I witnessed tug-of-war and proxy wars
Russian-Chinese relations reflect deep feelings of mutual respect and resentment as well
Jinping and Putin have "friendship without borders".
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Tianmen in China and Red Square in Russia are symbols of two nations united by socialist creed and interests.
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When the soldiers gathered on the border, the commander in chief decided it was time to invade, to teach the other side a lesson.
Shortly thereafter, the forces crossed the internationally recognized border, clashing with local forces.
That country is not Ukraine 2022, but Vietnam 1979.
In January of that year, then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping told then-US president Jimmy Carter that he wanted to "rubbing the ears" of his neighbors.
For a month, Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed, killing tens of thousands.
Chinese troops withdrew in March 1979, when Deng wisely decided, unlike Russian President Vladimir Putin, to declare a resounding victory, and return home.
Since then, there has been no apparent breach of international borders by Chinese forces.
China's brief invasion of Vietnam is not mentioned much in the world, especially now, during the Ukraine crisis.
And none of the Western parties want to put it up while trying to pressure China, because of its attachment to the sanctity of national sovereignty.
Moscow will not mention this, because it brings back an embarrassing memory to its friends in Beijing, as China's project in 1979 was not really about Vietnam, but about Russia.
Sino-Soviet relations had become toxic since the spat between the two communist superpowers in 1960. Vietnam, with the support of the Soviet Union, invaded and occupied Cambodia in 1978, overthrowing the Khmer Rouge.
According to the bizarre Cold War politics of the time, both the United States and China supported the genocide perpetrated by the leader, Pol Pot, only because the enemy of the Vietnamese Pot regime was backed by Moscow.
On February 4, at the Winter Olympics in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin declared "friendship without borders."
Shortly thereafter, Russia invaded Ukraine.
Most analysts believe that Beijing had some idea that Russia would try to seize more Ukrainian territory, but it almost certainly did not realize that there would be a full-blown invasion.
Chinese concern
China is genuinely concerned about Russia's confiscation of Ukraine's sovereignty, though it has not said so publicly, instead making vague humanitarian signals at the United Nations and censoring pro-Ukrainian sentiment on Chinese social media.
But Beijing seems to see little point in becoming a mediator in the conflict, seeing that many of its partners in the global south, such as Pakistan and South Africa, do not view the European crisis as an existential test for themselves or China.
China's primary motives in seeking peace between Russia and Ukraine are realistic. Ukraine is an important, if not decisive, source of grain for China, and its having to find new suppliers of cheap grain, at the moment, for its middle-class population, could lead to inflation.
There are advantages to China in the compromise that sees Putin remain in power.
China could become Russia's only major market for wheat and fossil fuels, and could get it at bargain prices, although Russia's traditional allies, such as India, have not taken a tough stance against Moscow as the West, and may also provide markets.
Preferred partner
Russia also remains China's preferred partner in creating semi-official military groupings (rather than binding NATO-style alliances) against the West.
Beijing has repeatedly suggested that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be used to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, an organization expected to be dominated by China and Russia, with India and Central Asian countries as members.
However, the relationship between Russia and China is not only about power politics.
There is a memory stretching back to the present of a more emotional relationship between China and Russia, a long-standing tradition in Russian literature and culture that shaped the modern Chinese revolution.
One of China's greatest contemporary authors, Ba Jin, takes his pseudonym from passages of names in Russian literature translated into Chinese by the Russian revolutionaries, Bakunin and Kropotkin.
Young Chinese women leaving their families to participate in the communist uprising in the 1940s cite Turgenev's poem Threshold (1878).
The work was written in the voice of a man speaking to a young woman about to join the anti-Caesarean movement, saying that she would suffer “alienation” and “solitude.” She replied, “I know, and I still want to join.”
The magic of ideology
The height of Russian influence came in the 1940s, when Soviet ideology and the allure of Soviet technology also influenced Chinese visions of Moscow as a future, and in the 1950s, when the country was isolated from the United States.
The situation in China at the time was emotionally different from the anti-foreigner Cultural Revolution in which Xi had grown up, but that was largely the world of his father, the veteran revolutionary general Shi Zhongxun.
From the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, love turned to hate, as ideological differences brought the two countries closer to war over the border islands on the Ussuri River in 1969, sparking China's enthusiasm for an opening to the United States that had occurred in more than 50 years.
Post-Cold War Path
In recent decades, the relationship has grown warmer, as Moscow and Beijing have realized that this relationship gives them cover against the encroachment of the West.
However, the post-Cold War trajectory of Russia under Putin and China under Xi is not the same.
China has seen its economy and global influence grow, while Russia's purchasing power and life expectancy have shrunk.
In some regions, such as Central Asia, cooperation masks mutual mistrust.
Russian Siberians became increasingly resentful of Chinese investment in their region.
China has created one of the world's most powerful civilian and military economies, yet Russian elites still look to the West, with many considering China to be rich, but "uncultured."
China feels a little bit superior, because Russia has never invented technology like Huawei, and Russia has some disdain for China, because it has never produced an icon like Dostoevsky.
In this contradiction, along with unmentioned episodes such as the 1979 proxy war between them, lies a common history of respect and resentment.
This appears to be reflected in the relationship today between Xi and Putin.
• Most analysts believe that Beijing had some idea that Russia would try to seize more Ukrainian territory, but it almost certainly did not realize that there would be a full invasion.
• China could become the only major market for Russia's wheat and fossil fuels, and could get them at competitive prices, although Russia's traditional allies such as India have not taken a tough stance against Moscow like the West, and may also provide markets.
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