Introduction to translation
Beijing and Moscow are often categorized as virtual allies in the face of Western hegemony economically, militarily, and politically.
However, this hypothetical alliance is out of balance day by day with the increase in the power of China and the decline of the power of Russia, so that Moscow begins to gradually transform into a power of China, a trend reinforced by Russia's recent war in Ukraine and its increasing isolation globally, which left it dependent on China more than ever.
translation text
Following the outbreak of the Ukrainian war about six months ago, Russia was cut off from most of the countries of the West, and while sanctions were imposed on it, condemned in the international press, and denied participation in many international cultural forums, the Russians felt more and more isolated.
However, the Kremlin can still count on a key pillar of support, and that is China.
Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine forced him to take refuge in the neighboring Eurasian giant, an asylum that is in fact submissive.
Throughout the twentieth century, the Soviet Union viewed China as its poor cousin, the country to guide and assist in its floundering quest for a respected international position.
After many decades, it seems that the table has turned decisively, as China has a vibrant and strong economy, a huge technological power, and an international political and economic influence that exceeds that of Moscow.
Most likely, this inequality between the two countries will increase in the coming years, coinciding with Putin's dependence on Beijing for his political survival. It is also likely that China will swallow a larger share of Russia's total trade, as it will become the main market for Russian exports (especially natural resources), while Russian consumers will become increasingly dependent on Chinese goods.
Moreover, China will take advantage of the current Russian impasse to force the use of its currency, "the renminbi" in economic transactions between the two countries, to become, over time, a regional currency, and then a major international currency.
As for Russia's leaders, in their quest to please China, they will have no choice but to accept unfair conditions in trade negotiations with it, support Chinese positions in international forums, and Beijing will pressure Moscow to reduce its relations with countries such as India and Vietnam (which is considered a competitor to China).
Western analysts are accustomed in their writings to describe China and Russia as partners, and to indicate that they are two authoritarian powers seeking to reconsider the foundations of the international system.
However, the Sino-Russian relationship is not a relationship between two equal parties, as the Kremlin's increasing dependence on China will turn Russia into a tool in Beijing's hand in the midst of the latter's conflict with Washington.
Russia's recklessness surprises China
Presidents Xi and Putin have a close relationship, and at one point they shared a nostalgia for their countries' glorious past and a burning desire to reclaim their glories.
Before the Russian strike on Ukraine on February 24, Chinese diplomats and intelligence officers tried to understand the reasons for the massive military build-up of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border, and assess US warnings that a war scenario loomed.
Beijing questioned Washington's warnings and, like European governments, assumed that the cost of the invasion to Russia would outweigh any potential benefits from the war.
Despite speculation that Putin had at least told Chinese President Xi Jinping of his plan before it was implemented, the outbreak of the war seemed to surprise China and put it in a difficult position to determine its position on the invasion of Ukraine.
If China supports Russia, it risks exposing itself to international sanctions and losing access to Western markets and technology, a scenario it would never like.
But if it denounces Putin's moves, it puts its relations with Russia in jeopardy.
Beijing sees its relationship with Moscow as a very important element for many reasons, as the two countries share a vast border of 4,200 km in length, and their economic relationship is completely complementary, Russia is rich in natural resources but needs technology and investments, while China can provide technology and investments, but it needs natural resources .
In addition, Russia is a pivotal source of advanced weapons in the eyes of China, as the flow of weapons from Russia to China has increased over the past decade.
Given that they are two authoritarian states, the two countries support each other in international institutions and refrain from criticizing each other on human rights.
Presidents Xi and Putin have a close relationship, and at one point shared a nostalgia for their countries' glorious past and a burning desire to reclaim their glories.
This bilateral relationship is motivated by a sense of that goal that must be achieved, and discontent with the United States in the first place, a feeling that has been increasing with the growing power of the two men and the centering of power in the political system of the two countries around the personal rule of Xi and Putin.
Those considerations shaped China’s response to the Ukrainian invasion in February, as Beijing resorted to its typical approach to previous crises sparked by the Kremlin’s regional adventures, such as the 2008 Georgia war, the 2014 seizure of Crimea, and Russia’s interference in the US presidential election. 2016, which is the middle stick approach.
In their meetings with their Ukrainian and Western counterparts, Chinese officials expressed their country's support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and their quest to end the war as soon as possible.
As for their Russian counterparts, they emphasized the strength of the relationship that will not be shaken, and that Beijing opposes unilateral sanctions from the West, and that it understands Russia's position that the real cause of the war is NATO's expansion and Washington's enthusiasm to involve its military alliances around the world.
There are Western efforts to push China to move the stick further in favor of Ukraine, but these efforts have so far failed.
China's leaders do not believe that they would benefit from taking a critical stance on Russia and its actions, and they know that the real causes of their differences with the US-led West will not disappear if they align themselves with Ukraine.
China also fears the possible collapse of the Putin regime under the weight of unprecedented economic sanctions, a result that is completely opposite to its interests, as China sees Russia's anti-Western position as a precious treasure, and that the emergence of a new regime in Moscow with Western biases will be a strategic nightmare for it.
Quiet China accounts
China is thus walking a fine line, refusing to pressure Russia, but seeking to avoid the economic consequences imposed by the West.
So China has chosen to abide by US sanctions and restrictions on Russian exports, at least for now.
Many Chinese companies have frozen their projects in Russia or suspended their activities there, and similarly the major Chinese state-owned energy companies have refrained from buying Russian stakes in Western companies, such as BP and Shell (which are currently available at cheap prices). );
For fear of falling under US sanctions in the future.
However, China's commitment to the sanctions does not mean that it does not support Moscow economically, but rather that its economic support for Russia is increasing, as China has benefited from the economic turmoil caused by the war, and placed itself in the position of an alternative market for Russian goods that were previously sold in European markets.
