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On the morning of January 25, specifically at six in the morning, 800 Egyptian soldiers and police officers in the Ismailia City Department, near the Suez Canal area, refused to surrender their weapons, and early in the morning fired their primitive rifles at the crowded forces outside. Oath, engaged in a completely unequal battle that ended in their defeat and the arrest of all those who remained alive after the battle.
Later, that day, January 25, became a police holiday, in commemoration of that incident, when British forces stationed in the Canal area narrowed down the guerrilla operations in which young men and men from all Egyptian political forces participated, with the clear complicity of the Ismailia Police Department, whose men could not Controlling their excitement with the growing patriotic feeling in the country, the British forces at dawn on January 25, 1952 surrounded the department building and asked the soldiers and officers to surrender themselves and their weapons. And the battle ended with the killing of three British soldiers and the martyrdom of fifty Egyptian policemen, and the surrender of the rest and their arrest in preparation for a military trial. (1)
On the day following the incident, January 26, 1952, demonstrations erupted in the heart of Cairo in protest against the arrest and trial of Egyptian policemen, which ended with the Cairo fire, putting the Egyptian country on a hot pot. Its water evaporated with the army’s movement on July 23, 1952, but The eruption of water put out the fire, and about sixty years after that incident, it seemed in the streets of Egypt completely upside down, this time the youth demonstrations chanted the fall of the system of injustice, tyranny and corruption, the system protected by the police, who wrecked the country unjustly, torture, murder and corruption. and corruption, without any patriotic feeling or even a moral conscience. (1)
Today, ten years after the January revolution, the situation is still the same, and the police are still at odds with what they were on January 25, 1952.
A party in which it is difficult for its soldiers, who have learned military discipline, to take a brave decision in a national confrontation, or for its officers to take a responsible initiative without waiting for orders.
A party in which it is difficult for the police to agree with the street and its movement if that movement contradicts what the authorities see, even if the street’s movement stems from belief in the principles of justice, national sovereignty and human rights for all.
How did the police turn to this extreme, becoming a stick in the hands of the authorities, with which the bodies of the oppressed people were crushed?
The wedding of the police and the political system... Is the police a politicized institution?
Historian Khaled Fahmy raises a question about the "politicization" of the police institution: Were the police defending the monarchy or working for it? Then he says that this question is not correct. The Egyptian police institution before the establishment of the July movement was headed by civilian ministers. “The regime did not seek to protect itself before the army’s movement through police forces, but rather the tendency to militarize the police grew after July. The police did not protect the king or the king. If it was politicized before July, then this relates to the fact that its members themselves are politicized, perhaps in a non-institutional or systematic way, and it is not necessary for them to be involved in groups or political parties, but their decision to take action and confront the tanks and bullets of the occupation without Waiting for orders is in itself a political decision, which could no longer be repeated after the military coup in July 1952.”(1)
Fahmy explains that before the army movement, politics existed on the street, with the presence of parties and other political forces such as the Young Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, with the presence of Parliament and a civilian political elite, but what the new military elite decided, which carried out the July movement based on a principle that is very simple and short, but it represents a legitimate cover for the rule The military so far, which is: “Political life is corrupt and has corrupted the state of the country. The army must intervene to end politics and its corruption, but it may cause economic failure. Military rule must remain in order to restore the discipline that political protest may create.” Thus, the state remains in a vicious circle with its basic content. It is to remove politics from the street, and thus remove it from the ranks of the army and police so that military coups do not recur.
After the Free Officers staged their military coup on July 23, 1952; "The officers in this movement wanted to ensure their survival in power and prevent any future possibilities of repeating what they had done. The only and successful way for that - according to their vision - was to remove politics from all state institutions and from the street. That is why they established security agencies and intelligence services that monitor members of the army and police, and not only Monitoring the people It was necessary to control political action and “secure the army”, which is why Abdul Hakim Amer was appointed for his assured loyalty as commander in chief of the army to ensure “security”, which later led to the 1967 defeat (1).
