Congo Hold-up: how to transfer millions abroad?

UAC is a company well known to the Congolese.

In the city centers of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, its signs are omnipresent.

© RFI

Text by: Sonia Rolley Follow

34 mins

The US Treasury has already sanctioned foreign actors operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for corruption and money laundering.

The Congo Hold-up investigation reveals the existence of another network suspected of illicit fund transfers.

While massive embezzlement takes place, this network has managed, in four years, to transfer nearly $ 350 million to accounts abroad.

Survey carried out with PPLAAF, Mediapart and the EIC network.

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Nizal, Nil Shop, Aliya, SMB, Boboto, Mapendo business, Tuendeleye, DK Doing Business and Karibu.

These are the names of establishments and companies created in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in recent years and which, for a few months and without the knowledge of all or almost, transferred each year hundreds of millions of dollars of money. liquid abroad.

This is one of the latest revelations of Congo Hold-up, an international investigation based on the leak of more than 3.5 million documents and millions of bank transactions from BGFIBank, obtained by the NGO Platform for the protection of launchers. Africa Alert (PPLAAF) and the French information site Mediapart.

We have identified several dozen suspicious establishments and one-person companies that operated at the BGFIbank between 2015 and 2019. They operate in communities, there is only limited information about them.

In a few months and with no apparent activity, these entities received hundreds of millions of dollars in cash and transferred them by wire transfers abroad.

Many do not even have a legal existence or when they do, these establishments are reduced to a single individual, most often unknown, who brews millions of dollars overnight, without any publicity, before falling back into forgetting.

It is difficult, at this time, to establish the source of funds transferred from the DRC to abroad. Due to the low number of bank account holders, the DRC is a country where cash circulates. And often for dubious purposes, hundreds of millions of dollars disappear each year in cash from the accounts of public institutions and enterprises, including those of the Central Bank, despite very clear legal provisions. Officially, withdrawals or deposits of more than 10,000 dollars in cash should be accompanied by proof of their origin.

The issue of laundering illegally collected funds in the Congo is of growing concern abroad and in particular in the United States. All dollar transactions pass through the American banking system, including between banks operating within the DRC. Several dozen people and businesses have been sanctioned by the US Treasury for corruption and terrorist financing over the past decade. For the American financial intelligence unit FinCen, the DRC is a country at risk.

The analysis of these suspicious single-member establishments and companies, which have or have had accounts at the BGFI, remains preliminary.

It was carried out by a group of journalists and researchers including investigators from PPLAAF.

It covers a sample of nine companies that are among the largest in terms of transaction volume.

Their names: Nizal and the Boboto, Mapendo Business, Tuendeleye, SMB, DK Doing Business, Nil Shop, Aliya and Karibu establishments.

Aliya, a suspicious institution that operated at the BGFIbank between 2015 and 2019 © PPLAAF / Mediapart

Indicator # 1: ephemeral companies that transfer millions abroad

These signs are all unknown to the general public in Congo. However, in less than four years, between 2015 and 2019, they collected in cash and transferred abroad for nearly 350 million dollars. This colossal amount has been reached by a multitude of "small" transfers, involving tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. These operations have therefore gone almost unnoticed in a country where fund transfers number in the millions. Congo Hold-up data also establishes that these companies transferred, in a coordinated manner, these funds to a limited number of correspondents: more than 500 people or companies, mainly abroad.

Six of our establishments (Boboto, DK Doing Business, Nil Shop, Tuendeleye, Mapendo and SMB) without apparent links between them, thus sent, between January 2017 and August 2018, in one hundred installments, the sum of $ 18 million to a UAE based company named Atlantic Traders FZE.

There is no guarantee that this is the ultimate beneficiary of this money.

Another four send five million in 45 transfers to another Hong Kong-based company, Hong Yu International Shipping Agency Co LTD.

The apparent recipients of these transfers are, for the most part, based in these two financial centers, the United Arab Emirates and Hong Kong.

