Confrontation on Iraqi soil.. How did Sinjar turn into an arena for war between Turkey and Iran?

On May 1, the Turkish soldiers at the Zilikan base in northern Iraq, which is one of a group of Turkish bases established in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, were immersed in the performance of their normal military tasks despite the constant danger that the base might be targeted by missiles, as it had previously been targeted. Al-Qaeda several times, most recently last April.

At the time, accusations were directed at firing four to six missiles at the base at the pro-Iranian Iraqi militias in Nineveh Governorate, as previous similar attacks bore the same imprint through the 107mm rockets owned by the Shiite militias.

These militias did not conceal at any time the fact that they monitored the Turkish presence, and this can be read in the statement of Kata’ib Hezbollah Iraq, an Iran-backed group that threatened Ankara, saying that “the knife is to the bone,” referring to Turkey’s military operations in northern Iraq.

In the wake of Ankara's recent threats of military intervention in the region, these militias have strengthened their presence in Iraq's Sinjar, deploying three brigades, in addition to the Popular Mobilization Forces deploying 15,000 fighters to confront any Turkish military threat.

In short, the prospect of a Turkish incursion has angered these militias, as Tehran now sees the increased Turkish presence in Iraq as an encroachment on its sphere of influence. It is concerned with protecting its hegemony in Sinjar because of its importance as an access point to Syria.

For this reason, Iran wants to exploit its influence and its relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party - which Turkey classifies as a terrorist organization - on the one hand, and the Popular Mobilization on the other hand, to extend its influence more in Iraq and limit the Turkish presence, especially in areas controlled by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which is an important ally of Turkey and is accused by Tehran Supporting Kurdish parties opposed to the Iranian regime.

Iran is also trying to exploit its relations with the PKK to pressure Turkey and gain concessions from it, whether in Iraq or Syria.

A regional battle on the soil of Iraq

After nearly four decades of the Turkish conflict with the PKK, it can be said that the year 2014, in which Kurdish fighters took over the task of fighting the Islamic State (ISIS), constituted an important station for the Turks who initially watched the consequences of ISIS control over Iraqi and Syrian lands, and then found themselves in A threat to the progress of the (Kurdish) Syrian Democratic Forces, which established a semi-autonomous region in northern Syria, and consolidated its control over the lands it captured from ISIS.

Ankara quickly headed with the Syrian factions that supported it towards regaining the cities controlled by the Kurds. While Ankara, backed by its security fears, set out to increase its air strikes against the PKK militants in southeastern Turkey, and launch military operations in Syria against the People’s Protection Units and ISIS, it launched It attacked Afrin in January 2018, and eventually captured the city in March 2018, and threatened attacks on other Kurdish-controlled areas inside Syria.

However, the expulsion of ISIS militants from the areas they controlled took the Turks far beyond Syria, reaching Sinjar in northwestern Iraq, the historical home of the Yazidi Kurdish minority.

That area, which the Kurds call "Shingal", witnessed a major conflict with ISIS, and after the expulsion of the organization's militants, it was controlled by the PKK fighters who came to help the Yazidis.

Not only did the PKK set up a special administration in the region, the Yazidi resistance units known as the "Sinjar Resistance Units" (YBS), but also established a base for them there.

In the party’s foothold in Sinjar, Ankara saw nothing but a dangerous link between the group’s old bases in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan and northern Syria, and in its logistical base, it saw nothing but a dangerous link between the party’s operations in northeastern Syria and its latent bases in Turkey and the Iraqi Qandil Mountains.

In addition to the above, the great mistrust of the Yazidis towards the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga forces overshadowed the internal relations under the pretext that these parties abandoned Sinjar during the campaign against ISIS. The Sinjar Resistance Units linked to the PKK proceeded to assert their presence in the region and ally with the Shiite Popular Mobilization, which His units adopted a hostile attitude against Turkey's operations.

