Russia's attack on Ukraine suddenly made it clear that Germany is not prepared for an armed conflict.

No one can say for sure that this will be the Kremlin master's last war.

Germany must be ready for this, also for its allies.

Because if the German army did not rush to the aid of Poland or the Baltic states in the event of a Russian attack, they would be lost.

Peter Carstens

Political correspondent in Berlin

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In his speech on February 27, Chancellor Olaf Scholz promised the armed forces 100 billion euros for equipment, as well as an increase in the defense budget by at least 28 billion euros per year from 2024.

That sounds like an awful lot.

But what can you actually buy for it - and what would it cost to strengthen the armed forces so that they would be able to defend the country and the alliance with other Europeans, even if America did not help?

Before looking ahead, a brief look back: peace dividends, for thirty years this word was the flowery metaphor for the organized destruction of the western alliance's ability to defend itself.

All the major European countries have been involved since 1990, decommissioning warships, scrapping tanks and abolishing conscription.

It was believed that good had triumphed.

And as is almost always the case when it comes to romance and idealism, Germany was at the forefront.

Economic institutes have calculated that around 450 billion euros have been saved in this way.

More than any other country in the western world.

Two-thirds of staff reduced

So if the traffic light coalition promises an equipment program worth 100 billion euros, that would be less than a quarter of what Germany saved.

Where savings meant: Abolition of defensive capability.

The assumption behind this was that Russia was too weak or peace-loving to threaten its neighbors.

In the middle of Europe, united Germany has created a largely demilitarized zone.

The heavily armed National People's Army of the GDR, about 150,000 men under arms, disappeared completely.

In the Bundeswehr, two-thirds of the staff were reduced and entire branches of the armed forces were abolished, such as air defense.

Others were reduced by around 90 percent, such as the armored force.

This should be borne in mind when the talk is now of an alleged huge armament.

No chancellor has pursued demilitarization more consistently than Angela Merkel, especially from 2005 to 2015. After that, the condition of the Bundeswehr no longer got worse, but hardly any better.

As a result, the German government can't offer much more than 5,000 helmets and a few Soviet-Russian Strela rockets to support Ukraine.

And even there there are still problems.

Now that arms deliveries are suddenly possible, it is clear that the warehouses are empty.

The Ukrainian Ambassador Andriy Melnyk hardly wanted to believe that, but the Social Democratic Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht told him so herself.

Broken NATO promise

The share of German defense spending in gross domestic product had halved since the end of the Cold War.

In 1974, under Chancellor Willy Brandt, it was 3.4 percent.

Later, with Helmut Schmidt, it was still 3.2 percent.

Ironically, it was under these Social Democratic Chancellors that weapon systems were purchased or ordered that are still used in the Bundeswehr today, such as the Marder infantry fighting vehicle or the Tornado bomber, guarantors of nuclear participation.