But they are also found in dozens of countries around the world, from China to the British Virgin Islands via the United Kingdom, France and many African countries.

► 

Indicator # 2: financial flows similar to those of Congo Futur

These establishments were confused by the compliance department of the BGFI with those of the Congo Futur group,

in the DRC and linked to the Tajeddine siblings.

This family, originally from southern Lebanon, has hit the headlines several times.

In Belgium, in 2008 and 2009, some of its members were convicted of money laundering and fraud.

In the United States, three of the brothers have also been placed on the Treasury blacklist, accused of being major financial contributors to Hezbollah.

The Congo Futur group itself ended up being sanctioned in 2010.

In 2017, after the revelations of the NGO The Sentry on the continuation, despite these sanctions, of the activities of Congo Futur companies at the BGFI Bank, an internal investigation was carried out to identify them.

In a memo dated November 24, 2017 to its general management, Adonis Muamba Mantuila, head of the compliance department of BGFI DRC produced a comparative analysis of companies that have similar characteristics to those of Congo Futur companies, could operate on his behalf. and money laundering.

" 

 ", he explains.

Glory Group does indeed belong to the Congo Futur group, the compliance department of the BGFI implicitly recognizes this by recommending the closure of its accounts.

But for the other Nizal company, belonging to our sample, Adonis Muamba Mantuila recommends " 

 " a field visit "in

”.

Despite this demand, Nizal will continue to conduct transactions

BGFI for another month.

► To read also: Congo Hold-up: the biggest leak of bank documents in Africa

The Congo Hold-up survey proves that there are indeed links between the establishments in our sample and the companies of Congo Futur.

We find, for example, common beneficiaries between Nizal, the Aliya and SMB establishments, three of the companies about which our investigation led us to question us and Glory Group, Kin Trading, Afri Food or Union Invest on the Lebanese side.

They all paid money from the same correspondents: Sweet Road Industry and Trading Co, Vital Solutions Pte Ltd, African Ocean Trading, Jiangmen Sonic Industrial, Intercontinental commodities, ICC Oils and Fats.

So many companies whose leaders are difficult or impossible to identify.

E-mails also attest that managers of companies linked to Congo Futur and those of our establishments exchange information on transfers. 

It is thanks to Congo Hold-up, the biggest leak of banking documents in Africa, that these financial flows have been identified: without access to these millions of documents and banking transactions, the control services have no access to them. been able to establish all the links between these entities.

The Future Tower was the headquarters of Congo Futur.

© Imcongo.com

Indicator # 3: Limited or false legal information

Among those we have analyzed, one of the companies that causes the most questions is the one with the highest volume of deposits and transfers. His name: Nizal. Between March 2016 and January 2018, this company collected more than $ 135 million in deposits in its BGFI account. Concretely, these funds are deposited in cash in several branches of the BGFI distributed throughout the country. Mainly in Kinshasa, the capital, in Lubumbashi in the former province of Katanga, and Mbuji-Mayi in Kasai-Oriental. Nizal will transfer 138 million abroad in the same period.

But Nizal's activities astonish BGFI: in an email of July 11, 2017, Paris-based BGFI Europe Chief Compliance Officer Eve da Silva explains why she wants to block transfers from this company : "

(and the diversity of their activities as well),

”. Mrs. da Silva is also irritated at not having obtained the articles of association of the company and other official documents: “

"

When Nizal's statutes were finally communicated to the BGFI fifteen days later, Madame da Silva was not reassured. These documents explain that Nizal was officially created on December 31, 2015 and is dedicated to an anthology of activities: "

”. The author of these statutes even felt obliged to extend it further: "

" . In short, on paper, Nizal is casting a wide net.

