Introduction to translation
The Turkish Bayraktar marches were able to turn the scales in more than one conflict around the world, and in the ongoing war in Ukraine, "Bayraktar" enabled the Ukrainians to withstand and even carry out operations that caused a painful loss for the Russians.
But that is not all, as the rallies have turned from a mere weapon into a diplomatic pillar of the Turkish government.
On this topic, Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, and Rich Utzen, a retired US Army colonel and former member of the State Department's policy planning team from 2016-2018, prepared an analysis published by the American magazine "Foreign Affairs".
translation text
On April 14, the Ukrainian forces astonished the world when they sank the "Moskva", the heavily armed Russian warship, which was leading the Moscow "Black Sea" warship.
As the world press widely noted, the Ukrainians managed to hit the ship with their local "Neptune" missiles, despite the ship's impregnable defenses.
However, what was not mentioned in the same way was the foreign drones that made such an exceptional attack possible. According to Ukrainian officials, the strike was coordinated using two Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, which were able to evade the ship’s radar, thus providing targeting information. accurate missile.
This is not the first time that Turkish drones have played a decisive role in the Ukrainian resistance to the invasion of Moscow.
Since the early days of Russian aggression, the lethal TP2 drones, despite their low cost, have repeatedly played a decisive role in eliminating Russian tanks and blocking the Russian advance.
This was not a coincidence. In January, while Russia amassed large numbers of its forces on the Ukrainian border, Kyiv went on a spree of military spending with Turkey, buying 16 Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles, in addition to Turkish weapons systems. , amounting to a total of about $60 million, a figure thirty times greater than Kyiv's spending on Turkish defense equipment during the same period the previous year.This new batch joins some 20 other TB2 unmanned aircraft that Ukraine has purchased Formerly from Turkey.The Bayraktar rallies are
Bayraktar "TB2"
Despite the attention directed to Ukraine's marches, much less attention is paid to the strategy of the country that produced them.
These marches are produced by a Turkish company linked to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and they are more than just an element that adjusted the balance of the war in Ukraine. In the past few years, the marches played a decisive role in many conflicts in the Caucasus, Africa and the Middle East, and Ankara became by marketing them Marches to nearly 24 low- and middle-income countries are able to extend their geopolitical influence, while at the same time positioning themselves to shape the outcomes of major regional conflicts.
Ankara's parade diplomacy did not go without hindrances.
In the Middle East, Turkey's growing military involvement in countries such as Libya has led its opponents, such as Greece and Egypt, to form new loose alliances with the aim of curtailing Turkish power.
And in Ukraine, the rallies threaten to derail Ankara's cautious equilibrium with Russia, with which it still maintains relations.
In recent years, Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress have expressed concern about the spread of Turkish drones, as "Bob Menendez", Democratic Senator of New Jersey, cited the role that drones played in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Karabakh region in 2020. He said, "Turkish drone sales are dangerous, destabilizing, and a threat to peace and human rights."
However, after years of a unilateral policy approach on the part of Turkey - which dragged it more regional opponents and weakened its alliance with the United States and Europe - the Turkish government was able to use Bayraktar and other approaches to change its international standing.
In the Middle East, Turkish drones have helped cement their interests with relatively limited diplomatic resources.
In Ukraine, Ankara's military aid has given Erdogan renewed leverage in NATO at a time when his government is in a precarious situation at home, and his relations with the United States and Europe have been in crisis for years.
If Turkey can continue to manage and build successfully on its own drone program, it may well have given itself a new and fundamental form of influence, while redefining drone warfare.
under the radar
Turkey's marching program was born out of frustration with foreign suppliers.
In the early 1990s, when the United States was the dominant manufacturer of armed drones, Turkey tried to gain access to American technology to combat the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which the United States and Turkey have designated a terrorist organization, but to no avail.
Turkey then turned to Israel in 2005, but the results were equally disappointing.
In the years that followed, Ankara's efforts to purchase more advanced American drones, including an armed version of the MQ-9 Reaper, were rejected.
Ultimately, Turkey resolved to develop its own parades.
In 2012, a Turkish government-owned company developed an unmanned prototype, and by 2016, it was able to efficiently conduct exploratory flights.
Within those years, another extraordinary achievement occurred when Selcuk Bayraktar, an MIT-educated engineer (and future husband of Erdogan's daughter), succeeded in designing Bayraktar TB2 drones.
In 2012, mass production of the TB2 drones began, and over the course of three years, the drone was able to carry out precision attacks, which made it a new and important component of the Turkish arsenal. -9 Reaper, the TP2 drones have the ability to fly for long periods at medium altitude.
