercepts missiles.
The THAAD base in Seongju, North Gyeongsang Province, has not yet been fully normalized.
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But in an era when the US-China conflict is intensifying, will China overlook that Korea, an ally of the United States, and the Republic of Korea, which has projectile technology to put artificial satellites into Earth's orbit, will acquire nuclear weapons?
Doo-Hyun Cha, director of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said:
“It is possible that China will tolerate South Korea’s own nuclear armament and not take harsh sanctions like the THAAD regime. There is only one case. In which case, if the ROK-U.S. alliance is severed (due to South Korea’s nuclear development). yes."
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3-1. Are India and Pakistan armed with nuclear weapons?
India started developing nuclear weapons after losing the war with China in 1962.
It was only in May 1974 that the first nuclear test was successful.
Astonished by this, Pakistan also started developing nuclear weapons.
India spent 36 years developing nuclear weapons until the last nuclear test in May 1998.
In the same year, Pakistan also successfully conducted a nuclear test.
In the 1970s and 1980s, when India was focusing on nuclear development, the Soviet Union tolerated India's nuclear development, which had a bad relationship with China, because the Soviet Union made it an important strategy to contain China.
At that time, China did not have the power to exclude India from the international community.
China has been a permanent member of the UN since its founding, but it was the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang.
The People's Republic of China (CCP) ruled by Mao Zedong took over mainland China in 1949, but fought with Taiwan for representation on the international stage for a long time.
China's economic power and influence in the international community were not the same as it is now.
It was only after 1992 that China started full-scale reform and opening-up.
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India was a country that was the head of non-aligned forces, and it was a reality of power that could not be ignored in terms of the size of the land, geopolitical location, and population.
Although it was a British colony, it was once an empire that ruled South Asia.
The United States did not believe that India was a threat to the United States and eventually tolerated India's nuclear arms.
Pakistan had a hard time for a while after the nuclear test in May 1998, but after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on Afghanistan, Pakistan was freed from sanctions and accepted nuclear weapons by cooperating with the United States in the war on terrorism.
4. Economic sanctions, longer than expected and frightening
The US Biden administration is firmly committed to a non-proliferation and non-nuclear international order - the so-called NPT system.
The NPT system cannot be maintained without sanctions and retribution against countries that attempt to break out of that and arm themselves with nuclear weapons.
Doo-hyeon Cha, director of research at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, predicted that if South Korea was subjected to international sanctions for developing nuclear weapons without the approval of the United States, the impact would be huge, such as a massive flow of foreign capital and collapse of the financial market.
It is different from the past India and Pakistan, which were released after being sanctioned for about a year.
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Contrary to some optimism, sanctions will not end in less than a year, and the United States will manage the situation to minimize damage to its own country (eg semiconductors, etc.) I expected surrender.
Doo-hyeon Cha also pointed out that the US paradigm for dealing with nuclear weapons and international order is different from when India developed nuclear weapons.
If India's nuclear-armed era was the era of non-proliferation, it is now the era of counter-proliferation and counter-proliferation.
Non-proliferation is a concept focused on controlling the export of strategic goods and technologies.
On the other hand, counter-proliferation or anti-proliferation is a more aggressive concept that emerged after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and it also includes physical blockade of goods and funds, restoration of the victimized country, and retaliatory attacks.
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When asked, 'Are you saying that even if it doesn't completely ruin Korea, you're going to set a good example?', Director Cha Doo-hyeon replied, "I think that's a reality."
5. To be excluded from the global supply chain of advanced strategic technologies
Director Cha Doo-hyeon also raised the following concerns.
Developing nuclear weapons without the consent of the United States will eventually require the assistance of the same nuclear proliferation network that North Korea has contacted.
You can't just give them money to buy nuclear weapons-related technology.
We will also be in a situation where we will have to give up some other technology.
Would the US not know about such a deal?
He said:
"(From the US view) I get the impression that they are a country that can do business with a network of so-called rogue states at any time. They are dealing with nuclear technology this time, but next time it could be another advanced technology of the United States, and semiconductors. It could be, but why would the US put us in it?”
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6. The Korean version of the march of hardship?… The risk of democratization retreating and dictatorship
We can complete the development of nuclear weapons only if we overcome all these difficulties.
There may be political leadership that pushes it forward.
Then it becomes the same logic as Kim Jong-il-Kim Jong-un's 'March of Suffering'.
It is also compatible with China's Xi Jinping's logic that I must seize power in order to overcome pressure from foreign forces and achieve prosperity for the country and nation.
