It's not that long ago, around twenty years, that many German politicians, especially those on the left, wanted a multipolar world.

That's where we live now.

It cannot be said to be a better life than in the world where the United States (and the West as a whole) ruled.

At least that applies to Europe.

The continent is experiencing a massive imperialist war of aggression, rearmament is taking place, and Germany's energy security is gone.

The stability that has characterized Europe over the past few decades is in jeopardy. An old scourge of the continent is returning: power politics.

One can argue for a long time whether Putin is really getting the historical moment right.

Russia may be stronger today than when the president took office.

But an army alone is not enough to become a great power.

Russia has an emerging economy.

From an economic point of view, a country with the strength of Brazil or South Korea is currently taking on the united West.

He's far superior to him.

Power shift through globalization

Nevertheless, the fact that Putin is seeking this test of strength has something to do with the shift in power brought about by globalization.

The G7 group, which sets the pace for the Russia sanctions, currently represents around 43 percent of the global economy.

That's an impressive number for just seven countries.

But three decades ago it was almost seventy percent.

The gradual loss of power in the West has long since made itself felt politically.

Many Western goals can no longer be enforced against emerging and developing countries, that was the case even before the Ukraine war.

The failed interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Mali are evidence of massive overexpansion in America and Europe, and also of overconfidence.

The resulting domestic political conflicts have further weakened the western camp.

It would be doing Putin too much credit to think that he had all of this factored into his calculations.

His actions in Ukraine are characterized by some improvisation, and he clearly did not expect Western sanctions to this extent.

But he is right about one thing: his alliance with China holds, and the middle position of countries like India also benefits him, even materially.

Indeed, if you will, the Ukraine war is the first battle of the multipolar era.

A (re-) climber wants to undermine the prevailing order with violence.

The fact that other rising powers are watching, even providing limited help, is already a success for Putin.

A military conflict does not become a “world war” just because it is fought in Europe.

Ideological conflict with Russia and China

After the classic foreign policy, a lesson that is largely unknown in Germany today, the West must now try to win Putin's allies over to its side.

In the Cold War, that worked particularly well with China, America was able to sever the People's Republic from the Soviet Union.

This strategy would be particularly useful for Europeans who are directly threatened by Russian expansion.

Putin can only afford to reach out to the west because he has peace in the east.

Two factors oppose this.

One is the American view that China is the real problem.

Since Europe cannot defend itself against Russia, it will not be able to pursue China policies that run counter to the Washington baseline.

Europe is as dependent on America today as it was before the wall came down.

This is especially true for the militarily weak Germany.

The other factor is the underlying ideological conflict.

In Germany, people talk about it with the usual moral exaggeration, but it's still real.

Russia and China want to push through an authoritarian counter-proposal to the West's democratic model, and they speak openly about it.

The idea that one could in any way agree on coexistence is unrealistic.

That didn't work in the Cold War either, the Soviet Union had to be dismantled.

So it's about making other influential states allies.

It's not just Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal and South Africa that Scholz invited to the G-7 summit.

One of the many things that Germany has to learn (again) is that potential partners do not expect conversion to values ​​that are considered universal in Berlin, but that their interests are taken into account.

In the new multipolar world, Germany and Europe will still have to make many compromises.

The question is whether you want to do it with Putin.