Starting in 2015, the Turkish army began using its drones in its long-running fight against the Kurdish militias of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
During the next three years, thanks to the new rallies, Turkey was able to largely drive the militia out of Turkish territory, and it was able to kill large numbers of PKK members, including some of its leaders, in Iraq.
Soon thereafter, Ankara also began using drones against Kurdish fighters in Syria, known as the People's Protection Units (YPG) linked to the PKK. This strategy allowed Turkey to consolidate its control over its southern and southeastern borders, extending its presence into northern Syria and Iraq without risking troops. Great military on the ground.
For the first time in decades, Ankara is able to make a decisive gain in its long-running struggle with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
Bayraktar flying in all directions
Bayraktar "Aqnji"
The advantages that made Bayraktar essential to the Turkish government's security priorities soon proved equally beneficial to many small and medium powers outside Turkey.
In exchange for a relatively modest investment, many countries are able to acquire lethal military technology that enables them to alter the dynamics of a conflict, or provide effective deterrence against armed groups or other forces.
In 2017, Turkey began exporting TB2, and within five years it had sold the marches to nearly 24 countries, including allies and partners in Europe (Albania, Poland, Ukraine), Central and South Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan), and Africa (Ethiopia, Libya). Morocco, Somalia, Tunisia), the Gulf (Qatar), and the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Although these arms deals were the result of a mixture of commercial and geopolitical motives, they almost always involved countries in which Turkey has strategic interests.
As a result of these deals, the Turkish drones upset the balances in many conflicts.
In Libya in 2020, these marches enabled the Tripoli government, which is internationally recognized and backed by Turkey, to withstand the fierce attack launched by the Russian-backed warlord “Khalifa Haftar”.
Likewise, the marches helped Azerbaijani forces successfully retake disputed lands in the Karabakh region, which had been held by Armenian forces for decades.
In the Syrian province of Idlib, the Turkish drones allowed the Syrian opposition forces to stop the aggression of the Syrian regime government, which sought to push the opposition back into Turkey.
In Ethiopia, the Turkish marches obtained by the Addis Ababa government helped tip the scales of its civil war against the Tigrayan rebels.
Turkey's rapid rise as a primary supplier of low- and middle-income countries has brought gains to Turkish power, but it has also created new challenges.
A number of countries, including Ethiopia, Somalia, and Tunisia, have acquired Turkish drones without completing the technical systems required to operate them.
These countries may not achieve decisive results against a well-trained enemy or outnumber them, and they may have slipped occasionally.
During the conflict in Tigray, the Ethiopian government was harshly criticized for causing civilian casualties, even hitting a school using Turkish-made drones.
Such incidents have contributed to the impression, shared by some American officials, that Turkey has become recklessly spreading the marches.
As for the biggest problem, it may have an impact on Turkey's competitors.
Turkey's involvement in conflicts such as the Libyan one has alarmed its opponents, including Egypt, France, and the United Arab Emirates.
In May 2020, while the Turkish drones changed the course of the civil war in Libya, Egypt formed an informal alliance with Cyprus, France, Greece and the UAE to confront Turkish activity in the eastern Mediterranean by coordinating the political, diplomatic and naval presence.
The United States recently increased its military aid to Greece as a preemptive measure against Russia, but it was also directed, to a lesser degree, against Turkey and its increasing military presence in the region.
Turkey's dilemma in Ukraine
Turkish drone diplomacy has proven to be the most important, and perhaps most dangerous, in Ukraine, as Kyiv began buying TB2 in 2019 and used it for the first time against Russian-backed separatists in the Donbass region in 2021. But with the Russian president’s war.” Vladimir Putin” on Ukraine, these weapons have acquired a more dangerous situation, for the first time these weapons are directed directly against the Russian forces themselves.
Indeed, more than 60 successful TB2 attacks have been carried out on Russian tanks, artillery, vehicles, and even supply trains, and probably many more unreported incidents.
As for Turkey's relations with the West, the unexpected role played by the "Bayraktar" rallies
However, the drone war in Ukraine has raised new, complex questions about Turkey's efforts to maintain its working relations with Moscow. Turkey has to deal with Russia in many areas, from the Black Sea to Syria and Azerbaijan.
Strategically, Ankara will do everything in its power to ensure that Kyiv does not fall into the hands of Moscow.
This is because Putin's aggression against Ukraine has created a sense of realism in Ankara regarding Russia, Turkey's historical archenemy.
And now, more than ever, Ankara values Ukraine and the other Black Sea states as indispensable allies in building a counterweight to the Russian giant north of the Black Sea.
