The interaction of secular and Islamic currents is one of the features of the Arab Spring phase since the outbreak of the Arab revolutions in Tunisia in 2011. This interaction witnessed a clash at times and agreement at other times, and this relationship was marked in many stages by confusion in the understanding of the "other" party.
This confusion contributed to the tension in the relationship between the two parties at certain stages that witnessed a joint effort by the two parties to achieve a peaceful transition of power and build consensus on a democratic transition. Arabic was limited.
In this regard, political researcher Muhammad Affan, who holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Exeter and executive director of Al-Sharq for Strategic Research, presents his book “Saddam Secularism and Islamism: The Divergent Paths of Transitional Negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia,” published by the prestigious Routledge publishing house within Her series entitled "Studies in Democratization and Government in the Middle East" for the year 2022, and the following is the text of the interview.
The book "Saddam Secularism and Islamism: The Divergent Paths of the Transitional Negotiations in Egypt and Tunisia" was published by Routledge (communication sites)
Why did you choose to complete a study on the subject of transitional negotiations in the Arab Spring countries?
The idea of this study began in mid-2014, after the stormy events of the summer of 2013, nearly two years before the start of actual work on preparing a doctoral thesis at the University of Exeter in Britain, which was later published in this book.
The motivation for this study was 3 things:
First, an attempt to overcome feelings of frustration and sorrow as a result of the faltering experience of democratic transition in Egypt due to the political polarization between Islamic and civil forces throughout the transitional period. The simple idea at the time was that if we had made a mistake, let us try to learn something from our mistakes.
Secondly, I still believe that authoritarian regimes in the Arab region cannot last long for many factors, and that a new opportunity for democratic transformation will come sooner or later. Political and societal actors when this opportunity arises in the future.
Third, I still believe in the virtue of peaceful conflict management, negotiation, and the search for compromise solutions and compromises, so I tried in this study to investigate when, how, and in what context the negotiation process can succeed during transitional stages.
In the second chapter of the book, you establish a conceptual basis to know the roots of the concept of secularism. Is it permissible to use the concept of "secularism" in the Arab-Islamic context?
Does the concept of "Islamism" contain an implicit secular orientation?
One of the main objectives of this study is an attempt to understand and deconstruct the terms “Islamism” and “secularism”, because the controversy over these two terms and defining what is meant by them was part of the misunderstanding between the conflicting political forces in the Arab Spring countries. This chapter presented 3 basic hypotheses, and detailed them:
First, it is correct to use the concept of secularism in the Arab-Islamic context, despite its Christian and European origin.
But, in this case, we should not define secularism as a call for the separation of state and church, or religion and politics, or a call for the privatization of religion, and the social division of labor associated with modernity.
Instead, secularization should be seen as a reconfiguration of religion to be more compatible with modernity, and therefore secularism is a political ideology, which presents a version or group of modern versions of religiosity, some of these versions are anti-religious, and try to replace it with intellectual and value systems Alternative, but there are other versions that are supportive or at least tolerant of religion, its presence in the public sphere, and its political and social roles.
Second, Islamism should not simply be equated with Islam, and this distinction between them does not imply a secular bias.
Islamism is a concept that refers to a modern phenomenon that expresses a group of political ideologies and social movements that are inspired by Islam and its values, and tries to confirm its political and social presence and its effectiveness as a reference in Muslim societies that have entered the stage of modernization. Religious sects, theological schools, jurisprudence schools, Sufi orders, folk traditions and customs, as well as forms of government represented in the traditional Caliphate state and sultanates. This manifestation in modern Muslim societies is represented in Islamic political ideologies, Islamic parties, and Islamic social movements. Islamic republics, and the like.
If Islam is a religion that corresponds to other religions such as Christianity, Buddhism and Judaism, then “Islamism” is a political ideology that corresponds to other ideologies such as nationalism, capitalism, liberalism and socialism. and wealth in Muslim societies.
Finally, in the context of the Arab Spring, “Islamism” and “secularism” should not be portrayed as diametrically opposed fields, representing religion versus non-religion, authenticity versus Westernization, enlightenment versus reaction, or similar stereotypes.
Rather, they must be understood as two distinct modes of interaction between Islam and modernity, two different sets of ideologies that adopt competing versions of modern religiosity, and that there are often areas of intersection between them. The idea of a unified and personalized traditional authority, as well as the centrality of the nation and its oversight role in the political system, like many types of liberal-democratic-oriented secular systems.
In contrast, some authoritarian and fascist versions of both "Islamist" and secular ideologies adopt the model of a totalitarian state that controls both the public and private spheres, although they differ, of course, in their highly ambivalent attitude toward religion.
Is it correct to frame the political conflict in the Arab Spring countries using these two concepts?
Or is this framing a shorthand for the nature of the conflict in the Arab Spring countries?
The Arab Spring is a very ambiguous and complex phenomenon, and perhaps nothing brings together the Arab Spring countries other than their participation in the manifestations of political instability from demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins, to armed conflicts in some cases, but the motives behind this state of political rebellion differ from one country to another, and overlap It contains several factors: political, economic, sectarian, tribal, conflicting elite interests, a smoldering historical memory, regional and international polarization, and so on.