Does this mean that the Egyptian police institution was originally patriotic to defend the rights of Egyptians, and did not commit any crimes against national political figures and resistance to the British occupation?
The thinker Timothy Mitchell in his book “The Colonization of Egypt” chronicles the beginning of the establishment of the Egyptian police, saying: “The Egyptian countryside had to become, wherever possible, like the study hall and the city, a place of permanent supervision and control, for tickets and registration papers, for monitoring and inspection. In addition to supervision. on fields, factories, railways, and groups of workers, the government desired a public police system that would be intelligent, efficient, and ubiquitous.”(2)
Abdel Hakim Amer, one of the men of the July 1952 revolution in Egypt (communication sites)
Initially, after the collapse of the government in 1882, it was an equivalent system to the imposition of martial law, which is in fact a modification of the modern emergency law, and it was called "the bandit committees" with which the English tried to crush the local armed groups resisting the English forces in The Egyptian countryside, and the English used all the techniques that later became familiar in the July state, such as: military raids, secret police and guides, the systematic use of torture, and mass imprisonment. The country's prisons have been filled to four times their capacity. (2)
Examples of torture used to extract confessions from suspects included hanging people in iron collars, and burning the body with superheated iron nails.
A decade after the introduction of "highway committees", they were replaced by a more disciplined, widespread, and continuous "police" system.
Colonel Kitchener, a British officer in the Egyptian army, was appointed inspector general of the Egyptian police, and he transformed modern methods of inspection, communication and discipline into a process of political power. (2)
In addition to the organization of the police force, a comprehensive system of English inspection (2) was established, under the Ministry of the Interior, which was the expression of the new bureaucracy organizing the internal affairs of Egypt, so that the internal affairs of Egyptian village life were to be subject to constant supervision.
To assist in this, the local village wardens, numbering 50,000, were arranged with government salaries, later brought to regional centers for military training and supplied with weapons.
These guards were to assist in the police surveillance of criminals, suspects and all "well-known bad characters" or opponents of English authority (2), and finally a series of government regulations were introduced with the aim of suppressing any "internal disturbance" including the prohibition of bearing arms on all but the "Government and local officials, or landowners and merchants with recitals."
The new approaches to domination were very successful. The rural resistance groups were crushed, their leaders were shot dead or arrested, and the attacks on English property were put to an end.
By 1895 the British established the Ministry of the Interior in Egypt, and in 1911 the so-called Special Department appeared, which is the department charged with the work of internal control, which is the first predecessor of the State Security Investigations and General Investigations.
Political crimes were defined in 1937, defined as any expression intended to insult or despise the government. (3)
Mitchell (4) tells of an incident that took place in the Directorate of Beni Suef that illustrates the monitoring and control role played by the police under the supervision of the British, where Lord Cromer wrote in a report he sent to the Foreign Ministry in London that the English inspection officer had enough reasons to be convinced that there were a large number of adults and children They were not registered in the books of the estate belonging to one of the rich Egyptians, and the responsible sheikh admitted that in the village located in the estate of that rich man there is no one suitable for compulsory conscription or conscription for unregistered work, so the inspection officer, with the assistance of a force of police and guards, cordoned off the village at night, and in the morning they found more than Over 400 unregistered people were all arrested, and the sheikh was subjected to a military court.
In the thirties of the twentieth century (5), prisons expanded to include concentration camps in the desert and outside cities, including Tora, Abu Zaabal, al-Qanatir, and oases. One hundred thousand in the era of Abdel Nasser.
So the main reason for establishing the police was not to establish justice or maintain security, but to control the Egyptian countryside and cities to suit the British authority and its commercial and capitalist goals. It is the exception as a result of the growing patriotic feeling, in addition to the prosperity of the political and legal elites since the 1919 revolution and their ascension to the top of political and ministerial positions during the monarchy. (6) What happened after the June coup was the opposition to that exception in the history of the police and the restoration of things to their normal conditions, and the return of the police force To carry out its natural mission since its inception.
