Amid the acceleration of geostrategic shifts in the region, the European mediator entered the nuclear negotiations line with the aim of reducing tension between Tehran and Washington, but the latest Iranian response did not meet his ambitions.
The European troika questioned Tehran's intentions to return to the nuclear agreement, and this is not the first time that European parties have expressed their disappointment with the lack of a result, but the only difference this time is that time is running out for them due to the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the aggravation of the energy crisis. Globalism.
The views of the US administration and the statement of the European tripartite, represented by France, Britain and Germany, on the recent Iranian response reveal the difficulty in overcoming the remaining differences, albeit few.
Iran has openly declared that it will not give up one iota of its red lines regarding its nuclear program, and thus it is well aware that prolonging the negotiations may lead it to confront Western countries and aggravate the situation more than before, which may make its nuclear file vulnerable to deliberation in the corridors of the United Nations General Assembly. Which Iran sees as biased, of course, to Western policies.
It is possible that the upcoming meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors will coincide with the meetings of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, the proceedings of which will be attended by the Iranian President, Ibrahim Raisi, where he will deliver his country's annual speech.
It is likely that the Agency’s Board of Governors, in the event that the file is not closed by reaching an agreement or announcing the imminence of reaching it, will issue a decision against Iran, which will force it to raise uranium enrichment in its nuclear facilities to 70% or more in response to the agency’s decision, which transfers the entire crisis. to new scenarios.
But before talking about the most prominent possible scenarios regarding the chances of reaching an agreement, we will touch on some spots of pessimism that may prevent the revival of the nuclear agreement.
hotbed of pessimism
There is also an Iranian concern that the agreement will be a means to prevent Tehran from possessing an effective deterrent force in exchange for a free hand by Israel to enhance its military superiority and deterrence in the region (Reuters)
The withdrawal of former US President Donald Trump from the nuclear agreement in 2018 exacerbated the crisis of confidence between Iran and the United States, prompting Tehran to demand more guarantees to prevent a repeat of the US withdrawal again.
Add to this her lack of confidence in the ability of the current US administration to abide by the terms of any new agreement.
Even if the Democrats win the midterm elections to the US Congress, scheduled for November 2022, and confirm the Biden administration’s ability, it is clear that the current proposals in the exchanged drafts do not encourage Iran to sign a new agreement after it achieved a significant leap in foreign trade with neighboring countries ( 1).
What complicates the conditions internally is the belief of many ideologues of the fundamentalist movement that Iran’s exit from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the increase in the enrichment rate will provide Tehran with a deterrent force that guarantees national security and provides advanced negotiating conditions (2).
There is another focus of pessimism around the European Union, which cannot guarantee that US sanctions will not catch up with the Iranian companies that will deal with it in the event that Washington abandons the agreement, which eliminates the main goal of foreign companies investing in Iran, which urges Tehran to demand a subsidized agreement In a tight text that includes reassuring guarantees in the event the US side withdraws from it for a second time.
The Iranians do not overlook the destructive influence of Israel and its relentless attempts to sabotage the agreement. Israel had previously played this disruptive role in 2014, when the agreement was ready to be signed, and former US Secretary of State John Kerry delayed it for a year in response to Israeli pressure.
These are some hotbeds of pessimism that could return the negotiations to square one.
We must also take into account the fundamentalists’ emphasis that a bad agreement is worse than no agreement, contrary to what former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif had stated that any agreement is better than no agreement (3).
Indicators of the success of the agreement
Failure to reach an agreement will push the Iranians towards escalation by raising the enrichment rate, which opens the door to a nuclear race in the region that contradicts the American approach aimed at Israel's superiority in the region with its nuclear arsenal (Reuters)
Just as the indicators of escalation that could lead to the failure of the Vienna negotiations exacerbated, other indicators appeared on the horizon that favor the success of the agreement, the most important of which is the unanimity of decision-makers in Iran, including fundamentalists and reformists, that returning to the agreement will lead the country out of its economic crisis, and enhance social security, which is a mainstay. The regime will continue and contribute to dispelling security and military threats and threats against the regime, as well as laying the foundations for Iran’s internal and regional security.
On the American side, the Biden administration needs the agreement paper for electoral motives, in order to tell the Americans that by reviving the nuclear agreement it was able to control energy prices and, most importantly, contain Iran and prevent it from acquiring a nuclear bomb.
As for the other indicator of success, it is represented in solving many of the contracts and removing a large part of the technical obstacles through negotiations, which makes us optimistic about the negotiators’ ability to remove the rest of them, especially since the failure of the negotiations will lead the region into a dark tunnel and bring many scourges on the world. Confronting Iran militarily will be costly to the West, and failure to reach an agreement will push the Iranians to escalate by raising the enrichment rate, which opens the door to a nuclear race in the region that contradicts the American approach aimed at Israel's superiority in the region with its nuclear arsenal.