The owner of Nizal would be called Bénie Madumukina Nsimba, he is less than 25 years old and the head of compliance of BGFI Europe does not believe it. It notes that the managers are older than the beneficial owner of the company, that the date of registration of the company and its share capital do not correspond to the data provided by the Congolese trade register. She always wonders by email: "

".

Eve da Silva also seems to tick off the name of the manager who is ten years older: Mahmad Munir Khwaja Zulfikar. He is an Indian national, born July 4, 1982 in the state of Gujarat. She is interested, because she has already noted that Mahmad Munir Khwaja Zulfikar also appears to be the manager of at least one other suspicious establishment: Aliya.

Not everyone is so keen on BGFI.

On October 17, 2016, Mahmad Munir Khwaja Zulfikar sent Moreau Kaghoma, head of the portfolio department in this bank, an Excel table with a list of seven companies receiving transfers ranging from 20,000 to over 310,000 dollars, along with bank details, wording and invoice numbers, but not the supporting documents themselves.

This is a list of transfers made on the same day to India, Hong Kong, China, Korea and Dubai.

It costs almost $ 960,000.

Among the documents that we have been able to consult are several e-mails of this type, all sent by Mr. Khwaja Zulfikar to Moreau Kaghoma.

When questioned, the former banker declined to comment, preferring to refer to the BGFI.

Mahmad Munir Khwaja Zulfikar did not follow up on our questions either.

Blessed Madumukina Nsimba could not be reached.

A National Transfert shop in Kinshasa.

© RFI

Indicator # 4: businessmen from the same community

Mr. Zulfikar is a trader based in the DRC.

He is the co-founder of several companies including Ghadeer and National Transfert Services, a money transfer service.

His best-known brother and partner, Tofik, is based in Lubumbashi.

The latter is a manager or partner in around fifteen companies, including Unity and its subsidiaries.

He appears as a contact person on the website of a company receiving transfers from these networks.

Tofik and his partner Mirat Virani are rising figures in the Lubumbashi business community.

They are credited with the ownership of chain stores such as the Rani Group, Megastore or even the development of Interpetrol service stations in the former Katanga.

Brands or companies that are booming, but whose owners are difficult to identify.

Partners of the two businessmen, all Indians, are among the recipients of transfers from our nine companies.

When contacted, neither Tofik Khwaja Zulfikar nor Mirat Virani answered our questions.

They are not the only Indian traders to have a storefront and whose company is cited in the Congo Hold-up investigation. This is also the case for Kamlesh Shukla, the president of the Indian community of the DRC and boss of the African Trade Union (AUC). Our investigation established links between this company and two of the nine suspicious establishments: Nil Shop and SMB. 

UAC is a company well known to the Congolese. In the city centers of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, its signs are omnipresent. UAC SARL has, according to its website, eleven stores in these two agglomerations and 17 showrooms and service centers in the eight largest cities of the DRC. It imports " 

" including the Korean brand Samsung. Her boss, Kamlesh Shukla, is a Canadian of Indian origin. His brother, Deepak, is the head of the GG Mart supermarket chain.

What links can be made between UAC and our two suspicious companies? In official records, none. But in several internal letters to BGFIBank, BGFI agents sometimes refer to UAC and Nil Shop as one and the same customer called "Ets Nil Shop / UAC". Officially, Nil Shop would however belong to a certain Nicole Kambia Tshungu. In any case, this is what the BGFIbank will answer to the compliance services which will ask the question.

On other occasions, this link between UAC and the Nil Shop establishment seems to be information stamped with the seal of confidence… On May 4, 2016, an accountant of UAC, Jayesh Kanadia, asks the BGFI for the account statement of the Nil Shop establishment. A first agent of the BGFI refuses this request and justifies it: “ 

 Another BGFI agent then made a strange recommendation to the UAC accountant: " 

 ."

In fact, those in the know are not unaware of the volumes of cash coming into Nil Shop's account and its connection to UAC.

On March 20, 2017, a bank executive asked to meet with the “CEO” of UAC “in 

 ”.

