Both Sudan and Ethiopia stand on the brink of political collapse, and are at a crossroads against the backdrop of multiple and intertwined crises.
The three-month-old truce in Tigray did not defuse the ongoing civil war in Ethiopia between the central government and the Tigray Liberation Front, a war that has continued since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced his military campaign on the region.
On the other hand, neither the United Nations nor the African Union has succeeded in restoring Sudan to civilian rule and repairing the fragile partnership between civilians and the military, which was strained after the military coup in October last year.
Despite the army's call for negotiation and its agreement to restore the civilian component, the overpowered forces refused, as they no longer trusted that they could guarantee their position in the political process controlled by the army.
The problem did not stop at that in the complexity of the internal affairs crises in the two countries heaviest after Egypt in the Nile Basin, as the tar is facing another crisis today as a result of the weak control of their governments on the borders, the spread of armed movements, the growth of tribal wars in the far-flung fringes, and the worsening economic situation.
Between the gunfire and the complexities of domestic politics, Khartoum and Addis Ababa are involved in several episodes that increase the conflict between them.
Because of changes in the relationship of the two countries in the light of contradictory political movements, and differences in views on several crucial issues, the most important of which is the Renaissance Dam, which Egypt and Sudan view as making them at the mercy of Ethiopia, and Abiy Ahmed’s accusation of Khartoum of complicity in supporting the Tigray rebels, and then his refusal to mediate Which the country presented in the crisis, which Sudan considered an insult to it, especially as it incurred an economic loss from the consequences of the war as a result of the cessation of trade and the burden of refugees flowing into Sudan.
"Al-Fashqa" .. History and land between Sudan and Ethiopia
At the same time every year, Sudan and Ethiopia witness an escalation of border tensions, with the beginning of the harvest season in the fertile lands of the disputed Al-Fashqa area between the two countries, an area of about two million acres, and its plains extend for a distance of 168 km, giving way to the Ethiopian mountains, and it includes lands Very fertile agricultural land, and inhabited by some Ethiopian farmers as well as the Sudanese, although it is located inside Sudan.
Sudan invokes the borders set by the British in 1902 as a basis for its eligibility to those lands, while Ethiopia stalled in officially recognizing those borders, justifying its position that the borders are part of the legacy of British colonialism, which tried to limit the influence of the Ethiopian Empire in favor of Egypt and Sudan, which are under its control at the time.
Later, the good relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa in 1995 - when Ethiopia ruled the Tigray Liberation Front - succeeded in reaching understandings that led to Ethiopia's acceptance of the borders of 1902 in exchange for Sudan's agreement to keep Ethiopian farmers in Fashaqa (1).
However, Fasqa returned to the spotlight again with the departure of the Tigray Liberation Front from power and the rise of Abi Ahmed, and even the transformation of the Front into a military rival to the ruling regime in Addis Ababa;
This resulted in a desire among the politicians of the new ruling class to reconsider what the government agreed to in the 1990s, and to reclaim Ethiopia's right to mischief.
Since that time, militias backed by Addis Ababa have penetrated al-Fashqa and committed abuses against Sudanese forces there.
The latest episode of this escalation occurred recently when Sudan accused the Ethiopian army of kidnapping and executing seven Sudanese soldiers and one civilian who were prisoners of it. Appointed by the militias, which Khartoum says do not move except on the orders of Addis Ababa.
While Khartoum summoned its ambassador to Addis Ababa for consultations in the wake of the incident, the Sudanese army fired its heavy artillery with continuous aerial bombardment, according to which it regained control over the “Jabal al-Laban” area, destroyed a military base there, and evacuated the Ethiopian farmers, forcing them to retreat to the borders of their country. .
The Sudanese and Ethiopian armies clashed two years ago due to an Ethiopian militia withdrawing water from the Atbara River and cultivating Sudanese lands without Khartoum's approval.
Tensions in that border area were reinforced as a result of several considerations in Addis Ababa after the conflict launched by Abi Ahmed over the Tigray region, as part of a cycle of liquidating his old opponents who had dominated power and authority in Ethiopia for the previous three decades, and replacing them in favor of the Oromos, from which he hails, with the alliance Also with the Amhara ethnicity.
However, the repercussions of the war affected Sudan, which became a haven for more than 67,000 Ethiopian refugees who fled Tigray and settled in the cities of the east and south.
What exacerbated matters further in light of the fragile conditions on both sides, the failure of the reconciliation attempt initiated by Khartoum, and Abi Ahmed met it with some open estrangement, as the man announced his rejection in a manner that insulted the Sudanese regime, and then relations deteriorated further at the official level after accusations from the Ethiopian government to its northern neighbor with the support of the Tigrayan fighters.
Tensions in the border region were reinforced as a result of several considerations in Addis Ababa after the conflict launched by Abi Ahmed over the Tigray region, as part of a series of episodes of liquidating his old opponents.
On the other hand, officials in Sudan believe that Addis Ababa supports the Ethiopian militia that attacks farmers every harvest season, and what reinforces this hypothesis is that the militia follows the Amhara nationalism, the most important ally of Abi Ahmed in his ongoing war against the Tigrays.
Therefore, it does not seem that the Ethiopian Prime Minister actually has the ability to reach an understanding on border issues as a result of his keenness on the political backer who supports him in staying on top of power after difficult elections in his party last year.
