The most important ones are the rise of China and climate change

The United States faces insurmountable challenges

America pays great attention to Asia despite the war in Europe.

archival

Whatever happens on the battlefield, one must be careful.

Despite Kyiv's heroic, as well as surprisingly successful, resistance thus far, the outcome of Russia's war on Ukraine is still far from clear.

The United States will emerge from the conflict after having achieved strategic objectives in Europe, which seemed quite elusive, six months ago.

NATO has regained its cohesion, and assuming the possibility of overcoming Turkey's opposition, the accession of Finland and Sweden will not expand in a way that adds to its responsibilities without enhancing its capabilities.

As was the case in the Baltic states.

It will greatly increase its power and resources, if the two countries join.

Post-Hitler era

Germany, for all the double game it is playing on importing Russian energy, has finally entered what might be called the “post-Hitler era” and will be rearming.

An economic withdrawal from the European Union from Russia will remove much of the influence that Moscow previously exercised in Brussels.

Less measurably, the anti-Americanism of many Europeans must recede, at least now, with the realization that it is Russia that poses the existential threat.

The balance has not changed that much for a long time.

And in my most bizarre moments, I sometimes wonder about conspiracy theorists from the left and right who believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been pushed into war by NATO expansion, and that what is happening in Ukraine is orchestrated by the West.

But Europe is not the world, and all geoeconomic and geostrategic reasons rightly push Washington to see Asia, above all, as the primary concern of US foreign policy.

And again, while we do not yet know the fate of the war in Ukraine, even if Washington and its NATO allies, in my opinion, should do everything they can, other than sending their own forces into the battlefield, to help Ukraine win, we know that no matter what. If so, Russia will emerge from the war weaker, poorer, and less globally influential.

China will come out safely

Conversely, at worst, China would emerge unscathed from the conflict, but would likely emerge significantly stronger which would force Russia - Mao Zedong would have enjoyed that - to deal with it, being a junior partner in the relationship with China, and would have to to sell its energy in a market biased in favor of the last buyer: Beijing.

At the same time, this is a moment of great internal tension in China, especially in urban areas, where the "zero COVID-19" policy is putting pressure on both citizens and the economy.

Overconfidence and anxiety are always a dangerous combination facing totalitarian governments.

In this context, the recent reoccupation of Taiwan may seem irresistible to Beijing, which means that it is now one of the main challenges facing US policymakers as they try to shape the US response.

Worry

Whatever the decision, it seems inevitable given the concern in both South Korea and Japan about the rise of China.

For the first time since 1945, Japan's willingness to consider rearmament is high (as in Germany, which is remarkable).

Certainly, the military component of US foreign policy will develop further after Ukraine.

Perhaps this would have happened anyway, given that even before the Russian War, it was quite clear that the so-called long peace of the post-1945 world was at an end.

But the timetable for this has clearly been cut short after Ukraine.

At the same time, the so-called East Asia pivot by no means makes clear what US foreign-policy makers should do, or indeed, even how to think about it.

More important is what to do about India, under (Prime Minister) Narendra Modi, and to balance the United States, China and Russia, while New Delhi's performance, at least so far, has been a great development.

Rising Africa

Then there is a rising Africa, whose population by 2100 will either equal or surpass Asia, and which, despite its rapidly growing importance, US policymakers have not begun to seriously engage in.

And all of this is taking place in the context of a global climate emergency, which no country, even if it is as rich and powerful as the United States, can hope to address it itself, and if it is willing to do so, and there is a local consensus to do so, which is not present in America.

At the same time, international institutions, led by the United Nations, rarely seemed irrelevant, except perhaps for their humanitarian role;

While the international system after 1945 appears to be collapsing in general.

It is all too well to speak in a welcoming tone of the new era of multipolarity, but for the time being, at least, it seems that this era is more likely to be the beginning of a period of chaos and war, than an era of stability, balance and peace.

And US foreign policy will have to confront the post-Ukraine situation.

And it will be forced to do so at a time when the United States is deeply divided over how to interpret its past, how to govern itself in the present, and how to imagine a decent future for itself.

David Rife is a writer and political analyst

What is certain is that the military component of US foreign policy will develop further after the Ukraine war.

An economic withdrawal from the European Union from Russia will remove much of the influence that Moscow previously exercised in Brussels.

Europe is not the world, and all geoeconomic and geostrategic reasons rightly push Washington to see Asia, above all, as the primary concern of US foreign policy.

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