" 

 ", he writes.

► To read also: Congo Hold-up: BGFIBank, the bank of presidents

The email address of the same UAC accountant, Jayesh Kanadia, is also a copy of certain transactions relating to another establishment in our sample: SMB.

SMB's BGFIBank account is only active for a few months, from January 2017 to November 2018, but during that time it will garner $ 53 million in deposits and make $ 52 million in transfers.

The accountant himself is a small beneficiary of this illicit system, he receives a hundred thousand dollars through an establishment which is not under his control: Nizal.

On each of these transfers, Jayesh Kanadia's name is spelled with a different spelling, like many recipients of these funds.

Contacted, the accountant did not respond.

Other documents question the role of UAC: strange invoices in the name of the Korean brand Samsung that it represents.

We are talking about a dozen invoices issued on behalf of two companies, Samsung Electronics South Africa and Samsung Gulf Electronics FZE.

The logos of the Korean company Samsung, pixelated, clearly appear to have been added to non-standardized documents.

 It is the same UAC accountant who requests payment of certain invoices.

In total, 10 million dollars will be paid to these Samsung companies or presented as such between 2016 and 2018. 

Asked by RFI and its partners, UAC boss Kamlesh Shukla denied any link with Nil Shop and SMB.

“UAC only deals with retail and has no connection with these networks,” he explains: “ 

.

He also claims to be the official representative of the Samsung brand in the country, but says he does not know anything about the false invoices, neither of the two Samsung Electronics South Africa and Samsung Gulf Electronics FZE.

The Samsung group did not follow up.

Indicator # 5: from artisanal to industrial

These two companies, which call themselves Samsung, brew millions of dollars.

The first movements identified by our survey took place between May 2011 and December 2013: an unknown establishment, called New African Impex, made transfers to these two companies for amounts that were always identical and their wording had nothing to do with Samsung products. .

Thus, for one year, amounts of 10,000 dollars, that is to say within the legal limit of deposits of cash, are transferred to the two companies as “living expenses” for beneficiaries whose name is specified.

The following year, sums of $ 5,000 to $ 9,000 for "

 " are sent.

In eighteen months, the total amount of payments remains below $ 400,000.

From April 2016, the volume of transactions is racing.

Until August 2018, that is to say in a little more than two years, Nil Shop and SMB, the two establishments managed at the BGFI by the accountant of UAC, transferred to the two Samsung companies nearly 10 million under almost always different pretexts, but in connection with the activities of Samsung.

We also find on these accounts payments from two other establishments in our sample: Karibu and Mapendo.

A billboard promoting UCA products.

© RFI

Another striking case suggests a change of scale in 2016 in the very nature of the establishments that operate these types of transfers: under the effective control of Mahmad Munir Khwaja Zulfikar, the Aliya establishment thus transfers, between September 2015 and June 2016, to nearly $ 34 million to various beneficiaries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, then abroad.

Between September 28, 2015 and January 8, 2016, 22.8 million dollars were transferred to accounts of individuals inside the Democratic Republic of Congo with the same motive: “

”.

There was a four-month break exactly, then on April 8, 2016, transfers resumed, but this time to beneficiaries abroad, individuals and companies that are difficult to identify.

At least $ 11 million will be transferred in less than three months under various reasons, which are regularly summarized under the heading "

".

But we do not find any trace of Aliya in the Congolese trade register before June 2021. This establishment appears there as officially managed by a certain "Panjavani Umedali Chhotalal", an Indian from this same region of the state of Gujarat from where are originally the Khwaja Zulfikar.

Aliya is declared to be domiciled at 188 avenue Basoko in Kinshasa.

We went to this address.

It houses a building that looks like a warehouse and offices.

Asked about the Aliya establishment, two employees hesitate to answer.

A first explains that this establishment moved a long time ago;

the other, which must be referred to the boss.

Neither of them seems to know the manager's name.

