After the outbreak of the Ukrainian-Russian war, circles of conflict and interests began to appear gradually and expand to include other actors. After the conflict was purely Western, Russia, other countries began to take their first steps in this minefield, most notably Turkey and China, in addition to the Israeli occupation state.
These countries face a difficult challenge that requires them to respect the balance of power in their relations between the conflicting parties, so that their political, diplomatic and security interests are not harmed by any uncalculated step, and they do not want to be a party to any conflict - at least so far - what necessitates them. Gently walk a fine line between carefully supporting one party and maintaining acceptable levels of relationships, and open lines with the other.
Israel..a failed attempt to leave without damage
In 2008, "Israel" ignored the feelings of the 80,000 Georgian Jews residing in the occupied territories when it decided to refrain from selling any weapons to Georgia, which was facing a Russian invasion and was in dire need of any military extension that would enable it to confront Moscow.
14 years after this incident, Russia invaded a new country, Ukraine, this time. This news had a strong impact on the Ukrainian community in Israel, which, accompanied by the Russian community, constitutes most of the Jews of the Soviet Union, numbering about one million people, and the scenarios of the Russian-Georgian war returned. Looming within Israeli society linked to the two countries.
The Israelis were busy preparing a scenario for saving the Jews of Ukraine and their relatives in the event that the Russian threats to invade its western neighbor were realized. The Israeli authorities prepared a secret plan to bring 200,000 Ukrainian citizens to Israel under the Law of Return if they chose to settle in the occupied territories. The occupation government also prepared temporary housing sites for Jews fleeing the fire of war. Waiting for all arrangements to be finalised.
But at the political level, pressures began to increase on the Israeli government, which is linked to political and economic interests with the two parties to the conflict, which initially prompted it to reject the request of the United States of America to provide Ukraine with the Iron Dome missile defense system, as Israel realized that by selling this defense system, which it developed with the support of From the Pentagon, to Ukraine, its relations and interests with Russia will be seriously jeopardized.
Of course, this decision did not favor Kyiv, which was waiting for strong diplomatic and moral support from Tel Aviv in the face of the Russian invasion, for many reasons, the most important of which is that Ukraine sees in its war with Russia a copy of the alleged “Israeli War of Independence” in 1948, As it is - as is the case in the occupying state - surrounded by hostile Russian forces that want to eliminate it.
To obtain this support, Ukraine began offering sacrifices to the satisfaction of the Israelis, such as seeking the approval of the Verkhovna Rada of a bill providing for financial penalties and prison sentences for those convicted of hate crimes against Jews.
On the other hand, Israel has strong interests with the Russians in several files, on top of which is the Syrian war file. Tel Aviv, whose warplanes do not stop bombing Iranian influence areas in Syria, needs to maintain security coordination with the Russian forces in Syria.
However, despite this great military harmony that has reached its climax in the recent period, the space for intervention provided by Moscow to Tel Aviv inside Syrian territory has been gradually reduced by Russia taking some tactical decisions that limit the freedom of Israeli aircraft, such as recently conducting joint patrols with the air forces of the Assad regime. .
Prior to the outbreak of the war, Tel Aviv tried to stay away from any positions that showed clear favoritism for either side, trying to hold the stick in the middle by inviting everyone to resolve the dispute through the dialogue mechanism in order to preserve its security, diplomatic and cultural interests with all parties, despite its tendency more towards the western side, which considers Ukraine its main interface. at present.
The Israelis also express a clear fear that Putin’s war against Ukraine will distract the world’s attention from pursuing the Iranian nuclear issue, which may allow Tehran to work more comfortably on its nuclear program without being disturbed by the West, which is preoccupied with what is happening in Eastern Europe, not to mention that the Russian-Ukrainian war will give Tehran an opportunity to extract A new nuclear agreement on favorable terms with Washington and the international community, which meets strong Israeli opposition.
However, with the passage of the first days of the war, Tel Aviv lost its ability to maneuver diplomatically, despite knowing the price it would pay if it took a position opposing Moscow, so it was forced to declare its support for the unity of Ukraine in an official statement expressing its concern about the Russian incursion into eastern Ukraine.
As was expected, the Russian response to this Israeli announcement was not delayed, as Moscow officially denounced Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights, and it remains to be seen how the repercussions of the crisis might affect coordination between the two countries in the Syrian territories and airspace.
Turkey... Explosive neutrality
In early February 2022, when the war was approaching at a frightening pace due to the Ukrainian crisis, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that his country would provide Ukraine with Turkish-made armed drones (through a sales deal, not aid), coinciding with Ankara’s cautious support, Kyiv diplomatically, supporting During the Turkish President's visit, he arrived in the Ukrainian capital to support the country threatened by war.
The cooperation agreement between the two countries in the defense sector was considered the latest step in the security partnership between Kyiv and Ankara after the Ukrainian crisis that erupted in 2014. The two countries also intensified economic cooperation between them, as Turkey - which is one of Ukraine's most prominent trading partners - signed new trade agreements with the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky, and bilateral trade between the two countries grew by nearly 50% during the last nine months of 2021, bringing the total trade exchange to $5 billion.
The interests of Ankara and Kiev intersect in a number of axes, starting with the security and economic aspects, and ending with the strategic aspect, as the two countries worked to form a geopolitical balance in the broader Black Sea region, as Ukraine is an indispensable partner for Turkey in this region, while Turkey controls the only waterway to Ukraine. To the Mediterranean Sea - the Bosphorus Strait - which connects the country to world markets.