Director Cha Doo-hyeon points out that President Park Chung-hee implemented the Restoration and strengthened dictatorship after the withdrawal of one USFK division was a product of the same logic.
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7. Is national defense over with only nuclear weapons? Not like that
Then, if the national defense force is firmly strengthened, I don't know, but nuclear development could lead to weakening of conventional forces, which could cause another security instability, says Cha Doo-hyeon.
his explanation.
“The opponent with nuclear weapons wants to be touched by neighboring countries. He says he has nuclear weapons, so let’s test it out to see how it turns out. No. For example, if Japan enters Dokdo with a patrol boat, it will intercept with conventional power or its ability to do so will run, so we have to say, ‘Then we will use nuclear weapons.’ How dangerous is that every time a diplomatic dispute arises? To respond with nukes…”
Then, can't the nuclear development be done as it is, and the conventional force can be augmented by itself?
He said, 'With what money?'
inquired.
As is always the case with the country, there will be several times the cost and unexpected expenses than initially estimated. is it coming out
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Moreover, the problem is not limited to development costs.
If nuclear weapons are used, the cost of follow-up management will increase significantly.
North Korea's nuclear weapons are insecure because some are concerned that they will fire them recklessly, but they can also cause accidents due to improper maintenance.
How much money would actually cost to maintain a nuclear force, we don't know yet.
Cha Doo-hyeon, the head of the department, said, "I would have to learn from the accounting process... In the process, the amount of money going through trial and error will not be easy."
8. Will our own nuclear weapons act as a deterrent against North Korea?
Chun Young-woo, chairman of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum, heard the second of 'Six Misconceptions and Myths about Nuclear Armament' in his book, 'If the US deterrence against North Korea fails, the illusion that our nuclear weapons can succeed in deterrence'.
According to him, if South Korea's nuclear weapons are to be effective in replacing or reinforcing the US deterrence against North Korea, North Korea must fear South Korean nuclear weapons more than US nuclear weapons.
But there is no such possibility.
It is not because South Korea's nuclear weapons are inferior in performance to US nuclear weapons and in fewer numbers.
The problem is the 'will' to use nuclear weapons in case of emergency.
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Cha Doo-hyeon, director of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, also asked the same question in a Facebook post.
"Will South Korea's own nuclear weapons, which may or may not be secured in three to five years, really be a deterrent to North Korea, who acts as if it's only living today?
9. The claim of self-nuclearization is an expression of distrust of the ROK-U.S. alliance… The effect?
South Korea's demand for nuclear armament itself is an expression of doubt that the US will protect us with a nuclear umbrella.
The Chosun Ilbo's October 13th editor-in-chief Yang Sang-hoon's column <'American Nuclear Umbrella', Is the Lie Real?> is a good example.
The official response of the United States to these domestic voices is firm.
Don't be suspicious of America.
US Ambassador to Korea Philip Goldberg gave the following series of responses at the Kwanhoon Club discussion on October 18th.
"Expanded deterrence means protecting by mobilizing all sectors, including the nuclear force, of the United States", "No one should doubt the ironclad promise of the United States to this" ) irresponsible and dangerous", "We should not focus on nuclear weapons that increase the threat, whether tactical or not, but rather on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons to slow such tensions", "North Korea, which has nuclear weapons We should not focus on hypothetical situations that are considered normal.”
There is a contradiction in the claim that the United States believes in security guarantees by conventional forces, but cannot believe in a nuclear counterattack against North Korea's nuclear attack.
When North Korea goes to war against the Republic of Korea again, how likely is it to attack only with conventional power without nuclear weapons?
So, to say that you do not believe in the US nuclear umbrella is the same as saying that you do not believe in the United States' promise of common defense as an ally.
Nevertheless, if South Korea is to pursue its own nuclear armament, it must convince the United States that it will help the United States manage Northeast Asia, which is unlikely.
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Director Cha Doo-hyeon predicted that South Korea's nuclear development that would break the US-created order without US approval would be regarded as breaking the alliance by the US.
9-1. Did Trump say he would condone South Korea's nuclear weapons?
Former President Trump has been making remarks since his days as a presidential candidate that he was willing to tolerate South Korea even if it had its own nuclear weapons if the US could ease the burden.
However, it is difficult to interpret this as 'the United States will also turn a blind eye to South Korea's nuclear arms'.
This is because Trump is a short-sighted, snobbish American egoist who does not understand or even try to understand the global strategy of previous administrations of the United States.
Trump's remarks that South Korea can be armed with nuclear weapons are rightly read as meaning that South Korea will be abandoned if it can ease the burden on the US.
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9-2. France also managed to break through the US's disapproval and armed itself with nuclear weapons, but aren't they doing well?