Moreover, the Amhara nationalism clings to misery for historical considerations represented in their claim to have existed there for decades, in addition to being a source of wealth for the elites who, through repeated attacks, succeeded in emptying that region of the Sudanese, benefiting from its agricultural lands and exporting its crops.
The military in Sudan and Abi Ahmed... conflicting interests
The demonstrations that uprooted the Bashir regime in 2019 represented a resounding surprise in its Arab surroundings, not only because the opponents of the Arab Spring were neither ready nor willing for a new wave of Arab uprisings, but also for several long-term considerations for the Gulf states, which were not willing to allow the opposition to reach The seat of government in Sudan, due to fears that the war in Yemen will tilt in favor of the Houthis.
Al-Bashir was a good ally of Gulf interests in Yemen, and entered into an alliance with Egypt and Saudi Arabia to prevent countries that sought to find a foothold in the Red Sea, in an explicit and public reference to Iran.
What Riyadh and Cairo considered together as one of the negative aspects of the Sudanese uprising was that the political forces driving it adopted a conservative stance towards Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
What made the Arab world wary of the upcoming alternative in Khartoum.
This policy led to the failure of the first Egyptian mediation, with the refusal of influential civilian political entities to accept any Egyptian role, which coincided with Ethiopian movements that sought indirectly to ascend a civilian government, and to exclude the military as much as possible.
To ensure the support of the new authority of Addis Ababa in regional issues, and alignment with it against any crises with neighboring countries, especially Egypt, a policy that Ethiopia wrapped in the envelope of supporting democracy and civil rule in Sudan, especially since Abi Ahmed, who had just arrived in power, enjoyed at the time the image of a young civil ruler who He strengthened democracy in his country.
In front of the Egyptian initiative, which was supported by the military component and rejected by the civil forces, Addis Ababa put forward a counter-initiative that carried implicit support for the civilian component, and was openly rejected by the Sudanese army leaders, and included in its clauses the formation of three structures of governance;
It is a Sovereign Council comprising military and civilians, a Legislative Council in which the Freedom Forces (civilians) have a two-thirds majority, and a Council of Ministers with full powers, with the start of a transitional period, a period whose presidency is divided equally between the military and civilians, provided that the leaders of the Military Council in the Sovereign Council do not run for presidential elections.
While the bone-breaking battle took place between civilians and the military, the military component sought to pass the "Juba" initiative backed by Cairo, but the rejection of the civilian component aborted the initiative, which was replaced by the amended constitutional document to get out of the political crisis in Khartoum under the auspices of Addis Ababa.
Ethiopia has reaped quick political gains from its mediation. In addition to the international and regional celebration that Abiy Ahmed received, Addis Ababa, after Abdallah Hamdok’s ascension to the presidency of the government, found an opportunity to strengthen its relationship with the post-Bashir Sudan, and to rely on the friendship that brought together the two heads of government, to ensure Khartoum’s support. For Ethiopia, if regional differences erupted.
The position on the Renaissance Dam reflected the turbulent relationship that brought Sudan's soldiers together with Abi Ahmed, as the Sudanese government initially supported Addis Ababa's position;
This prompted Cairo to request the intervention of its allies in the crisis to at least neutralize Sudan, until the leaders of the Military Council responded and declared their commitment to stand by Egypt.
After the recent coup movement of the military in Sudan, which Egypt explicitly distanced itself from its support, Ethiopia's chances of rallying Sudan back to its side under the control of the military diminished.
Addis Ababa bumpy road
Abi Ahmed threw all his political weight to win a consensual initiative to penetrate the Sudanese crisis, and try to bring all parties together;
To strengthen its relations with the new regime on the one hand, and to ensure its regional interests on the other.
Just as the Sudanese revolution had echoes and considerations in the north and the Arab east, it also had other accounts with the Ethiopian regime, which paid with all its weight to freeze Khartoum’s membership in the African Union after the military council’s procrastination with Cairo’s support in handing over power to civilians.
Addis Ababa has defended its position, saying that it has the right to guarantee the security and stability of Sudan, and then Abi Ahmed threw all his political weight to win a consensual initiative to penetrate the Sudanese crisis, and try to bring all parties together;
To strengthen its relations with the new regime on the one hand, and to ensure its regional interests on the other hand, especially since its national project means an inevitable confrontation with Cairo in the Nile Basin.
Proceeding from the same principle, the civilian elite sees that its interest requires a political rapprochement with the southern neighbor, due to the intersection of this with the goals of the civilian component that desires to create a supportive regional center of gravity that balances the relationship of the military with Egypt, but with Ethiopia today preoccupied with its own battles, and its relations with the army are strained. With a tight grip on power, it seems that Addis Ababa's way of returning to the Ethiopian scene is no longer strewn with roses.
Under the rule of the military, Sudan has become more aligned with the Egyptian position on the issue of the Renaissance Dam, and all statements that carried a balanced formula with Ethiopia were absent.
Although it is too early to say that relations between Khartoum and Addis Ababa are heading towards an irreversible rupture, it is safe to say that Cairo finds itself benefiting from the escalation of the conflict between two countries whose understanding has always represented a great danger to Egyptian interests in the south.