The sustainability of Washington's maximum pressure campaign depends on the support of allies and partners
The steadfastness of the transatlantic alliance against Russia depends on a change in the US strategy
Russian shells reached all over eastern Ukraine.
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Biden is required to change his strategy.
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The German chancellor adopts the strategy of unifying the European position.
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Macron faces internal pressures
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With the Russian invasion of Ukraine completing its fourth month without a clear end in sight, despite the maximum sanctions campaign imposed by the West led by the United States on Moscow, an important question arises: “How long can this Western alliance hold, despite the internal differences that permeate the general picture? What unit does it look like?
Researcher Matthew May says in a report published in the National Interest magazine: “American policy makers often refer to Western sanctions imposed on Russia as evidence of a united international response to the war in Ukraine.
For example, in response to a reporter's question last week whether French President Emmanuel Macron's peace initiatives raised fears that transatlantic unity could hold (under pressure), the US ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe replied, Michael Carpenter, pointing to the six EU sanctions packages as evidence of "enormous unity" with radical differences over tactics.
splits
However, upon closer examination, the divisions that existed in Europe before the Russo-Ukrainian War have not disappeared.
Unless the administration of US President Joe Biden implements a sharp change in policy, divisions within the transatlantic alliance mobilized against Russia risk making the United States a bystander, not a participant in the peace process.
If U.S. policymakers hope to have a hand in crafting a settlement that will pave the way to a lasting peace and ultimately thaw in U.S.-Russia relations, they must adopt a different strategy that looks beyond the next lethal aid package to Kyiv. .
work in concert
May believes that the sustainability of the US maximum pressure campaign depends on the support of allies and partners, especially in Europe.
As US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has repeatedly described, countries that make up “more than 50 percent” of global GDP — (which also includes Japan, South Korea and Australia) — are working in concert to impose economic and financial costs on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.
This gives the United States, as well as its allies and partners, a unique negotiating advantage if sanctions relief is linked to limited and achievable political goals.
So far, the alliance that Washington has forged to isolate Russia has held out, even if the stated goal is to “weaken Russia.” As President Joe Biden explained in an op-ed published in The New York Times, arming Ukraine would be “the strongest possible position at the table.” Negotiations" have not yet materialized.
However, the military and political balance tilted decisively in Russia's favour, as it continued to bomb Ukrainian positions in the Donbass region, seize control of major urban centers, and weaken Ukraine's fighting power.
While US policymakers are skeptical about the prospect of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, other international mediators have stepped in to fill the void.
Accordingly, May says, "the strength of the coalition mobilized by the Biden administration deserves critical evaluation."
A report by the New York Times on June 11 noted that “As the conflict enters its fourth month, US officials are facing the disappointing reality that a powerful coalition of countries stretching from North America through Europe to East Asia may not be enough to break the deadlock. looming in Ukraine.
The Biden administration failed to persuade partners, including India, Brazil and the Gulf states, to "join the campaign of economic sanctions, military support, and diplomatic pressure to further isolate Russia and bring a decisive end to the war."
Avoiding Isolation Similarly, it would be wrong for US policymakers to assume that European allies would continue to view it in their best interests to follow Washington's lead, especially as the war turned in Russia's favour.
Various alliances, threat perceptions, economic constraints, and historical perspectives that are temporarily subjugated for greater purposes will re-emerge as Ukraine's war of attrition continues.
It is likely that the powerful allies of Western Europe will begin to avoid isolation as a political goal in the interests of peace negotiations to achieve a settlement with Russia.
May says that there are three axes that shape the directions and discourse of European foreign policy.
The first, centered around Paris and Rome, prioritizes dialogue with rivals and favors independence from Washington.
With the exception of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Macron and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi have had more contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin than any other world leaders throughout the war.
Other partners of this axis include Hungary, whose leader, Prime Minister Viktor Orban, won re-election in April in part, on the basis of a nationalist anti-war message.
As for the second axis, which pushed hard to completely cut off Russian energy, deliver lethal aid to Ukraine, impose economic sanctions, and support Kiev's maximum military objectives, it includes: the United Kingdom, Poland, the Baltic states, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic.
Poland and the Baltic states, for historical and geographic reasons, have traditionally adopted a hard line toward Russia.
Berlin
The last axis revolves around one capital, Berlin.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, like the previous chancellor, has tried to shape an EU consensus on Ukraine that the first and second axes can accept.
In practice, this means cautiously supporting sanctions, approving select arms transfers, and advocating a diplomatic settlement.
Germany's approach reflects a balanced foreign policy that passes security costs on to the United States, waters down French proposals for alternative pan-European defense structures, and engages in robust trade and diplomacy with great-power competitors, such as Russia.
Indeed, Germany's double-deal satisfies the preferences of both axes who, while often dissatisfied with Berlin's conservatism, cannot build a new consensus on their own.
Unless the administration of US President Joe Biden implements a sharp policy change, divisions within the transatlantic alliance that has been mobilized against Russia risk making the United States a bystander, not a participant in the peace process.
Despite continuing military support to Ukraine, the military and political balance tilted decisively in Russia's favour, as it continued to bomb Ukrainian positions in the Donbass region, seize control of major urban centers, and weaken Ukraine's fighting power.
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