Despite this, framing the political conflict in some Arab Spring countries as a struggle between “Islamism” and secularism is not wrong, as in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, for example.
It is true that there are other dimensions of the conflict in these two cases, but its organizing framework was ideological, centered around religion and its relationship to the political and societal, and the space for social and political roles that scholarly institutions and Islamic movements are allowed to play.
Rather, the study noted that “Islamism” and secularism, in the midst of a sharp political conflict, shifted from ideologies that struggle at the level of policies and decisions, to different lifestyles, that struggle on the level of paradigms, reference, and cosmic visions, which turned the conflict into a zero-sum conflict, and made the political forces involved in it. She feels that she is in front of a conflict of identities and my existence.
In the third and fourth chapters, you explained the causes of the conflict between secularists and Islamists in the transitional period. Could you explain its role in containing the recurring political crises in Tunisia and Egypt?
Regardless of the historical backgrounds and personal and interest motives, the direct causes of the conflict between the “Islamist” and secular forces in the transitional period in Egypt and Tunisia were numerous, whether the disagreement over the management of the transitional phase as happened in Egypt between the “constitution first” or “elections first” camps, or The struggle over the term and powers of the Constituent Assembly in Tunisia, or because of the poor performance of transitional governments dominated by Islamists to varying degrees in both countries, especially in issues such as the economy, security and transitional justice, but the main reason for this conflict was the difference over the nature of the political system that should be established.
Especially during the preparation of the constitution, as the two parties differed about the reference of Sharia, the manifestations of this reference, and the role of scholarly institutions such as Al-Azhar and Dar Al-Ifta. Important issues emerged in that, such as the issue of the possibility of determining the reference of human rights in international and international references, or whether there is a specificity of Muslim societies that must be taken into account. Or that Sharia is the only or primary reference, or does it represent one of the sources among other sources in legislation, and so on.
The fourth chapter included monitoring and analysis of nearly 12 national dialogues and general conferences during the transitional period in the Egyptian case, which ended with the July 2013 coup, and about 10 national conferences and dialogue sessions in Tunisia during the transitional period, which ended with the announcement of the national unity government and the consensual constitution in January. / January 2014, and there was a set of goals, the most important of which was to determine the ability of these dialogues and conferences to contain conflicts effectively and successfully.
This analysis showed that the impact of these dialogues and conferences on the course of the transitional phase in Egypt was limited. Either they did not succeed in achieving the required consensus, as in the dialogues of Dr. Abdel Aziz Hegazy, Dr. Yahya Al-Jamal and Dr. Ali Al-Salami, or the Egypt conference sponsored by Dr. Mamdouh Hamza, or The political parties did not adhere to the document that was agreed upon in these dialogues, such as the document of the parties sponsored by the military council, the "Vermont" document, or the Al-Azhar document on the renunciation of violence.
In Tunisia, although several conferences of the national dialogue failed, the interlocutors managed in other cases to contain the conflict effectively, such as the dialogue of Ayed Ben Achour in September 2011, which resulted in the document of the management of the transitional period, and the national dialogue sponsored by the Quartet In the summer of 2013, which resulted in the adoption of the 2014 constitution, and the consensual government of Mahdi Gomaa.
What can we learn from the experience of the Arab Spring regarding transitional negotiations in light of developments related to politics in Tunisia and Egypt?
There are many conclusions that came out of the study, both at the theoretical level in the nature of democratic transformation processes, and the factors that affect its course and results, or at the applied policy level, the most important of which are:
First: The process of democratization faces an important problem, as the partisan and societal forces of change that are supposed to take over power and lead the process of building the new system in the transitional period are the same forces that were oppressed and that were exhausted, weakened and divided by the late tyrannical regime, and if these forces had Experience and knowledge of opposition mechanisms and protest tools that enabled them to effect change, this does not mean that they have the know-how and experience that enables them to deal with state institutions and manage public affairs, especially in the complex situations of the transitional period.
Second, the transitional negotiation process is also subject to a complex problem. During periods of authoritarian rule, economic, social, class, and regional grievances overlap and complex. Therefore, many of the forces that were oppressed or marginalized during the former rule come to the negotiating table with a long and overlapping list of demands, some of which are related to Redistribution of wealth, the tax system, and restructuring wages, some of which are related to the investigation of cases of torture and the demand for compensation for human rights violations, some of which are related to bringing about development in marginalized areas, and some of them related to the recognition of the religious or cultural rights of oppressed minorities, and most importantly, all of them come to negotiations with the mentality of a “defining moment” or "Now or Never", which greatly complicates the negotiation process, and makes it impossible to reach consensus.
In conclusion, the success of dialogue and negotiation processes in the transitional phase requires comprehensive approaches that do not focus on the skill and experience of elites, political and societal leaders and their individual behavior, and do not take into account the neutralization of the structural dimensions that affect the choices of these elites, or they are immersed in local affairs and do not pay attention to the dimensions Regional and international, or interested in political settlements between competing parties and do not give enough attention to settling economic conditions and social grievances, and most importantly, the components of the different forces of change do not go too far in competition in order to achieve their own visions - which is a natural and legitimate issue - to the extent that they neglect the necessity of a regulatory framework From understanding and agreeing with each other to keep the change process going and prevent its collapse.