Nasiriyah State Police.. and the dawn of the state of oppression
The Free Officers jumped on the throne of the Egyptian state as a satanic implant that has no roots. The July movement did not have any mass political organization motivated by a clear political ideology to take power, which prompted Gamal Abdel Nasser to rely on the existing institutions, which are the institutions of the old English design that have worked since 1882 To serve the interests of the British and serve them in Egypt.
In the absence of a political struggle after Gamal Abdel Nasser succeeded in defeating all his opponents, from Muhammad Naguib and Abdel Razek al-Sanhoury to the Muslim Brotherhood, the Communists and some factory workers, the essence of “Nasser” policy and the essence of what he claimed of purifying the country from the tails of colonialism turned into a mere group of Administrative problems, which only need to be rearranged and organized while raising the level of performance, without addressing the same options and priorities. (7)
And because the new system lacked any mass political organization, it considered the employees who were originally in the administrative system to be its basic organization, and the purge laws of 1952 only applied to the organs related to security and politics, such as the army, the police, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was coupled with the abolition of politics as an absolute evil and emptying the entire administrative system, including the army and police institution, of any political orientations (7), and paralleled this with the abolition of parties and any old or new political forces, so that the immortal charismatic leader would remain alone on a throne of canes.
Counselor Tariq al-Bishri summed up this matter accurately, saying: "With the integration of powers in favor of the government apparatus, and with individual authority, the third feature of the political system established by the July 23 revolution appears, which is the dispensation of the political organization of the state and society from the principle of partisanship in general, ... the political necessities have imposed The same applies to the officers and their movement, so the state apparatus became with them the political and administrative apparatus together.There has not yet been a political party organization with its own distinct identity from the state, and in which the various political functions were concentrated... The organizational phenomenon that characterized the July 23 revolution, which is the integration of the political function into the administrative organs... It soon became specialized and led in particular to the integration of the political function in The security services, and the security services almost became the custodian of the functions that political parties and organizations can perform... This resulted in what can be called media security tendency, which is to consider every political opposition as a conspiracy or as a hideout for a crime that threatens the security of the group and the system, and threatens the higher goals. for the country in its independence, renaissance and prosperity.” (8)
On the other hand, those administrative institutions, with the police at their core, became politically affiliated with the Nasserist regime, and at the same time, it became forbidden for police personnel to have a political opinion, as their faith is full loyalty to the regime. Khaled Fahmy adds: “This fear of politicizing the army or the politicization of the police and the street This led to the confiscation of the political sphere.”
Zakaria Mohieddin established Internal Security (9) by restoring the police apparatus with the same system established by the British, with the separation of all elements whose loyalty is suspected, and transforming the secret police department into the General Investigation Department, whose name was changed in 1971 to the State Security Investigations.
The largest example of this was the officer "Mamdouh Salem", who was an officer of the political police during the reign of the king and then continued to work within the State Security Investigations in the post-July 1952 period, where he became the director of the Alexandria investigations after the July coup, and later Sadat appointed him as Minister of the Interior instead of Shaarawy Juma.
The Director of Investigation is responsible to the Minister of Interior and Deputy Minister for State Security Affairs.
As for the district administrations in the mabahith, they are directly responsible to the leadership in Cairo, not to any local authorities of any kind. These departments recruit a wide network of informants, some of whom appear in public, and some of them disguise to collect secrets, and the rest is distributed secretly within institutions, associations, companies and various political forces. .(9)
Then the General Intelligence Authority was established in December 1953, and its first head was Khaled Mohieldin, and the thinker Azmi Bishara points out that there are several reports indicating that the United States paid directly after the 1952 coup an amount of one million dollars for surveillance and wiretapping equipment for the police and riot control tools. .