But if Putin succeeds in occupying part of Ukraine - or fails and blames it on Turkey - he may have significant new anti-Turkish influence.
Perhaps Putin can, for example, undermine Ankara's interests in Syria by unleashing a huge wave of refugees from Idlib into Turkey. Anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey has become stronger recently, and with the country's economic crisis, it is likely that Erdogan will find himself under severe pressure. If large numbers of refugees flow into the country.
Putin can also impose an economic burden on Turkey by limiting Turkish agricultural exports to Russia, banning Russians from tourism in Turkey, or stopping Russian gas supplies to Ankara.
These steps would undermine the recovery of the Turkish economy, and thus Erdogan's chances of re-election in 2023.
Erdogan's ultimate goal is to avoid confrontation with Putin, who might use economic influence or even cyber attacks to stymie the Turkish president's re-election chances.
Turkey has publicly downplayed the importance of the role it plays in arming Ukrainians, asserting that it is not the Turkish government that supplies the Bayraktar drones to the Ukrainians, but rather a private company.
Even as it supplies Kyiv with drones, Turkey is seeking to play the role of mediator, as it hosted a meeting in the coastal city of Antalya that included the Ukrainian and Russian foreign ministers on March 10.
Turkey fears the Russian defeat at the same time, albeit to a lesser degree than it fears a Russian victory, and the reason for this is, on the one hand, because Russia is a useful trading partner, and on the other hand, because the Turks and the Russians have practical understandings - albeit in the context of competition between them - in The Caucasus, Libya, and Syria, understandings that might be jeopardized in the event of a Russian defeat.
Moreover, Erdogan wants to attract Russian oligarchs under sanctions to Turkey, hoping that their properties and money will help revive the Turkish economy in the midst of its suffering.
Turkey may also become a real estate market for the Russian upper-middle class, eager to protect its wealth.
So Erdogan's strategy in Ukraine is to provide quiet military support to Kiev, while seeking to preserve diplomatic channels with Putin and economic gains from Russia.
To achieve this, Erdogan has refused to support Western sanctions against Russia, as Turkey continues to buy Russian oil, and unlike its Western counterparts, Ankara has kept its airspace open to Russian civil aviation.
Such a contradictory strategy may be acceptable to Putin at the moment. It is unlikely that the Russian leader will provoke a confrontation with Turkey now, especially if Erdogan provides an economic lifeline to him and the Russian oligarchs.
However, if the war in Ukraine is prolonged, and the marches continue,
Turkey and the rearrangement of foreign policy
While the war in Ukraine places increasing pressure on the Erdogan government to be a powerful part of the Western alliance, engaging with the United States remains a particular challenge.
On the one hand, Turkey gained new respect in NATO through the astonishing role that Turkish military technology played in the Ukrainian resistance.
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, many European leaders have renewed their relations with Ankara, including Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, despite the mutual altercations between his government and Erdogan, but US President Joe Biden has not opened his arms to Erdogan so far. The relationship between the two men was lukewarm.
When Biden served as Vice President, he played the main interlocutor with Turkey between 2013-2016, but relations deteriorated when Erdogan blamed then-President Barack Obama for the 2013 coup in Egypt.
Erdogan was also angered at the time by US support for the People's Protection Units - linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party - which the US considered a key tool for defeating the Islamic State (ISIS).
Biden promised that the support would be, according to the description of US policy, "tactical, temporary, and in return," but that policy quickly turned into something like open support.
Biden, for his part, was frustrated by Erdogan's recoil from democratic values and his defiance of US strategic and political priorities in the Middle East, and by his increasingly direct criticism of the Obama administration.
Thus, Biden has not been impressed by Erdogan's recent heroic role in Ukraine.
During a NATO summit in Brussels at the end of last March - a full month after the Russian invasion - Biden ignored a Turkish request for a meeting.
Even if Turkish involvement in Ukraine reorientates Turkish foreign policy closer to the West, there is a risk for Erdogan that Biden, and some Western leaders, will be so eager to get rid of him that they are delaying any rapprochement with Ankara until after the 2023 elections. Now, Erdoğan's fortunes seem to have risen as a result of his marching diplomacy and the substantive support he is providing Ukraine.
But Erdogan is unlikely to win re-election easily unless the Turkish economy rebounds and sees more than 10% growth over the next year.
At the same time, while the rallies gave Turkey the ability to play a role that exceeds its usual weight in international politics, its economy may be subjected to further deterioration due to this policy, which has come to play a decisive role in Ankara's new influence and Erdogan's political future at the same time.
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Translation: Hadeer Abdul Azim
This report has been translated from Foreign Affairs and does not necessarily reflect the website of Meydan.