According to its expansionist policies and the Belt and Road Initiative linking Asia with Europe, leading to its “Made in China 2025” strategy, Beijing seeks to achieve political hegemony by employing industrial and technical policies within a group of large economies, whether in Africa, Latin America or Europe.
As it expands its influence within the global system, many fear that China's economic clout, combined with its growth in technological innovation and military power, will allow it to remake the world according to its perspective.
Despite the strengths within this model, reality casts doubt on the possibility of China taking over the reins of affairs internationally, as rich and poor countries, as well as large and small, all over the world realize that China is intrusive into its domestic economic fabric, which makes its independence threatened.
In this regard comes the work of Luke Patey, a senior fellow in the Oil and Gas Program for Africa at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, an independent affiliated with the prestigious Oxford University, and also a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies. He has important publications, one of which is his book “How China Loses: How China Loses The Pushback against Chinese Global Ambitions.
In his book - published by Oxford University Press in 2021 - Patty discusses what he calls "China's expansionist economic agenda" and its impact on political action, as well as military expansion that could undermine its ambitions to control the global economy and global affairs, and it is the book that forms the basis for the Al Jazeera Net dialogue. with him.
The researcher conducted field work during his travels to Africa, Latin America, East Asia and Europe, exemplified by interviewing a number of activists, business executives, diplomats and intellectuals in order to understand the challenges that threaten the rising power of China.
"How China Loses: Resisting China's Global Ambitions" was published by Oxford Press this year (Al Jazeera)
While discussions focus on the strategic competition between China and the United States, Patty's study goes beyond that to show as well the interactions of other countries and regional powers with Chinese ambitions in the world. To the dialogue:
We have recently witnessed that China is pursuing policies towards Africa. There are those who see that it is coming to the so-called "debt trap." Is this true?
Do its policies toward Africa offer solutions, or do they reinforce the continent's crisis and only entrench hegemony within it?
China's participation in Africa includes trade, investment and finance, as well as political, diplomatic and security activities.
It is difficult to generalize China's relations with a continent of 54 countries, but there are some important things that get lost in the details and are important about China's relationship with Africa.
For example, much of China's economic engagement in Africa is directed toward a select few countries.
More than half of China's funding - amounting to $ 153 billion - goes to Africa about 5 countries: Angola, Zambia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria.
In this regard, it is worth noting that South Africa and Nigeria account for 30% of China's trade with Africa.
South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also account for more than a quarter of all Chinese investment in this continent.
China enjoys a positive reputation throughout Africa.
According to a recent survey of the Afro barometer applied in 18 African countries, most of the continent's countries prefer the American development model, and the measure, in contrast, sees that there is no common vision for China in Africa.
It is also important to recognize that there are differences in China's relationship within African countries as well. African elites may prefer the economic benefits that Chinese financing can provide, while local populations and civil society are more critical of the social and environmental consequences of such financing.
Whether trade and investment in China and infrastructure financing result in sustainable development growth in African economies or not will be a critical test for the relationship going forward.
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese economy has become more attractive to foreign investment, does the latter contribute to promoting innovation and growth within China?
On the other hand, can't Beijing's investment in the world's economies be considered a political tool aimed at creating pressure on countries?
This depends on the responses of other major economies, as well as multinational corporations.
On the other hand, Chinese state-owned enterprises and private companies are facing new investment constraints in advanced economies.
For example, the European Union has passed new investment screening policies, and the United States and Japan are critical of Chinese takeovers of their economies.
This closes one avenue for Chinese industries to raise their technological capabilities through overseas acquisitions.
In addition, the superiority of China's economy over other large economies during the COVID-19 pandemic has made it attract large levels of foreign investment, and contributed to the technological advancement of Chinese enterprises, which can also boost China's innovation and growth.
Is Europe's economic dependence on China so important that it could give Beijing the ability to influence European foreign and defense policy at the expense of democratic values?
Europe's economic dependence on China is not real.
China may be the second largest economy in the world and is on pace to become the largest, but this does not necessarily mean access to foreign trade and investment.
Here it should be noted that the proportion of the total EU trade with China is only 6%.
China is Germany's largest trading partner, accounting for 7% of its total trade, but it has roughly similar levels with the United States, France and other countries.
Both the European Union and Germany have a diversified trading portfolio.
