It considers its nuclear program an "insurance policy" against any external aggression

Iran has all the material and intellectual expertise needed to produce a nuclear bomb

• US-Israeli military exercise a clear message to Iran's nuclear program.

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• The Iranian delegation during the talks to revive the nuclear agreement in Vienna.

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In the months since the resumption of talks aimed at reviving the Iran nuclear deal, Tehran has been declaring that it has crossed one technical obstacle after another in its nuclear program as it continues its path, and some ask: Why is Iran doing this?

The answer to this question is still not clear.

But for some nuclear proliferation experts, Tehran may at least believe that it will eventually have to obtain an "insurance policy" to break this pattern that brings it very close to having a nuclear weapon.

Iran insists, as it has been claiming for years, that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.

Towards the end of the year, CIA Director William Burns said the United States still saw no signs that Tehran might use its program as a weapon.

For many nuclear proliferation experts, Iran's announcement of advances in its nuclear program is largely aimed at bolstering its position at the negotiating table, as it seeks relief from sanctions imposed by former US President Donald Trump after withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018.

Iran's achievements in this area include increasing stockpiles of enriched uranium to levels of purity much closer to those required to fuel a nuclear bomb, and installing hundreds of increasingly sophisticated centrifuges designed to produce this enriched uranium.

But what worries a growing number of nonproliferation analysts is how Iran's unbridled nuclear program and technical advances since 2018 have brought it unequivocally closer to becoming a country on the cusp of a nuclear capability, meaning it has all the physical and intellectual expertise needed to produce bomb in a short time.

Without an agreement that reimposes restrictions on Iran's program with the return of the agreement and the repeal of Trump-era sanctions, "raising the armaments threshold may become an attractive option for Iran," says Susan Dimaggio, a fellow on Iran and North Korea at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

And she adds, "If the diplomatic track fails, we should not rule out that Iran will seek to move to a more advanced program as an insurance policy."

Indirect talks between the United States and Iran resumed last November 29 in Vienna after a five-month hiatus, but no progress was made as the United States responded to Tehran's extreme demand for a full lifting of sanctions by doubling the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" campaign.

Talks came to a sudden halt late last year, when Iranian negotiators said they needed time to consult with their government, prompting European powers to lead diplomatic efforts to salvage the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, warning that there were only "weeks" left to reach a deal before it reached Iran's nuclear program. Fast progression range.

North Korea's precedent

The idea of ​​taking nuclear weapons as an insurance policy did not originate in Iran, but dates back more than a decade to failed US-North Korean diplomacy.

Regional experts now say Pyongyang's decision to develop nuclear weapons was a way to protect the regime from American destruction.

Some analysts say the main difference between North Korea and Iran is that the Iranians have not decided to arm their nuclear program.

What some worry, however, is that the United States is now using an approach with Iran similar to the one it used with North Korea, but expects a different outcome.

"In terms of comparing North Korea to Iran, we're still really taking one approach to getting them to give up their nuclear weapons program," says Jim Walsh, senior research associate at the Cambridge Institute for Security Technology Studies in Massachusetts. "Either way, the primary American tool is sanctions, and the idea is that we can impose enough pain to get them to do what we want," he adds. Instead, North Korea and Iran decided that the best response was to expedite the completion of their nuclear programs. In both cases this resulted in a coercive failure.

It seems that not everyone agrees on that.

Many experts assert, for example, that the early sanctions imposed by the administration of former President Barack Obama on Iran were instrumental in persuading Tehran not to go beyond the limits imposed by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on its nuclear program.

For others, however, this does not change the fact that in the case of both Iran and North Korea, US rejection of diplomatic agreements early on in the two countries' nuclear programs encouraged both to move forward.

"Let's remember we had a chance to make a deal with Iran in 2003, when they had about 300 centrifuges," says Dr. Walsh. "But because the United States said we don't want centrifuges, the deal collapsed, and they now have 19,000." A centrifuge, and they are talking loudly about storing 60 percent highly enriched uranium.”

As for North Korea, DiMaggio notes that the administration of former President Bill Clinton reached a framework agreement with Pyongyang aimed at eliminating its nuclear program in the bud.

"But after the presidential transition from Clinton to George W. Bush, the agreement was cancelled," she says, as the new administration decided that the deal was essentially an appeasement of North Korea.

Now Pyongyang is believed to be expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing missiles that could carry those weapons.

different regional context

Despite the similarities between the trajectories of North Korea and Iran, there are key differences that could prevent Iran from becoming a de facto nuclear power.

On the one hand, DiMaggio warns that the two countries' regional contexts are quite different.

"North Korea had nothing like Israel to rub against," she says, referring to Iran's arch-rival, "but in fact, if anything, Korea has China, which in some ways is its only and very important friend."

Indeed, President Joe Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, has traveled to Israel to consult on Iran, while the two allies' militaries are discussing organizing joint exercises to thwart Iran's much-advanced nuclear program.

For some, such exercises are meant to force Tehran back to the negotiating table and be more open to concessions in order to bring the JCPOA into action.

While Iran is working towards closer ties with both China and Russia as a strategic counterweight, no one comes close to North Korea's strong friend, China.

The way back to mutual trust?

If the talks fail and Iran chooses to continue its march toward the nuclear threshold, Walsh says, there is no reason to believe that military strikes will deter Tehran.

Alternatively, Iran may resort to this insurance policy.

And he goes on: "Suppose we bomb them, they have a good chance of deciding that they are a nuclear state and that they are building a bomb."

To avoid this outcome, DiMaggio says, the United States will have to back off the maximum pressure campaign, while both the United States and Iran will have to muster a key ingredient for successful diplomacy between adversaries — mutual trust.

• Without an agreement that re-imposes restrictions on Iran's program with the return of the United States to the agreement and the abolition of Trump-era sanctions, "raising the armament threshold may become an attractive option for Iran."

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