France is the western country that has launched its own nuclear armament with such doubts as to whether the US will protect its allies with a nuclear umbrella at the risk of nuclear missiles flying into their homeland.
President de Gaulle, who led France's nuclear armament, is also called de Gaulle's 'general'.
He led the Resistance, fought the Nazis, and led the liquidation and reconstruction of Nazi remnants in post-war France, but his authoritarian leadership also sparked dictatorship controversies.
Although he was the leader of the anti-Soviet western camp, he refused to settle under the US security umbrella and insisted on France's independent security line.
France successfully conducted its first nuclear test in 1960.
According to the diplomatic history page of the US State Department website, de Gaulle said this to US President John F. Kennedy, who visited the Elysee Palace in Paris in 1961.
"Can America sacrifice New York for Paris?".
This came from the process of discussing a joint response posture against the Soviet Union at a time when the Cold War was intensifying.
There should be no doubt about whether you can sacrifice New York for Paris.
I don't believe it either, but will Khrushchev believe it?
Then de Gaulle's remark was that the Soviet Union could not be deterred.
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However, it is said that the actual statement was a more complex nuance than this.
At that time, the US Kennedy administration's nuclear strategy against the Soviet Union was a flexible response strategy.
To the extent that it corresponds to the opponent's attack, one tactical nuclear missile is fired, and one strategic nuclear missile is fired in response to the strategic nuclear missile...
That's how it was supposed to respond.
De Gaulle is said to have asked, "Can America give up New York or Detroit for Lyon or Hamburg?"
If Paris was hit by Soviet nuclear weapons, the United States would respond with nuclear weapons, but what if it was not a major metropolis as important as Paris?
Judging by this remark alone, it seems that there is no difference from the remarks of Jeong Jin-seok, chairman of the People's Power Emergency Response Committee, who said, 'If Busan is hit with tactical nuclear weapons, will the US retaliate with nuclear weapons?'
The problem is that France at that time and Korea today are different from each other in terms of the times they are in, the international political environment, and the status of the nation.
Around 1960, when France was pursuing nuclear armament, the military threat of the Soviet Union, the leader of the communist bloc, was terrifying, incomparable to today's North Korea.
The Soviet ground forces, which destroyed the Nazi German forces, were still alive and well, and there was no air defense system to stop the Soviet missiles falling on France.
It was a time when even the United States suffered from fear that it might be destroyed by the Soviet nuclear missile.
De Gaulle's question, 'Can the US give up New York in place of a European city?' was about 'France must also have nuclear weapons to suppress the Soviets' ambitions'. It wasn't.
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From the American point of view, France was also a substantial force that should play an important role in Western Europe anyway.
Although it was helplessly defeated by Nazi Germany, it had a vast territory from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean in the middle of Western Europe, and it was an empire that had many colonies from Southeast Asia, Africa, the Pacific, Central and South America.
In addition, France's nuclear armament was before the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system.
The NPT came into force in 1970, ten years after France's nuclear test.
Doo-Hyun Cha said:
“(From the US point of view), I didn’t mean that France should never have nuclear weapons. And when the NPT system was established, it was not started by making France’s nuclear development a standard fact. But now, there is a system called the NPT. To
be able to do it is a dream in itself.”
Now, I ask those of you who have read this far.
Should South Korea pursue its own nuclear armament?
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So what to do?
For various reasons and circumstances, the Republic of Korea today is in a difficult position to make the same choice as France, India, and Pakistan decades ago.
However, the increase in North Korea's nuclear force cannot be overlooked.
According to a research report titled <North Korea's Nuclear Threat, How to Response>, jointly published by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies and the Rand Institute, North Korea will possess 151 to 242 nuclear weapons by 2027.
It means that it will have a similar number of nuclear weapons to China today, and it means that North Korea will be able to pose various nuclear threats to us beyond its 'self-defense nuclear force'.
In such a situation, the South Korea-U.S. alliance is the only South Korea-U.S. alliance, and it does not seem very wise to shake the trust of that alliance.
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This does not mean, however, that we should cling to the United States pitifully because we are powerless in the face of North Korea's nuclear weapons.
Doohyun Cha says:
"We also need to have a little confidence. Korea is not already in an international position to the extent that the US abandons it, and we must also have confidence that the US alliance network will be cut off the moment it abandons Korea."
In Chun Young-woo's book, the nuance is a little different, but there is a passage with a similar purpose.
He points out that the assertion that 'the United States cannot risk New York or Los Angeles being attacked by North Korea's nuclear missiles to defend South Korea' is based on two false premises.