Companies are well housed on site.

They are linked to one of the most powerful Indian families established in the DRC: the Dhrolia.

A plaque from Société Immobilière Khasam (Simkha) - now managed by a certain Roshanali Umedali Dhrolia - was even placed under the number 188-190 avenue Basoko.

This family is originally from the state of Gujarat like the other protagonists of this story.

Roshanali Umedali Dhrolia could not be reached, but her son, Rahim Dhrolia, explains that his family " 

" and that this domicile of Simkha " 

 ".

He also says he does not know the mysterious manager.

In any case, he ensures that he has no link with this network of illicit transfers.

188-190 avenue Basoko is also one of the addresses used by the Société africaine de commerce et de développement (Safricode), one of the real estate companies that another member of the family, Sajid Dhrolia, created in 2013. Sajid Dhrolia and his cousin Rahim embody the luxury real estate boom in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi, in the midst of a political crisis, while the Congolese demonstrate against a third term of Joseph Kabila.

We were able to speak with a source close to the Khwaja Zulfikar and these alleged money laundering networks, the latter confirming their change in nature after 2015. “ 

”explains this person who wished to remain anonymous. " 

 ." Our source further specifies that “old families” no longer appear on the front lines of these operations. “ 

 ” she says.

Is the arrival of the Khwaja Zulfikar brothers at the origin of this second generation of establishments which record higher volumes? Our source explains that the adventure of the two brothers began in 2015 with the Congolese company National Transfert Services (NTS). We can still see their offices in the largest cities of the country and this activity is completely legal. But the two brothers would very quickly disappear from the shareholding of this company to develop in parallel a much more lucrative and much less legal activity of transfers of funds abroad, still assures this source. " 

 " says our interlocutor.

What else should we think of the words of our interlocutor about the Indian businessman, Roshanali Umedali Dhrolia? Stavros Papaionnou, the former boss of the Congolese airline Hewa Bora, knows “Papa Dhrolia” well. Roshanali Umedali Dhrolia is one of the former shareholders of this airline. “ 

 ”he testifies. “ 

"

Mr. Papaionnou remembers a "

" man in a "

lawless 

". “He 

.

”, explains his former partner, before adding:“ 

 " 

At the time when he was a shareholder of Hewa Bora, the lifestyle of Roshanali Umedali Dhrolia would have remained " 

 ".

But he “

”, according to Stavros Papaionnou, when he joined the shareholders of a bank, the Congolese Bank, which will quickly close.

This bank had bought back debts from the Congolese State for an amount of 80 million dollars, which had made it bankrupt.

Its chairman of the board, a Lebanese businessman, Roger Yaghi, was arrested on April 18, 2011. His lawyers, at the time, ensure that the file is empty.

The “cousins” Dhrolia, Sajid and Rahim, have built for ten years, in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and Kolwezi most residences and luxury buildings.

(Commercial prospectus).

© RFI

C’est autour de cette période que Stavros Papaionnou dit réaliser, lui aussi, qu’il y a un enrichissement soudain de son ancien associé au contact du système bancaire et que cela dépassait les pratiques d’usurier. « Et j’ai compris que tous les banquiers de Kinshasa savaient. Ils ne l’ont pas dénoncé, car ils se font énormément d’argent avec ce business de blanchiment à l’international. » 

Contactés, ni Mahmat Munir, ni Tofik Khwaja Zulfikar n’ont donné suite à nos questions. Roshanali Umedali Dhrolia est, lui, resté injoignable. Sa famille a vivement démenti être à l’origine ou bénéficiaire de ce type de réseau de transferts illicites.

Indicateur #6 : des commerçants sortis du secteur informel

Parmi les rares destinataires d’argent identifiable de notre échantillon, on retrouve encore plusieurs sociétés liées, là encore, à la famille Dhrolia, bien qu’elles soient difficiles à identifier de prime abord.