The US intelligence also carried out planning and training work, and Hassan Al-Tohamy was the contact man between the new regime and US intelligence.(9)
Salah Nasr tells that he had studied intelligence organizations around the world and then came up with an appropriate form of intelligence organization suitable for the situation in Egypt, and this organization was closer to the organization of American intelligence, he says: "The specific task of the General Intelligence Service was to be a political and economic intelligence system...The military intelligence was separated and became It reports to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. As for the General Investigations, it reports to the Minister of the Interior, and its duty is related to the interior and is concerned with groups and partisan, labor, journalist, student and other activities, meaning that its activities are related to the interior, i.e. internal political security.”(9)
Egyptian historian Khaled Fahmy (communication sites)
Historian Khaled Fahmy comments: "This has been accompanied by a growing trend of militarizing the police and eliminating its civilian character, even if it is not formally affiliated with the army. Police officers in their academy do not learn law; And this is what later resulted in one of the biggest problems and crises for the police and the people together, which is the issuance of Law 127 of 1980, known as the Military and National Service Law, which established and codified the principle of Egyptian citizens’ judiciary for their military service within the Central Security Forces, with tens of thousands of people serving annually. They pay from the age of three to protect the system, not the state and its borders, and the enemy has become the sons of the homeland inside, and these are now the ones the conscript faces during his military service. (10)
The leader did not leave power except carried on his back, leaving behind an empire ruled by the General Investigations, State Security and General Intelligence, fourteen thousand arrest warrants with one hundred thousand Egyptian citizens who have entered detention in general, with an unknown outcome of crimes of torture, systematic murder, political assassinations and a state that lies under The rule of iron and fire.
The police declare war on the people.. the sunrise of the new guard
Before the leader’s soul left his body, and after the 1967 setback and the humiliating defeat of the Egyptian army and the Nasserist project, specifically on March 3, 1969, Abdel Nasser gave a speech in which he announced the fall of the intelligence state, leaving the internal field for the work of the internal security services and the detectives, meaning that the intelligence services directed Its work is abroad, and the State Security Investigations agencies take over the process of oversight and restrictions on freedoms, and the number of officers in the government decreased from 66% in 1967 to 21% in 1970, and the Arab Socialist Union controlled appointments in 367 public companies that Abdel Hakim Amer controlled from During the appointment of soldiers at the top of her pyramid. (11)
In 1969, the Central Security Forces were established to place a section of conscripts in the army under the command of the Ministry of the Interior, with the aim of keeping the army away from the tasks of suppressing the people in the protests, and the number of members of these forces in 1970 reached ten thousand soldiers, who turned into a fully equipped army, independent of armament and administration. After the death of Abdel Nasser. With Sadat's assumption of the presidency of Egypt, the influence of the interior ministers and their security services was strengthened, and the power of the position was strengthened in relation to the political system. In order to impose a curfew, the Minister of Interior after January 1977 became the strongman in Egypt immediately after the head of state, “that is, the state turned into a security state.” (11)
And the number of Central Security tripled, even though those forces were of limited cost, as the salary of the conscript did not exceed six pounds per month. (11) Then the political tensions accompanying the new policies of openness and peace with Israel escalated, until it ended with the assassination of Sadat, leaving behind the security hordes The central bank and a country simmering on a hot tin. In that atmosphere, the security state was formed during Mubarak’s era, and the January uprising demanded its downfall, while the military government restored it anew.
In the afternoon of the Third Republic of Terror
Mubarak came at a time when the political forces included new crowds of opponents of the regime angry at the failure of the July state on its promises, especially the change in economic policies and peace with Israel, and the increase in the national sentiment hostile to those policies. Mubarak tried to absorb the angry political forces, so the detainees were released in September 1981 within The cases of the assassination of Sadat, and he tried to appear tolerant and more moderate, but the rebellion events that took place in the heart of the central security camps and then in Upper Egypt brought the regime back to its true security face, reaching the height of its security brutality.
