British researcher: Putin failed to turn Russia into a major “power pole” or an attractive country
The West faces a double challenge from Russia's internal conditions and its external movements
Putin narrowed the margins of diplomatic work.
Father
Pro-Russian forces are advancing cautiously in more than one area.
Reuters
Russian soldiers will not find Ukraine an easy and malleable country as they would like.
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About two weeks after Russia's decision to invade Ukraine, the situation still holds a great deal of ambiguity regarding the horizon, end and repercussions of military action, whether on Russia itself, its surroundings, and the world as a whole.
“Moscow presents a double challenge to the West, between Its neo-imperial ambitions, as evidenced by the all-out invasion of Ukraine, along with the looming possibility of a rupture of the Russian state.”
While much has been written about Moscow's expansion, less attention has been paid to the fragile pillars of the Russian Federation.
Bogajsky believes that the two factors are closely linked, as the Kremlin will become more aggressive internationally to hide its internal fissures.
Escalating domestic problems convinced Moscow that a bolder and more dangerous foreign policy strategy could yield domestic benefits by rallying citizens around "fortified Russia" and silencing dissent.
However, this would backfire against the regime if the war in Ukraine were protracted costly with severe sanctions.
Re-imperialism and fragmentation alike will confront the Western alliance with decisive political decisions in deterring Russia's attacks and repelling its attempts to defend itself, while simultaneously dealing with Russia's demise as a single state.
The Kremlin pursued a policy of restoring imperialism by dividing countries along its borders, undermining American influence in Europe, and undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Russian President Vladimir Putin lamented the end of the Soviet Union not only as a catastrophe, but also as the demise of "historic Russia".
The Kremlin views its "power pole" as consisting of Eurasia, or the land mass of northern Eurasia, and as much of Europe as possible, especially those regions that were part of the Russian sphere in the Soviet era, or even tsarism.
liberation from self
Unlike other imperialist countries, which have rid themselves of their empires abroad, Bojazsky argues, Russia needs to be freed from itself.
Russia became an empire before Russians became a nation, and before Russia developed into a nation-state.
Russia as an empire focused on its territorial size, and largely neglected nation building.
It expanded contiguously through the incorporation and Russianization of many ethnic groups, whose national identities could not be fully assimilated.
Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the territories lost by Moscow were smaller than those surrendered to Western empires after decolonization.
Despite his resolute rhetoric and actions, Putin has failed to turn Russia into a major "power pole", or a real source of political, economic, and cultural attraction for neighboring countries.
For Bojajsky, the invasion of neighboring countries and threats against Western countries are not signs of strength, but frustration in subjugating it.
Instead of succeeding in empire building, Putin's regime carved out parts of neighboring countries, but failed to gain international legitimacy, for its acquisitions.
In addition, unlike voluntary associations, conquest of states increases the economic and security burdens on the center, with only short-term domestic benefits for national mobilization.
The Russian Federation is a "failed state"
Bogajsky describes the Russian Federation as also a "failed state" that was set up to succeed the Soviet Union, but it faces crippling challenges to its survival.
In the past three decades, attempts to transform Russia into a nation-state, civil state, or stable imperialist state have proven futile.
accelerated decline
He adds that "the accelerated decline of the Russian state and the emergence of semi-independent entities will challenge the ability of NATO to respond."
It cannot be assumed that Russia's cracking will be rapid, through a sudden collapse of the government, or through a state-level revolution.
It is likely to be a sophisticated process that accelerates at critical turns.
Motives for rupture could include an attempt to transfer power by Putin to his successor, an explosive protest against economic poverty, an ethnic clash degenerating into a broader conflict, violent provocation by hardliners or nationalists, slipping from police control, or a military mutiny as a result of the war. Failed in Ukraine, or clashes within the army based on ethnic loyalty.
The rupture of the state will also affect neighboring countries.
Some will be vulnerable to a spillover of the conflict or provocations from Moscow, as the Kremlin seeks to divert attention from internal turmoil.
Other countries will take advantage of Russia's divisions by alleviating their security concerns and reclaiming lost territories.
The federal collapse will also affect the attitudes and strategies of the major powers, and could lead to major strategic reorganizations that increase China's standing.
Without economic modernization and diversification, combined with democratization, decentralization, and a truly federal system, Russia will slide into an existential crisis, according to Bogazsky.
Finally, Bogajsky believes that the United States needs to develop a proactive strategy to manage Russia’s demise, by supporting regional and federal trends, recognizing aspirations to sovereignty and secession, defining the position of other major powers, developing ties with nascent state entities, strengthening the security of countries bordering Russia, and strengthening trends Transatlantic and Pacific between emerging nations.
Bojajsky concludes his report by saying: “Neglecting the failure of the Russian state may be more harmful to Western interests than preparing to manage its international repercussions.
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union more than 30 years ago should serve as a lesson that geopolitical revolutions occur regardless of the Kremlin's denial or the West's adherence to the status quo.
• Moscow represents a double challenge to the West, between its neo-imperialist ambitions, as evidenced by the comprehensive invasion of Ukraine, and the looming possibility of the rupture of the Russian state.
• The Kremlin views its “power pole” as consisting of Eurasia, or the land mass of northern Eurasia, and as much of Europe as possible, especially those regions that were part of the Russian sphere in the Soviet era, or even Tsarism.
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