Par exemple, trois établissements de notre échantillon (Nizal, Nil Shop et SMB) ont viré au moins 1,3 million de dollars à des sociétés liées à un mystérieux Vinmart Group dont plus d’un million de dollars entre mai et décembre 2016.

À première vue, il s’agit d’un groupe fondé en Tanzanie en 1997. Aujourd’hui, cette information a disparu de son site internet, mais elle figure encore sur ses réseaux sociaux

Aujourd’hui, le Group Vinmart est présenté sur son site comme un conglomérat « bien connu et bien établi » qui fait le commerce « de produits du quotidien ». Quels sont ces produits ? Mystère. La « vision qui a présidé à la création de l'entreprise » était de combler le « fossé en matière d'approvisionnement en produits de base essentiels sur le continent africain ». Ce serait « un réseau commercial stratégique au Canada, aux Émirats arabes unis, en Afrique, en Chine, en Inde et à Hong Kong ».

Plusieurs détails ne collent pas dans cette description. Les seules activités référencées de Vinmart Group se trouvent en République démocratique du Congo. Le groupe assure avoir créé deux fondations : les fondations Vinmart et Kisengo qui disent mener des actions autour du site minier de Kisengo, dans le Haut Katanga, en République démocratique du Congo.

Pour connaître les dirigeants du Vinmart group, il faut littéralement remonter le temps. Sur une version antérieure de son site internet, on retrouve le nom d’un homme d’affaires indien actif en RDC : Chug Chaitanya, qui se fait aussi appeler « Chug Chetan » sur plusieurs sites internet. Tout comme Mahmad Munir Khwaja Zulfikar des établissements Nizal et Aliya et les Dhrolia, Chug Chaitanya est originaire de cette même région de l’État indien du Gujarat. Il se présente comme membre de la branche britannique de l’Association professionnelle de comptables, Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA).

Son principal associé au sein de Vinmart n’est autre que Rahim Dhrolia, le fils de Roshanali Umedali Dhrolia. Canadien d’origine indienne, il est diplômé de l’école de commerce de l’Université de Toronto. Les deux hommes ont pignon sur rue en RDC. Ils sont les dirigeants légaux de sociétés bien connues, présentées par le site du Vinmart Group comme “associées”, entre autres la Société minière du Katanga (SOMIKA) et Mining Mineral Resources (MMR) qui exploite le site minier de Kisengo. Ce sont les populations riveraines de cette mine qui bénéficieraient des actions de la fondation Vinmart et de sa filiale, la fondation Kisengo.

Interrogés sur le Vinmart group, les associés de Somika expliquent par écrit que les deux familles sont « étroitement liées » et que « le groupe Vin Mart n'est pas une entité corporative avec des actionnaires, mais un nom donné à un groupe de sociétés qui ont été établies au fil du temps par les familles ».

Pour expliquer les incohérences dans sa présentation publique, M. Dhrolia et Chaitanya expliquent : « Si le groupe Vinmart a débuté en Tanzanie, son activité principale se situe désormais en RDC ». Quant aux deux fondations, elles ont été mises sur pied, car « depuis sa création, le groupe Vin Mart croit en la nécessité de redonner à la communauté ».

Indicateur #7 : des croissances suspectes ?

Ce n’est pas le seul « groupe » lié à ces familles qui rend publiques des informations incomplètes ou inexactes. Il semble que ce soit la même chose pour le Sanzi Group qui, avant de devenir le groupe SNS, donnait toutes sortes de données inexactes sur son origine et ses chiffres d’affaires. C’était une « dénomination informelle », assure un cousin éloigné, Sajid Dhrolia. Il indique que « le groupe n’existe pas, mais il existe des sociétés contenant le nom “Sanzi” ». 