The surprise that shook the July state during Mubarak’s era came on February 25 and 26, 1986, when tens of thousands of angry Central Security soldiers went out in protest demonstrations calling for an improvement in their living conditions, and as happened in January 1952 at the Ismailia Police Department, events began This time near the capital, Cairo, the rebellion began from two central security camps: the first on the Cairo-Fayoum road, and the second on the Cairo-Alexandria road, where soldiers rushed to the streets after rumors circulated about a decision extending the period of compulsory recruitment of central security personnel from three years to Four years, plus the government slightly cuts soldiers' salaries to pay off debts. (11)
The most dangerous movement of the Central Security Forces was in the Tora area, where confrontations intensified between them and the army forces, which used helicopters, and shot a number of them, leaving thousands of them fleeing to the streets carrying their weapons, which increased the concentration of the army and dealt with them violently. Official data indicate that the events have resulted in the killing of 107 members of the Central Security Forces, including 104 in Cairo and three in Assiut, in addition to 719 wounded, while some estimates put the victims in the thousands (11), and thousands of Central Security soldiers were arrested from The sites of the accidents, and about 21,000 soldiers were discharged from service.
Against the background of these events, important changes occurred in the security apparatus, most notably the appointment of Zaki Badr, Governor of Assiut, as Minister of the Interior, which constituted an escalating shift towards violence. Politics and Islamic currents.
Zaki Badr was known for his violent approach to dealing with opponents in general and Islamists in particular, and executing them in the field outside trial. He also tightened emergency law procedures, and the strength of the security apparatus grew and reached its zenith during Mubarak’s rule, “where the armies were practically marginalized in exchange for the internal security sectors, especially the security forces.” The Central Bank, which witnessed a boom in the quality of armaments and even food and clothing after the 1986 rebellion, also increased the police force from one hundred thousand people in 1974 to one million in 2002, to form during the era of Minister of Interior Zaki Badr about 21% of the total workforce in the state sector. The rate became about 25 security men per thousand citizens, which is one of the highest rates in the world.” The budget of the Ministry of Interior increased from 3.5% to 6% of the total domestic income between 1987 and 2000, and the salaries of the police force increased from 819 million pounds in 1992. to 3 billion pounds in 2002. (11)
Zaki Badr, former Egyptian Minister of Interior (communication sites)
After the attempt to assassinate Mubarak in Addis Ababa on July 26, 1995, the political regime’s dependence on the security services increased, from state intelligence and security investigations, and the influence of the police increased after its transformation into an institution for social advancement. Mubarak, in his capacity as director of the news sector, said, "There are those who are ready to pay bribes of up to 200,000 pounds to accept their children in police colleges. The officer's job secures a socio-economic ladder that any middle family yearns to possess to improve their social status."
With the entry of Egypt into the twenty-first century, the police institution in Egypt has become a fully politicized institution in favor of the political system (12), but it has completely separated from any legal rules, and cruel practices of torture and murder have become the basic behavior, in addition to the use of former criminals who are sentenced to death or life imprisonment. To be like hounds or thugs under the obedience of police officers, "and these people were seen in security directorates and police headquarters sitting in leadership ranks in return for their assignments, until they had constant influence and influence in their areas for years." (12)
The security mentality governs Egypt
On January 25, 1989, the Police magazine conducted an opinion poll in which it called on readers to highlight the negatives they see in the Egyptian police apparatus. They belong to different intellectual currents, and its results are a shocking reflection of reality.