They are not dependent on any particular foreign economy.
However, it is difficult to separate skepticism from reality because there are large European companies, such as Volkswagen, that benefit from high levels of sales and profits in the Chinese market.
If the EU is making concessions related to its foreign policy, as well as defending the norms and values of democracy, these decisions are either motivated by a false cover of economic dependence on China or are motivated by vested interests.
When Argentina saw a new president take office in late 2015, he called for the suspension and possible cancellation of multibillion-dollar Chinese infrastructure projects.
How did Beijing respond to the democratic change that threatened its economic interests?
Do domestic pressures from Argentina's private sector, labor unions, environmentalists, and others reflect the broader challenges that China faces in its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative across Africa and Asia?
The election of Mauricio Macri as Argentina's president has reshaped a few big Chinese infrastructure projects.
Macri is no longer in power and many Chinese projects, such as railways and hydroelectric dams, are still under development.
But many agreements have been reformed to promote local interests more closely.
Regarding the existence of workers' demands and protests against the Chinese presence, this shows that despite China's enormous economic power, it needs to adapt to local demands if it is to make the Belt and Road Initiative that came with it succeed.
There are domestic interests competing with Chinese projects within the countries in which Beijing seeks investment.
Most emerging and developing economies are also seeking to achieve a balance by introducing other foreign partners such as the United States, Japan, the European Union and India, in order not to be dependent on China.
Can China's development model find its roots in these regions while advancing its economic and strategic objectives?
I don't see any country in the world that takes the Chinese model of development as its way, simply because they do not enjoy the same local conditions that China lived in in the eighties and nineties, we do not have many countries with a large number of qualified population become factory workers at low cost , helping them exploit the global economy and generate rapid growth.
India may grow astonishingly fast in the coming decades, but it will find it difficult to generate significant growth.
China's success in economic development may inspire other countries to double their governance agendas, but China's authoritarian model also acts as an impediment to advancing some of its economic and strategic goals, such as the rollback of Huawei's global expansion and other Chinese technology.
Today, we are witnessing the strengthening of Chinese investments in the South China Sea countries, which coincided with Beijing taking firm policies towards these countries, after building deep trade relations with its Asian neighbors.
How will China's use of unofficial sanctions, such as the Chinese government's directing its citizens to boycott certain goods, such as what happened with Australia and South Korea?
China's recent economic coercion against Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan serves as a reminder to its neighbors that relations with Beijing are more difficult than they have been in past years.
For many years now, the neighbors' view of Beijing has been positive.
But her recent actions towards them undermined her reputation among her top neighbors.
Even in the emerging and developing economies of Asia, the local population is increasingly suspicious of Chinese investments, fearing that these investments will be used by Beijing against the interests of these countries.
There are those who believe that countries such as South Korea have succumbed to China's economic pressure to prevent it from placing a missile defense force on its border with North Korea.
Is this correct?
Will other neighboring countries be subject to Chinese hegemony?
South Korea has not succumbed to Chinese economic pressure, although Beijing has closed Chinese tourism to South Korea, and Korean companies are facing pressure to allow them to operate in China, but Seoul has moved forward towards establishing a US missile defense system on its soil.
There is a similar misunderstanding about China's economic coercion on Australia, which has been able to send many exports, subject to Chinese trade sanctions, such as coal and barley, to new markets.
The Chinese market is important to them, but the global economy is large and diverse.
Many of the economies targeted by China have not been affected by the sanctions, which also includes Canada, which has been hit by economic sanctions from China.
Here it should also be noted that China also has interests that it does not wish to disturb by putting too much pressure on its economic partners.
Does not what is happening today in the world put us before a new model of international relations, a model based on multipolarity in which it is difficult for one player to dominate the international scene alone?
The world order no longer defines unipolarity, the United States is in relative decline as a superpower.
We are in a multipolar world where the interests of other powers will have a greater impact.
China will be an important player in the future, but it will need to find a way to coexist with other major powers, including the United States, the European Union, Japan and India.
And here I want to point out that those who find ways to compromise and cooperate with others will achieve the greatest success.
If the United States and China continue to push their interests too aggressively, they will fail to realize their global ambitions.
Both Washington and Beijing need to recognize that they are both unfit to be at the heart of the global economy and politics alone.