According to a tsarist word treasured by President Vladimir Putin, Russia has no allies except "army and navy".

From a formal point of view, however, yes: a number of states in the post-Soviet space are members of the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (ODKB) and the Eurasian Economic Union.

In the first alliance, Russia is about defense with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Frederick Smith

Political correspondent for Russia and the CIS in Moscow.

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The second aims to advance the economic integration of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with Russia.

Actually, following the example of the EU, this should also lead to political integration.

But that's why things have been quiet since the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea in 2014 and the then still hidden war in Donbass.

This is because Putin not only questioned Ukraine's statehood, but also publicly questioned Kazakhstan.

The attack on Ukraine raises doubts about Moscow's alliances.

In early March, with the exception of Belarus, which has been dependent on Putin since the 2020 crackdown, Russia's allies abstained when 141 of 193 member states in the UN General Assembly called for an immediate withdrawal of occupation forces from Ukraine.

Beware of neo-imperial revanchism

When the UN General Assembly recently voted 93 votes to exclude Russia from the UN Human Rights Council as a reaction to the mass murders by Bucha, the result in the allied camp was better from Moscow's point of view: alongside Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan voted against the from America submitted request;

Armenia did not vote for abstention this time, but did not vote at all.

The partners who now stood by Russia are themselves known for serious human rights violations.

The partners in the economic alliance are in an uncomfortable position.

Of course, none have joined Western sanctions against Russia.

But they don't want to share Putin's pariah status.

No partner, not even Belarus, has recognized the “people's republics” in the Donbass as “states” as Putin has done.

Concerns about Putin's neo-imperial revanchism are also likely to play a role.

Kazakh Foreign Minister Muchtar Tleuberdi summed up his country's position as saying that while punitive measures against Russia should not have a negative impact on Kazakhstan's economy, it is also important that "our territory is not used to circumvent these sanctions."

His deputy Roman Wassilenko said: "If there is a new Iron Curtain, we don't want to be behind it." It is important to attract Western investors to maintain its "multi-vector policy".

Earlier this year, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev — with the support of Putin, who sent in ODKB troops — crushed an insurgency that had been sparked by a hike in LNG prices but quickly turned against the corrupt system of power.

Sympathies for Ukraine in Kazakhstan

Now Tokayev needs rapid reforms and development.

He must have understood that progress cannot be made against Russia (which is also needed for oil exports);

but that they don't exist with Putin either.

There is also great sympathy for Ukraine among the Kazakhs.

Humanitarian relief supplies were delivered.

In early March, thousands were allowed to demonstrate for Ukraine in Almaty;

but further protests were not allowed.

Last Saturday, activists who had laid down in front of the Russian consulate in Almaty with their hands tied and Ukrainian flags in view of the murders in Bucha were taken away and held for several hours.

Kyrgyzstan and Armenia are among the countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus from which many of the at least seven million migrant workers in Russia come who earn their money in construction, as janitors or in trade and send them home.

When Russia's economy collapses, it also hits its partners hard - and the prospects are bleak.

Armenia meets the hardest lot

In Kyrgyzstan, the television channel Next TV was classified as "extremist" at the end of March and its director was remanded in custody for "inciting inter-ethnic hatred".

"Next TV" had circulated a Ukrainian report that Kyrgyzstan was supporting Russian forces in Ukraine.

There are no signs of this - but there are reports of Kyrgyz (and other Central Asians) fighting for money and sometimes also in the hope of Russian citizenship for Putin in Ukraine.

Of all the partners, Armenia has the hardest fate.

The country has been more dependent than ever on Russia, which has deployed peacekeepers in the region, since losing in the recent flare-up of the 2020 war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

It now seems as if Baku wants to use the Russian distraction caused by the Ukraine war to test how seriously the promise of protection should be taken.

At the end of March, Azerbaijani troops advanced across the line of contact at a strategically important point, three (ethnic) Armenian soldiers were killed.

Moscow was outraged and reported that the troops were withdrawing, but Armenian and Azerbaijani statements, which are rare in parallel, argue against this.

Armenians fear that Baku is yet to reclaim the territory remaining under their control -- and resent Ukraine for sympathizing with Azerbaijan's 2020 "restoration of territorial integrity" successes.