Nearly a third of them mentioned that the major negative aspects of the police force are the “bad treatment received by the ordinary citizen, i.e. non-political opponents, from the security men in the streets and in the police stations, and about six or seven writers mentioned that the police’s lack of respect for the laws is the first reason, The opinions of the rest were divided between the police’s interest in political security at the expense of criminal security, and the poor general appearance of its members.. Some of those surveyed mentioned facts they witnessed themselves that included verbal and moral violations of citizens’ dignity, and violence and physical assault on their bodies.”(13)
For example, the satirist Mahmoud Al-Saadani described the situation of an officer, “His car broke down in the street, so he hit a young passerby who refused to obey his order and help the soldiers push it, then another scene of a citizen receiving blows with his paws and fists while being arrested in the street without To show any resistance to the police, and thirdly to an officer who used obscene words to insult a number of simple workers and peasants traveling to Iraq without any understandable reason.
Writer Sakina Fouad expressed her dissatisfaction with the behavior of the police, writing: "As if the police are no longer serving the people, and that they are at odds with them." In the same context, the Minister of Interior at the time, Zaki Badr, denounced the defense of human rights activists for the right of the citizen to receive dignified human treatment without violence or abuse. .(13)
However, this poll and that freedom to write opinions and debate has ended forever, and that was the last poll conducted by the Egyptian government about anything related to anything, and it came in 2002 only with a huge bill of torture, violence and killing practiced by the Egyptian police. Citizens reported being subjected to torture in it, and its number reached thirty-eight, while in the period between 2003 and 2006, the number reached more than eighty-eight police stations, in which violence and torture were practiced.(13) Torture, humiliation and violence have become a common and usual pattern against any person from By the police, the number of people who were subjected to violence and torture more than tripled between 2000 and 2008, and then doubled after that, God willing, during the reign of the general.
The security mind divides Egypt into three separate sections with feeble borders that can easily be crossed or changed: the section of friends, the section of enemies, and then a section of all those who are not classified
During Mubarak’s rule, the security mind of the political system in Egypt matured, and after repeated confrontations with his Islamist opponents in 1954 and 1965, then confronting the 1968 and 1972 protests, then the 1977 protests, then confronting the central security rebellion in 1986, and the war on Islamic currents during the 1990s, the formation of The collective mind of the security apparatus in Egypt, a mind that is characterized first by complete loyalty to the political system of the State of July and hostile to any political trend outside it, and secondly, the Islamists are the first opponent of that political system, and any manifestation of religiosity is a trend of extremism that may constitute a threat to the political system and necessarily to the security apparatus The Islamic security apparatus sees nothing but demons who want to steal power from them. (14)
In light of this, the security mind (15) divides Egypt into three separate sections with feeble borders that can be easily crossed or changed: the section of friends, the section of enemies, and then a section that includes all those who have not been classified, that is, "coexisting with the situation." The regime ascends to the category of friends those who are assigned senior and leadership positions, elects them to close circles, puts in their hands the vocabulary of power and shines the spotlight on them. As for the enemy, the oppressive hand of the regime turns to it to impose complete control over it, and to confirm that these bad guys are not safe and not out of reach. And that the interest of the system is above all and above the law.
As for the third category, the regime considers it the category of the marginalized people who do not belong to any political faction or a clear ideological trend, and are only interested in ordinary life and its requirements, but they are always nominated by the security as a reserve list for the enemy group, as long as they remain without any grumbling even if the matter threatens their lives, they must die. Silently, or else the police would immediately add them to the enemy category, until that box expanded at the end of Mubarak’s rule and the current rule to accommodate the huge mass of the people. (15)
All previous political events and changes in the security mindset led to the spread of wasta and nepotism
Hadi Al-Alawi summarizes the matter by saying: “The regime’s pillars have an incentive to seize power, as it is a value independent of the state’s social function, enabling it to achieve special interests, and to monopolize the benefits provided by the state leadership, which in turn results from owning a tool of oppression and the ability to direct others. And the management of society, and when there are many incentives for repression, it deviates from the practice of violence from the purely political purpose to become part of the daily behavior, i.e. a tendency with which all groups of society are dealt with in their different locations.” (15)
The Egyptian police is a hotbed of corruption and tyranny
All previous political events, changes in the security mind, and the transformation of the security apparatus into private property of the political system led to the spread of wasta and nepotism, and every major general or important man sought to enroll his son in the Police College in order to spend the conscription period or to secure a job under the auspices of his father after graduation, or to cross it to join the prosecution service and judiciary.