Depuis le début des années 2010, on doit à cet autre conglomérat la création de deux des principaux groupes de distribution alimentaire en Afrique centrale : Biso Na Biso et sa chaîne de supermarchés Kin Marché en RDC, et Noble Group et sa chaîne Angola Mart en Angola. Ces deux chaînes connaissent sur cette décennie une croissance exponentielle. On assiste à cette même multiplication du nombre de magasins pour les chaînes UAC et GG Mart, liées à la famille Shukla.

Certains de ces commerçants indiens ont également connu une croissance du même type dans le secteur de l’immobilier depuis 2010, un nouveau secteur qu’ils ont investi. Ensemble ou séparément, les « cousins » Dhrolia, Sajid et Rahim, ont construit depuis dix ans à Kinshasa, Lubumbashi et Kolwezi la plupart des résidences et immeubles de luxe, avec Modern Construction (2009), Safricode (2013) et Maisons Super Development (2014)

► À lire aussi :Congo Hold-up: comment sont financées les plus belles tours de Kinshasa?

Nous avons comptabilisé au moins 17 immeubles et résidences édifiés sur cette période : à Kinshasa, ce sont le Congo Trade Center, Kiyo Ya Sita, le Panoramique, la Capitale, le Mirage, la Promenade, la Raquette, le Prestige, le Central, Casa Bella…

In Haut-Katanga, there are almost as many: Index Building, the Dream (Lubumbashi and Kolwezi), Aura, Golf Building, the Residence, Atiya Tower / Infinity Building.

In 2019, Sajid and Rahim Dhrolia won, for the benefit of the Compagnie hôtelière et immobilière du Congo (CHIC), a contract for the construction of three hotels on behalf of the French chain Accor.

Commercial prospectus.

(Illustrative image) © RFI

In 2021, we even owe them Aqua Splash, the first water park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It opened on November 1, 2021. Located in one of the popular districts of the Congolese capital, the municipality of Limete in Kinshasa, the entrance ticket is not accessible to all budgets: the price is $ 35 for adults and $ 25 for children.

Sur plus d’une dizaine d’officiels – issus du gouvernement, de la présidence, du Parlement et des services de sécurité – interrogés dans le cadre de cette enquête, cinq ont pointé, directement ou par l’intermédiaire de leurs sociétés, les familles Dhrolia et Shukla comme appartenant à des réseaux de blanchiment d’argent. Ces officiels disent se baser sur les informations de leurs services, leurs expériences personnelles et dénoncent la croissance des activités de ces familles depuis 2010.

« Certaines de ces familles sont arrivées il y a presque quarante ans, les parents faisaient déjà ce blanchiment, mais à petit niveau », confie un officiel de la République démocratique du Congo. « Ils prétendent importer des biens, mais leurs factures ne correspondent jamais à ce qu’ils importent. Ils font ce blanchiment dans toutes les banques du pays. »

L’officiel ne cache pas son mécontentement et sa frustration : « Ce n’est pas facile d’agir contre eux. Même aujourd’hui, ils sont très puissants. Ils arrivent à faire déplacer un service de sécurité, à faire intervenir un ministre ou un conseiller du président. C’est pour ça qu’ils sont aujourd’hui devenus très dangereux pour l’État congolais. » L’officiel congolais dit manquer de preuves pour convaincre les plus hautes autorités du pays et même redouter pour sa sécurité. « Même maintenant, avec le nouveau régime, ils sont très forts », renchérit-il.

Ces familles de commerçants indiens ont-elles vraiment une croissance anormale depuis dix ans ? Deux membres de ces familles, qui ont préféré garder l’anonymat, s’en défendent. Ils expliquent venir du secteur de l’informel où très peu de relations commerciales étaient formalisées. Elles se seraient nouées entre des familles de marchands indiens qui avaient leurs boutiques sur les marchés, dans un environnement d’affaires très difficile.

Ces sortes de pactes de solidarité auraient donné naissance à ces « groupes » qui auraient mis parfois plus d’une décennie à rentrer dans le secteur formel. C’est ce qui expliquerait que leurs enseignes et leurs tours soient apparus si soudainement dans le paysage congolais. 