Between the 2015 agreement and the forthcoming agreement
The revival of the nuclear agreement is based on two principles: the United States lifts all sanctions related to the agreement, and maintains sanctions related to human rights and terrorism, especially those issued by Congress, in exchange for Tehran’s return to full compliance with its nuclear commitments to stop enrichment at levels not exceeding 20% and stop The production of advanced centrifuges, with some amendments to the previous agreement, enables Iran to keep the advanced centrifuges that it manufactured during the past two years and store them inside its territory under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, instead of destroying them, as was the case in the previous agreement, which practically helps Iran to resume enrichment activities at record speed in the event the United States withdraws again from the agreement.
The new understanding stipulates that the implementation period of the agreement will be between 5-6 months, starting in practice with a meeting of the joint committee of the nuclear agreement (France, Britain, Russia, China, the European Union and Iran) at the level of political directors, excluding the United States, during which the text of the new agreement will be approved and an invitation to meet the foreign ministers of countries The members of the committee, after which the Iranian and American sides will start taking steps for the simultaneous and gradual implementation of their commitments under the new agreement within a period of 5 or 6 months, after which the United States will officially return to the agreement and regain its membership in the joint committee (4).
For its part, Tehran sets conditions for entering into any joint agreement, including closing the file of the International Atomic Energy Agency, especially the investigations that the agency is conducting about the presence of traces of highly enriched uranium in three Iranian sites, in order to test the seriousness of the powerful West in the agency to cross this obstacle. And the start of a new phase entitled direct dialogue.
As Iranian officials, including the former Secretary-General of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, have stated that Tehran does not refuse a direct meeting with the Americans, similar to the 2015 experience, in order to revive the nuclear agreement and provide $400 million to Iran under the name of releasing American prisoners.
At the present time, the Iranians reject direct meeting with the Americans, but they do not reject it completely and permanently. Rather, they restricted it to conditions, the most important of which is that it be based on clear foundations that lead to the achievement of gains and generous offers for Tehran, which the United States may not be able to present to the Iranian party in multiple meetings. The parties are observing their European allies and partners in the region, in addition to providing satisfactory guarantees to Tehran confirming that it will not withdraw from the upcoming nuclear agreement.
The best scenario for Iran
In light of this, there are several scenarios being proposed at the present time to revive the nuclear agreement, which has become the subject of consensus among the fundamentalists and reformists who form the two main currents in Iran, and their dispute over the agreement has become limited to the date of its signing, which makes us put aside the possibility of not signing the agreement at the present time.
It has become clear that, through its recent response to the European proposal and the American response that followed, Tehran wanted to prolong the negotiations, especially since some figures close to the decision-making references believe that waiting for a period of no less than two months to wait for the arrival of cold waves, which will exacerbate the energy crisis and raise prices. Fuel again in the West, will undoubtedly give Iran a trump card at the negotiating table that will make the agreement more in line with Iranian interests (5).
Perhaps, through this deliberation, Tehran aims to make the most of the time factor, which many supporters have recently supported in the corridors of Iranian politics, with the aim of raising the rate of uranium enrichment to put pressure on the United States and the West, especially since the effect of sanctions has begun to decline, according to the Iranian government’s opinion.
What reinforces the postponement scenario is that Iranian circles believe that the US side is still reluctant to take the final decision, while Tehran is publicly disclosing its conditions for reviving the agreement, which makes it likely to postpone the negotiations until after the midterm elections of the US Congress, in light of Iran’s serious focus on closing Its security file is with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which prompted the US administration to postpone the negotiations until after the eighth of November 2022, due to the approaching date of the congressional elections.
There is a belief among the Iranian center that the postponement of the negotiations will not have an impact on the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which may be satisfied with a statement criticizing Iran's actions.
What future?
The course of the indirect nuclear negotiations between Tehran and the United States through the European mediator was primarily aimed at reducing tension and converging views between Tehran and Washington, rather than focusing on technical issues related to the Iranian nuclear program.
But the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war and regional interactions affected Iran and the United States' view of the content of the nuclear talks.
On the Iranian side, if these benefits do not equal the sacrifices Tehran is making, then the nuclear deal is empty-handed for Iran and not worth the trouble, especially with the constant threat of a US withdrawal soon after.
Despite that, we can say that there is a state of consensus within the Iranian constitutional institutions concerned with strategic decisions, especially those related to the nuclear file, on the necessity of reaching an agreement with a group of international powers, because the agreement achieves the interests of the regime internally by lifting sanctions, supporting the national economy and enhancing national security.
On the regional level, it will place Iran as a major and pivotal power in the West Asia region and enhance its regional role, provided that more positive negotiating conditions are obtained during the coming period.
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This article is taken from Al Jazeera Center for Studies.