Economist Abdel-Khaleq Farouk believes that the Egyptian security apparatus is one of the largest security agencies in the world, in terms of size and number. The number of Ministry of Interior personnel increased from 214,000 in 1970 to more than 1.5 million, including spy networks, guides and informants on the eve of the January 25 revolution. / January 2011. Farouk adds that this huge size of the security establishment has been filled with administrative corruption, which starts with the corrupt selection of most of the ministry’s leaders and their important positions, such as: “State Security - Prisons Authority - Security Directorates,” and extends to kinship ties to the leadership of the ministry or those around them.
“The minister also used the license he brought in with the amendments to the Police Authority Law regarding the renewal of senior and middle leaders, starting from the rank of colonel to major general, and excluding anyone who was suspected of loyalty or non-compliance with orders.. For example, for the department’s investigation unit, some heads were chosen The department’s investigations have specific specifications, including that he has the ability to rig elections and tame thugs in his district to suppress political opponents and voters, as well as his ability to create a network of relationships with merchants and contractors in his district to illegally gain apartments, land and business, and this can only be done with the satisfaction of his leaders even He enjoys this corruption.” (16)
"كذلك يتم اختياره بناء على قدرته على الاهتمام ببلاغات الكبار والأثرياء، وهذا بفضل الإحصائية الشهرية التي تطلب من ضباط المباحث، هذا فضلا عن أمناء الشرطة أو الأفراد الذين تولوا أعمال بلوكامين المباحث، والذين أثروا من عملهم بفرض إتاوات على المجرمين والمتهمين، بالإضافة إلى تلقي رُشًى من سائقي الميكروباصات وسيارات النقل والأجرة في مزلقانات القطارات، ومواقف الميكروباصات نهارا جهارا بالطريق العام، نظير التغاضي عن تحرير المخالفات، أما مأمور المركز أو القسم فكان يتم اختياره بمواصفات القيادات نفسها، مطيع لقياداته في تنفيذ التعليمات ولو ضد القانون، وطالما له ملف يكون أداة في يد مدير الأمن ينفذ أي شيء من أجل البقاء والصعود للمناصب الأعلى".
ولا يكتمل مستنقع الفساد الذي تغرق فيه مؤسسة الشرطة إلا بكشف تورط وزارة الداخلية بأكملها في أنشطة تجارية واقتصادية، تصل لتورط بعض كبار رجال الأمن في شبكات لتهريب الآثار وبيع المخدرات وغسيل الأموال، والاستيلاء على أراضٍ وأموال عامة. وتنفق الوزارة الملايين على شراء شاليهات ووحدات سكنية، واستخدم رجال الأمن نفوذهم في تأسيس مشروعات تجارية كبرى دون تكاليف وبتسهيلات حصلوا عليها بصفتهم الوظيفية، ثم تولي مناصب حكومية مثل منصب المحافظ بعد خروجهم على المعاش.(16)
وأدّى تغول مباحث أمن الدولة المعروفة حاليا بـ "الأمن الوطني" في مفاصل الدولة لدرجة طلب كشوف بأسماء المتقدمين للوظائف الحكومية وبعض الشركات الكبرى خاصة شركات الطاقة والبترول، والكشف على سجلهم السياسي، وإبداء الموافقة أو الرفض بناء على رأي مباحث الأمن الوطني.(16)
In light of all this, it becomes clear how the police came to be in contrast to what happened on January 25, 1952, and we understand why it is difficult for policemen to take a courageous political stance or to stand up for justice or even human conscience, and we conclude that the police need To radical changes in its administrative and structural structure in order to return to the task of maintaining security and administering justice, and not as a tool of repression in the hands of the ruling regime.