The PKK has tried, since its takeover of the Sinjar region in 2014, to achieve several gains, the most important of which is making the city a link between its areas of influence, and then facilitating the movement of fighters and weapons between the two regions.

In his interview with "

", the researcher in Kurdish affairs, "Abdul Rahim Saeed Tkhoubi" said that the PKK has tried, since its takeover of the Sinjar region in 2014, to achieve several gains, the most important of which is making the city a link between its areas of influence in Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, and then facilitating the movement of Fighters and weapons between the two regions: “The PKK exploited its areas of influence in Sinjar to recruit the largest number of fighters. A faction of the PKK’s Shingal Protection Units joined the Popular Mobilization to give it some kind of legitimacy and present it as an Iraqi force. This move was welcomed by the The crowd accepted because of the latter’s disagreements with the Iraqi Kurdistan government, especially with the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Masoud Barzani, and Iran’s desire to exploit its relations with the PKK to pressure Turkey and gain concessions from it in Syria and Iraq.

Of course, Ankara sensed the seriousness of the situation in Sinjar and the possibility of it getting out of control, so it wanted to cut the road between the party’s areas in Syria and Iraq and its military and economic supply corridors. Besieged squares of Turkey’s allies in Syria and Iraq, and this is what it did in Afrin in 2018, and in Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad in 2019, when the party became besieged in the northern countryside of Aleppo by the Syrian regime and Turkey’s allies of the armed factions.

Baghdad's tough choices

The government in Baghdad was not satisfied with the situation in Sinjar. Since the Kurdish independence referendum in October 2017, the influence of groups affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces linked to the PKK and Iran has penetrated, and these parties share control of the region with various groups, most notably the Sinjar Resistance Units.

In order to confront this situation, the Iraqi central government took steps to assert its control. It concluded an agreement in October 2020 with Iraqi Kurdistan under the auspices of the United Nations that stipulated the control of the Iraqi police in the area and the exclusion of other armed groups, including the PKK.

With this agreement, which was considered a political victory for Iraqi President Mustafa Al-Kazemi, as he obtained official approval from the Kurdistan Regional Government, Baghdad confirmed the restoration of its control in the region and distanced itself from the Turkish escalation, as well as maintaining confidence between Baghdad and Ankara.

However, despite the above, Baghdad found it difficult to implement the desired changes in the security infrastructure, as the work of Iraqi forces was hampered by the merger of the PKK and the Sinjar Resistance Units, which have been officially associated with the Popular Mobilization Units since 2015. The failure to enter the October 2020 agreement into effect until Now to Ankara's frustration, the PKK was not expelled from Sinjar, and Ankara's concern increased about strengthening the party's presence in the region, which poses a threat to its security interests. Accordingly, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar did not hesitate during his visit to Iraq months ago to seek Baghdad's approval. On the Turkish operations to expel the PKK from Sinjar.

Political researcher from Iraqi Kurdistan, Shaho al-Qara Daghi, says that Turkey fears that Sinjar will turn into another version of Qandil, the stronghold of the PKK elements and its base of operations, but at the same time it wants to work in coordination with the Iraqi government to confront these security risks in order to avoid repercussions and official reactions in Baghdad, and therefore its operations are limited to specific targets, and the matter has not yet reached the implementation of a comprehensive operation.

In his speech to

, Shaho added that Iran had previously worked and is currently working hard to strengthen the influence of its affiliated factions in this region, which is a strategic area for several internal and regional parties: The Popular Mobilization Groups must secure Iran's interests, but the Sinjar complex, the territoriality of the conflict, and the multiplicity of fighting groups there made Iran's ambitions threatened."

Where does the regional conflict in Sinjar reach?

On the eighteenth of last April, Ankara launched a ground and air attack on the pockets of the Iraqi province of Dohuk against Kurdish militants in an operation dubbed "Claw Lock".

Turkish forces soon fired artillery, helicopters, drones, and fighters, and Turkish special forces and commando units were deployed.