Beijing has taken full advantage of the opportunities to buy Russian goods at cheap prices, through short-term understandings that do not risk violating sanctions.
Since last February, China has increased the volumes of purchases of Russian oil and gas.
In conjunction with Europe cutting its dependence on Russian energy and other minerals, the Kremlin has no choice but to redirect its exports to Asia - and mainly China - a natural option due to geographical proximity, existing pipeline networks, as well as the availability of sea channels for trade, with Moscow's ability to pay In yuan instead of the dollar and the euro.
Over the past seven months, Russian exports to China increased by 48.8% ($61.5 billion), a jump that reflects not only the sharp rise in global commodity prices, but also the increasing shipments of Russian oil.
Chinese goods have been gradually displacing their European counterparts in the Russian market since 2014, and by 2016 China grabbed - for the first time - Germany's position as the first and largest exporter of industrial equipment in Russia.
The dual effect of high logistics costs and severe sanctions will limit the availability of many European goods in Russia, so Russian consumers and Russian companies will turn to Chinese alternatives more than before.
In fact, Chinese imports to Russia in the past seven months grew by 5.2% ($36.3 billion), and as China turns into Russia's main trading partner in both exports and imports, their trade activity will increase in renminbi.
Thus, the Chinese currency will actually become the Russian reserve currency over time, although it is not fully convertible, which increases Moscow’s dependence on Beijing, a transformation that is already in full swing, as the statistics of the rocket growth in the volume of trade in renminbi on the Moscow Stock Exchange, which recently exceeded for the first time, show us. Trade time in euros.
Those dealings with China will be very costly to Russia.
On the one hand, China will not be able to compensate Russia for its losses in connection with European markets.
On the other hand, Moscow's heavy dependence on Beijing will give the latter enormous influence, and will enable it to extract Russian concessions that were previously considered highly biased to the Chinese side and illogical.
For example, in the current negotiations for the new pipeline, which connects the gas fields of Western Siberia and the Chinese market, Beijing will be able to compel Russia to provide energy at competitive prices in the interest of Chinese consumers, to use the renminbi as the currency of the signed contract, and not to oblige China to buy Large quantities, so that China becomes obligated to buy only the minimum capacity of the pipes, provided that any future increase is subject to China's desire or not to buy more.
About a year ago, those terms would have been rejected by the Kremlin, but as Russia's options fade, China is gaining the upper hand.
Russian officials are not oblivious to this new trend, but the war has forced the Kremlin to reluctantly pursue pragmatism.
As long as China can give Moscow the cash flow necessary to keep the Russian political system alive and hold its battle with the West, the Kremlin will accept Chinese requests.
For China, the challenge is managing the risks of U.S. countermeasures for doing business with Russia, such as secondary sanctions on any Chinese dealings with sanctioned Russian entities or breaches of the (Russian) export restriction regime.
The rise of China and the dwarfing of Russia
Moscow is haunted by this reality of Sino-Russian relations.
Even before the war, relations between the two countries were swinging more in China's favor, and many Russian officials, including high-ranking officials in the Kremlin, expressed their fear that rapprochement with China more without improving relations with Western countries at the same time and enhancing the competitiveness of the Russian economy;
It will constrain Russia strategically.
However, relations with China are growing. China accounted for 10% of Russia's total trade before Russia's acquisition of Crimea in 2014, and by 2021 it accounted for 18%, a number that will increase against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
It is not difficult to imagine a near future in which China controls half of Russia's trade transactions and becomes the largest source of technology in vital areas such as communications, transportation and energy production.
In such a scenario, China would have a very powerful influence in Russia and would not hesitate to use it.
For example, China may ask Moscow in the future to end its military relations with India and Vietnam, and to support China in its border disputes in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan file.
The rift between Russia and the West will not heal as long as Putin is in the Kremlin, and will likely remain for some time after he is out of power as well.
Over time, Russia will turn into a huge Eurasian version of Iran, becoming largely isolated, with an economy smaller and more technologically backward, but one that remains too big and important for China to ignore.
For its part, China will become Russia's most prominent international partner, the most important buyer of its exports, the largest exporter of its imports, and an indispensable diplomatic partner, especially as India (which has historical relations with Russia) drifts day by day towards an alliance with the major democracies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. , such as Japan, Australia and the United States.
As for the old ruling elite in the Kremlin, obsessed with its conflict with Washington, it will become malleable in the hands of China in conjunction with Beijing's transformation into the main competitor to the United States internationally.
China will benefit most from that shift, and while it will not save Russia from bankruptcy or provide tangible assistance in modernizing the Russian economy, it will do what it can to maintain a friendly Kremlin system that advances its interests by buying cheap Russian natural resources and expanding the technology market. China, the promotion of Chinese technological standards, and the conversion of the renminbi into the de facto base regional currency in northern Eurasia.
With its growing influence, Beijing will be able to extract an important concession from Russia that no one could have imagined extracting just a year ago, which is access to the most advanced Russian weapons and designs, with special privileges in accessing the Russian Arctic region, and taking into account Chinese interests in Central Asia.
On the ground, the Kremlin has shielded itself from Western pressure in return for giving up much of its strategic freedom of movement, a trend that will continue beyond the end of Putin's rule.
China can complicate this by rushing to reap the fruits of that stage at a faster pace than necessary, and pushing Russia hard and quickly towards it, which may result in a nationalist counter-reaction within Russia, and put pressure on Putin to resist Chinese pressure.
However, the real change in the relationship between the two countries requires a desire by the Kremlin to break free from the captivity of China with a Western openness to Russia, two things that do not show signs of happening in the near future.
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Translation: Noor Khairy
This report is a translation of Foreign Affairs and does not necessarily reflect the website of Meydan.