Shortly after the outbreak of the Russian battle against Ukraine, Turkey announced its support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, considering the Russian attack a "major blow" to stability and peace in the region. Ankara also repeated its call to resolve the crisis through dialogue, but this Turkish support did not exceed the moral framework even at the height of the Russian strikes on Ukraine. Turkey initially rejected Ukraine’s request to close the Turkish airspace and sea straits to Russia, and to prevent the passage of Russian ships from the Bosphorus straits that connect the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, which connects the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean Sea, where 90% of military equipment, food, fuel and materials are transported Logistical support for the Russian army, declaring its commitment to the Montreux Treaty, which regulates navigation in the Turkish straits.
In order to understand the balanced Turkish position on the Ukrainian crisis, it is possible to go back to the recent past, specifically in 2014, when Turkey rejected Russia’s seizure of the Crimea, describing this step as illegal, but at the same time, Ankara avoided escalation against Moscow on all occasions, as it refused Recently, he supported the sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, and this can be explained by Turkey's dependence on Russia in the fields of energy, tourism and trade, without forgetting the military and strategic partnership between the two countries through military deals, such as those of the S-400 missile defense system, and the joint files that the Syrian file advances, where Turkey and Russia conduct joint military patrols, the same in Azerbaijan, where the two powers establish a joint center to monitor the ceasefire after the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war.
All these facts make Ankara face a difficult balancing process. It wants to show strong diplomatic support for Ukraine, without harming its relations with Moscow and crossing red lines with Putin. This is what prompted it to try to use the two cards of dialogue and threaten deterrence in parallel. Big challenges.
In the coming days, Turkey may be forced to make difficult choices that it has so far sought to avoid. While the West is pressuring Ankara to tighten its policy against Moscow by virtue of its membership in NATO, any Turkish response in this regard - by closing the straits, for example - could upset the delicate balance. relationship with Russia, and could push Moscow to retaliatory positions against the Turks in Libya, Iraq, the Cyprus issue, and most importantly in Syria, where it would be easy for the Russians to launch a comprehensive attack on Idlib, pushing Syrian refugees to cross the Turkish border, to create a new refugee crisis ahead of the scheduled elections In June 2023.
On the other hand, adhering to neutrality entails risks, perhaps the least of which is the loss of recent military deals with Ukraine, especially the 2020 agreement under which Turkey provides its Ukrainian customer with warships, not to mention the risk of straining relations with Washington, or even risking accidentally falling under Western sanctions imposed on Moscow.
Beijing .. a Russian partner plays the neutral card
With the start of the war and the casualties, China was quick to announce that the Russian military action against Ukraine came independently and without consultation with Beijing, at the same time refusing to describe this process as an "invasion", and stressing that Russia is a major country acting independently based on its strategic relations.
This statement came to confirm Beijing's insistence on the line it has drawn for itself since the start of the crisis in Ukraine. The language of war.
Of course, China did not miss the opportunity to point an accusing finger at the United States of America, considering that the US administration's announcement on more than one occasion that an imminent invasion facing Ukraine only complicated the crisis. For its part, Washington criticized what it called "tacit Chinese support" for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite the lack of The existence of any agreements, treaties or legal obligations that impose this support, but at the same time, Beijing does not seem to need this type of joint agreements with Moscow, as the two countries constitute a united front aimed at confronting what they consider Western interference in their internal affairs.
The two countries, which have resisted US sanctions imposed on them since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet partnership in the 1950s, agree on a wide range of issues, foremost among them are ideology, security, cyberspace and global governance, and the two countries are undoubtedly working to strengthen their relationship more and more to confront the threats directed at them together. For example, cooperation is no longer limited to many Chinese state banks providing loans to their Russian counterpart approved by the West, but bilateral trade between the two countries increased by 33.6%, or nearly $140 billion in 2021.
All of these facts do not mean a full Chinese adoption of Russia's policy in Ukraine, as Beijing, on the other hand, enjoys a deep strategic and commercial partnership with Kyiv, as it is not only Ukraine's largest trading partner, but the relationship between the two countries extends beyond this space to a broader military framework in the first place. It extended a helping hand to Beijing to build its military assets by providing it with some necessary technologies, especially in the airspace, as the two countries worked together, for example, to develop J-11 aircraft, which is the Chinese equivalent of the American F-15 fighters.
As for economic cooperation, Ukraine is a key member of the Belt and Road Initiative launched by Beijing, as the bilateral trade volume between the two countries amounted to more than $15 billion in 2020, and the two sides have maintained good relations for nearly 30 years that paved the way for a stable partnership.
But China's relationship with the Ukrainian crisis does not stop there. Rather, it goes beyond it to its personal ambitions in Asia. Western countries seem worried that Russia's invasion of Ukraine will encourage its Asian ally to invade Taiwan, which has been autonomous since the end of the Chinese civil war and has US military support. Although that remains a remote possibility.
In any case, China is trying to walk a fine line in the crisis, between maintaining its strong relations with Russia, and avoiding harming its commercial and military interests with Ukraine or excessively provoking the West by providing direct assistance to Russia, for example.
The options of some countries, then, in supporting one party at the expense of the other in the Russian-Ukrainian war seem very complicated. For example, Turkey, which is a member of NATO, did not make a clear decision to support Ukraine and stand up to Russia, and China, for its part, is trying to maintain a cordial relationship with Ukraine. And if it is in the war with its Russian strategic partner, and the decision of the Israeli occupation state to choose between Russia and America has become very difficult despite its strong relations with the West, its first ally and historical support in expanding its occupation of Palestine, and only days will tell us about the news of this map of alliances that the war may tamper with and reconfigure it.