Ankara embarked on this process, similar to the rest of its military operations in northern Iraq, based on the "Ankara Agreement" it signed with Britain and the Kingdom of Iraq in 1926 to settle its dispute with them over sovereignty over Mosul, an agreement that the Turks assert that it includes a clause to combat threats from northern Iraq.

The Turkish government provided justifications for starting this military operation, including deterring the sources of launching missile strikes against the Turkish base in Zilikan, confronting the influence of the PKK in the depths of Sinjar, clearing what it described as the "terror corridor", and establishing safe areas free of the PKK.

Sinjar is a vital area for Ankara, as it is close to northern Syria, where the Kurdish influence has been since 2014, and it is an extension of the Tal Afar district, which connects to Turkish territory. Therefore, Ankara views Sinjar as a strategic crossroads to ensure its security.

Based on the foregoing, Turkey seeks to disrupt Kurdish influence by extending its military presence to Sinjar, as the Iraqi researcher Safaa Khalaf tells us.

There is another aspect of Turkey’s entry into Sinjar, where Ankara is trying to split northern Iraq into two parts, a northern Kurdish under the umbrella of the Kurdistan region, and a northern Arab represented by the eastern Iraqi shoulder adjacent to the Syrian lands (Talafar-Sinjar), which explains its cooperation with the Iraqi government, which is also seeking To extend its hegemony in the region at the expense of the crowd and the Labor Party.

Khalaf stressed that the decision to eliminate Kurdish groups, whether opposition or loyalists, is not subject to military capacity, but rather to calculations of balance and political interests, as the PKK derives its strength from the stability of Syrian Kurdish groups in the eastern Euphrates region supported by the United States, and then despite its classification as a terrorist group by Washington, it is effectively benefiting from the support provided to the Syrian Kurds.

Khalaf then added, "The PKK is no longer a Kurdish party, but has become a regional militia with multiple arms, and therefore Turkey will inevitably engage in a regional confrontation with it so that regional balances do not tilt in a way that undermines its interests, and this may result in autonomous regions such as the administration area." The Kurdish east of the Euphrates, and with the increasing possibilities of armed conflict between the Iraqi political forces as a result of the collapse of the quota system, it is likely to isolate the Sunni region in western Iraq, and Sinjar will have a temporary administration with direct links to the east of the Euphrates” (which neither Turkey nor Baghdad want).

Tkhoubi expects that the regional conflict between Turkey and Iran in Sinjar will continue for a period of one to two years, especially because Turkey is currently concentrating its ground operations on the border areas with Iraq.

For his part, the researcher "Tchobi" confirms that any Turkish military operation outside its borders will face legal and military obstacles, especially since the Sinjar region does not share a common border with Turkey, and therefore the ground incursion is difficult, and the only option currently remains aerial bombardment and targeting of headquarters via drones.

Moreover, Turkey is trying to politically pressure the Iraqi government to expel PKK elements from Sinjar through the Iraqi army, and the Iraqi army has already established weeks ago its control over several PKK sites in Sinjar and clashes have taken place between the two parties.

Tkhoubi expects that the regional conflict between Turkey and Iran in Sinjar will continue for a period of one to two years, especially because Turkey is currently concentrating its ground operations on the border areas with Iraq.

In any case, it seems that the Sinjar file will not be resolved easily due to the intervention of regional and international parties, which means that it could turn into a focus of a future conflict if the parties involved in it do not reach a satisfactory settlement for all.

Turkey will face difficulty in achieving a quick victory in Sinjar because of its distance from the Turkish border on the one hand, and Sinjar's subordination to the Iraqi central government on the other hand, with the continuing difficulties in extending its control there, and the support that the PKK receives from Iran on a third hand, but the Turkish military and political pressure even Now it is bearing fruit with the Iraqi government, which is trying to confront the PKK in order to defend itself against the scenario of Turkish intervention and the collapse of relations with Ankara, which also does not want to drain its military power in another operation on its long and complex northern borders, which are now filled with various types of militias from Afrin to the Iranian border .