He has other options available to deter his opponents

Putin may use nuclear weapons despite dire consequences

• Putin may consider setting a further target without resorting to nuclear weapons.

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• Western intelligence has not detected actual activity of Russia's nuclear weapons at present.

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We are still in the early days of the war in Ukraine, but so far nuclear issues have received far more attention than expected.

A strategic missile maneuver was part of the run-up to the war.

At the launch of the Russian military operation, Russian President Vladimir Putin strongly warned that any country standing in Russia's way would suffer "consequences that it has not faced before in its history."

Perhaps most disturbingly, Putin instructed his defense minister and chief of general staff to raise the level of readiness of Russia's deterrent forces by placing them in a "special regime for combat duties";

It is not clear what he meant.

US defense officials noted that this was not a term in the operational lexicon, which they were familiar with, and stated that they did not see "real movement," later, in the status of the Russian nuclear arsenal.

The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that its nuclear missile forces and its fleet in the North and the Pacific have been put on an "enhanced" combat mission.

And some reports spoke of Russia increasing the number of workers at its nuclear sites, which may mean that all vacations have been cancelled.

These developments are considered a difficult period for nuclear strategists.

And nuclear signals through the war in Ukraine in a way not seen since the days of the Cuban missile crisis.

Naturally, it fueled a flurry of speculation on social media about the possibility of a nuclear clash, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

Cases of resorting to the nuclear option

In early June 2020, Russia published an official outline of the principles underpinning Russian nuclear deterrence.

The document lists four cases in which Russia may resort to the use of nuclear weapons, namely:

First, in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies.

- Secondly, in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state becomes in danger.

- Third, when there are reliable data about the launch of ballistic missiles to attack the territory of the Russian Federation or its allies.

Finally, in the event of an adversary attacking sensitive government or military sites in the Russian Federation, disabling them would undermine nuclear forces' response options.

Some of Putin's comments indicate an effort to make arguments under the second clause of those provisions.

The transfer of lethal conventional military equipment to Ukraine from NATO members and other countries, at a time when a massive raft of sanctions is hitting the regime and its supporters, is certainly not seen in Washington, European capitals or Canberra as “aggression,” or endangering the existence of the Russian state. at risk.

It is true that some commentators believe that these measures threaten the future of the Putin regime, but most of them see them as mere measures against Moscow in order to change its course, with regard to Ukraine.

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However, Putin's behavior has been odd, of late, including his long-distance sitting test of his interlocutors;

Driven by a long list of perceived grievances, a fervent ambition to re-establish a Greater Russia, and wounded pride.

This means, of course, that the probability of an escalation is greater than the possibility of a reduction.

Does this escalation include nuclear weapons?

Yeah.

But since the days of the Cold War, Western intelligence may still have a good list of warning signs of impending nuclear use.

And I don't think we're close to that.

It is worth noting that Putin has a host of other, more likely options.

Options include overthrowing the current government in Kyiv and installing a more compliant regime in its place;

Then Ukraine was gradually reintegrated under Moscow's control.

Easier said than done, sure, but Moscow has experience in this regard.

He may also choose to strike - with conventional weapons - the supply lines through which military equipment finds its way to Ukraine.

Or he might consider a further target, again, without necessarily resorting to nuclear weapons.

Today, strategic deterrence is not limited to just the old division into conventional and nuclear weapons.

The conflict has become multi-domain.

Conventional long-range precision-strike weapons, cyber options, and space-based weapons are all possibilities.

4 cases that require nuclear deterrence

A document, published in 2020, lists four cases in which Russia may resort to the use of nuclear weapons:

1. In response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies.

2. In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when the very existence of the State is in danger.

3. When there are reliable data about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation or its allies.

4. In the event that an adversary launches an attack on sensitive government or military sites in the Russian Federation, its disruption would undermine the nuclear forces' response options.

• Putin's recent behavior has been strange, including his long-distance sitting experience of his interlocutors;

Driven by a long list of perceived grievances, a fervent ambition to re-establish a Greater Russia, and wounded pride.

Rod Leon ■ Fellow of the Australian Institute for Strategic Policy

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