The first false premise is that the only ally of the United States is South Korea.
He wrote that NATO members and Japan are more important allies to the US than South Korea.
Failure to protect South Korea with a nuclear umbrella would undermine the world's trust in the United States' security promises.
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(The second erroneous premise, Chun Young-woo points out, assumes that North Korea's nuclear missiles can actually hit the US mainland. The US can respond with a preemptive strike or intercept before the missiles launched by North Korea reach the US mainland. )
Most experts who view the claim of nuclear armament with concern are not saying that nuclear armament itself as a long-term and ultimate goal should be completely excluded from the options.
Cha wrote, "If the strengthening of the US commitment to extended deterrence continues to be lukewarm, and if it is no longer possible to deter North Korea's nuclear development even in the long term, then its own nuclear armament itself should not be excluded from logical consideration." have.
Chun Young-woo also said, "If our independent nuclear armament is the best way to protect the lives and safety of the people against North Korea's nuclear weapons, and there is no other alternative, then there is no reason why we cannot arm ourselves with nuclear weapons." We must be prepared to accept the international condemnation and sanctions that nuclear armament will inflict.”
However, "You cannot go ahead with nuclear armament without considering the various costs and side effects you have to pay (Chun Young-woo)", "When other means exist, nuclear armament itself is difficult to become a 'game changer' in terms of cost-effectiveness. (Cha Doo-hyun)".
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So what should I do?
Doo-hyeon Cha, director of research at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, proposes to seriously persuade the US over the issue of tactical nuclear relocation.
According to him, the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is a card that can only be achieved when there is 'trust' in the alliance, unlike its own nuclear armament, which starts from distrust of the alliance.
He explained this in an article in the Seoul Economic Daily on October 21st.
“The US redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons (…) can respond in real-time to North Korean attacks, and although there will be diplomatic opposition from Russia and China, they will also be well aware that tactical nuclear weapons are not aimed at them, and the risk of damage to the NPT is also high. less, and above all, in line with the spirit of the alliance of co-responding to threats."
The final authority over the use of tactical nuclear weapons rests with the President of the United States and cannot be used in a manner contrary to the interests of the United States.
For the United States, it is more reassuring than South Korea's own nuclear weapons.
Tactical nuclear weapons based in South Korea can respond much faster to North Korean attacks than strategic bombers or nuclear submarines from Japan, Guam, or the US mainland, so they can be a good alternative in terms of deterrence.
Director Cha Doo-hyeon said that although the official position of the US government is still stubborn, positive views are gradually emerging from outside the academic circles.
The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons also has a long way to go.
A practice plan and operational plan must be prepared for where and how to put it, and how to use tactical nuclear weapons if North Korea starts a nuclear war.
However, to secure even such an alternative, the issue of 'trust' arises again.
Doo-Hyun Cha predicted that the more doubtful the alliance's nuclear umbrella guarantees, the more defensive the US will be in deploying tactical nuclear weapons.
He pointed out that overly strong remarks and political remarks that escalate the crisis are also not helpful.
The US policy makers who heard such remarks said, 'Korea, it's not urgent yet.
This means that if you think it will be helpful for domestic politics, you will see him say anything.”
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He also believed that tactical nuclear redeployment could be achieved only if the semiconductor 'Chip 4' alliance or whatever was involved in strengthening ties with the United States could be achieved.
Then there are those who argue that tying our feet together narrows the scope of our movements, but tying them together has the effect of binding not only small and weak countries but also large and strong countries to the relationship.
When the United States looks at issues with a country, it considers it in terms of global strategy.
Whether it be the nuclear issue or the dollar supply issue.
However, even though we are aiming for a global pivotal country as the world's 10th largest economy, we tend to approach it in a way that says, 'I don't know, I don't know anything else, just listen to us because we're having a hard time'.
This makes it difficult to convince a country that moves the entire game board like the United States.
Director Cha Doo-hyeon said the following in an interview.
Although it was about the Ukrainian war, it sounded as an criticism that had nothing to do with the threat of China's invasion of Taiwan or the issue of Hong Kong's democratization.
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He diagnosed that it is necessary to make efforts to increase our own value in order to gain the trust of not only the United States but also the world.
If other countries other than Russia and China must empathize with Korea and follow Korea, the US will not even think of abandoning Korea, and will feel pressure to protect Korea.
This is not something we can do just by making semiconductors and rechargeable batteries, but it is a problem that requires the international community's sympathy for what kind of value Korea is pursuing.
(Composition/Editing: Lee Hyun-sik, D Contents Producer / Content Design: Ok Ji-soo, Park Soo-min)