But two alleged actors in these networks, Chug Chaitanya and Rahim Dhrolia, do not come from the informal sector.

Graduates from the best schools, they even went into business with the World Bank.

When they started farming in the late 2000s, they had obtained, since 2014, an 18 million dollar loan from the International Finance Corporation (IFC / World Bank) on behalf of two associated companies. at the Vinmart Group: Terra SPRL and African Milling Company Congo (AMCC).

A photo of the Terra project site.

© RFI

Interrogée sur les bénéficiaires effectifs de ces sociétés et d’éventuelles pratiques de blanchiment de fonds, cette filiale de la Banque mondiale, dédiée à la promotion de l’investissement privé, assure avoir, lors de la phase d’évaluation de ce projet, mis en œuvre « un rigoureux processus de due diligence en matière d’intégrité » et « maintenir une position ferme contre l’évasion fiscale, la corruption et le blanchiment d’argent dans les projets qu’elle soutient ».

Pourtant, selon le site de l’IFC, l’actionnaire principal de ces deux sociétés s’appelle Passiflora, une société basée à l’île Maurice, appartenant aux familles Chug, Dhrolia et Rai. Cette île de l’océan Indien vient tout juste de sortir de la liste grise de l’Union européenne sur les paradis fiscaux.

N’en déplaise à la Société financière internationale, des mouvements suspects sont observés vers des sociétés du Vinmart Group deux ans après le début du prêt. Vinmart Limited, Vin Mart HK Limited, Vin Metal Synergies FZCO et Metmin SA PTY LTD vont être impliqués dans le transfert de 1,3 million en 21 virements. Ils sont parfois réalisés ou le même jour, mais pour des montants différents, ou des jours différents mais avec le même montant. Ils ne sont jamais trop élevés pour ne pas attirer l’attention.

Leurs justifications, l’achat auprès de ces sociétés du Vinmart Group de canapé, matériel informatique, téléphone, parfum et même un additif alimentaire. Rien qui ne semble véritablement correspondre à l’objet de ces sociétés.

Interrogés sur ces virements et établissements suspects, Chug Chaitanya et Rahim Dhrolia démentent tout transfert illégal : « Aucune des sociétés Vin Mart ne transfère illégalement des fonds », insistent les patrons de Somika. Ils assurent ne jamais avoir entendu parler les frères Khwaja, expliquent connaître les Shukla comme « membres de la communauté » et « avoir des relations d'affaires avec UAC, propriété de Kamlesh Shukla ».

Deux des ONG partenaires de l’enquête Congo Hold-up se sont penchées sur ces données. « Dépôts de dizaines de millions de dollars en liquide par des sociétés sans réelles activités apparentes, virements bancaires vers des centaines de sociétés dans le monde, principalement dans des juridictions offshore et opaques, factures douteuses, suspicions des départements de conformité », énumère Henri Thulliez, directeur de PPLAAF. « On a là tous les rouages d’une lessiveuse d’argent liquide qui envoie des fonds en grande quantité à l’étranger, à l'abri de tout contrôle. »

Denisse Rudich est l’une des expertes de The Sentry sur la lutte contre le blanchiment d’argent, la corruption. Elle y voit « beaucoup de sujets d’inquiétudes » : « Le recours excessif au cash, l'envoi de plus d'argent à l'étranger que celui qui est enregistré comme étant déposé en espèces ; la présence de sociétés liées par des relations familiales ou communautaires ; le transfert de centaines de millions de dollars à travers le monde, y compris via des pays connus pour être des pays de transit pour le blanchiment d'argent ; la présence de documents frauduleux... ». Pour elle, tous ces éléments indiquent « l'existence potentielle d'un vaste réseau international de blanchiment d'argent ».

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• Congo Hold-up

• DRC

• Joseph Kabila

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